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I. INTRODUCTION
[I]f a case on the outcome of a presidential election should reach the Supreme
Court.... the Court's decision might well turn on the personal preferences of the
justices.I

Journalists covering the 2000 presidential election controversy have had little trouble reconstructing the events of virtually
every stage of the post-election process, reporting even privileged
conversations among the candidates' lawyers. 2 Yet one critical stage
of the process remains shrouded in mystery: the behind-the-scenes
events at the Supreme Court, 3 which led to its decision in Bush v.
Gore.4 Investigative reporting has produced only a few suggestive
details. 5 The Court has long insisted that it speaks through its opinions, 6 and indeed the Court has left the public with only the Justices' statements at oral argument, and the various opinions themselves, from which to identify the considerations that motivated the
Justices. Undoubtedly, this will not deter law professors, whose
analyses are likely either to construct novel defenses, claiming that

1.
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 70 (1993).

2. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, For Gore, Reasons to Hope Dwindled: Blows Came from Suprente Court, FloridaJudge, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al.
3. Most accounts of the case simply skip from the oral argument to the time at which the
opinions were released. See, e.g., David Von Drehle et al., Anxious Moments in the FinalSiretch:
High Court Stepped in and Wrote StirringFinish,WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2001, at Al.
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
5. The reporting that does seem to reveal details of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering at
the Court does not make clear whether it is based on reliable anonymous sources or on pure
speculation. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al (reporting without attribution that the three most conservative Justices signed onto the per curiam opinion "[iun order to permit the majority to speak with one
voice"); Jeffrey Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 46 (reporting without attribution that Justice Kennedy authored the unsigned per curiam opinion). In
any event, both of these assertions will prove to be plausible inferences from the models we develop infra Parts III and IV.
6. The Court has sought to enforce that norm by preventing law clerks from revealing information about its deliberations. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Canon 3(C) (The relationship between a Justice and law clerk is
essentially a confidential one .... A law clerk should never disclose to any person any confiden.
tial information received in the course of the law clerk's duties .. "); id. Canon 3(D) ("After the
Justice acts, the action and, if there is an opinion, the reasoning underlying the action are matters of public record. Except as authorized, the law clerk should not purport to interpret or try to
explain them."). A former law clerk's decision to chronicle his year at the Court produced criticism from other former clerks. See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 83738 & n.12 (1999) (reviewing EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAIBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE EPic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998)).
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the Justices were acting consistently with constitutional doctrine, 7

or to attack the decision as unjustified and result-oriented, again on
doctrinal grounds. 8 Law professors, however, do not have a good
track record on Bush v. Gore. Although we do not have hard numbers, strong anecdotal evidence suggests that law professors generally predicted that the Court would not even take the case. 9 If law
professors cannot predict when the Court will act, one might ask,
can we confidently rely on law professors to explain what happened
now that the Court has acted?
While we do not have evidence of predictions by judicial politics scholars concerning Bush v. Gore itself, the opening quotation
reveals that at least two prominent judicial politics scholars anticipated the possibility not only of action in such a case, but also of a
result consistent with the Court majority's ideological predilections. 10 For judicial politics scholars, the notion that judges and
Justices pursue their policy preferences is nothing new. That the
five conservatives would vote for Bush and the four liberals would
vote for Gore simply underscores the commonly held belief among
political scientists that Supreme Court Justices vote consistently
with their attitudes, meaning their ideological views.' For judicial

7.
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The UnbearableRightness of Bush v. Gore, 22 CARDOZO L REv.
(forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 1-63, on file with authors); John Yoo, Bush v. Gore: In Defense
of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHi. L. REv. 775, 776 (2001) (arguing legitimacy concerns are

overblown); Note, Non Sub Honine?A Survey and Analysis of the Legal Resolution of Election
2000, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2170, 2174 (2001) (opining that the ultimate resolution was sufficiently
grounded in existing law to satisfy the rule of law norm); Jason F. Jagemann, Partisanship,
Legitimacy, and the Law: A Response to Seth Steinzor's "J'Accuse,"VT. BAR J., June 2001, at 51,
51-52; see also sources cited infra notes 131-33 (defending the outcome of Bush v. Gore, but not
the equal protection holding).

8.
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 28 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 3-37, on file with authors); Michael J. KMarman, Bush
v. Gore Through the Lens of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 4-31, on file with authors); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace,NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18,
18-21; Seth Steinzor, JAccuse, VT. BAR J., June 2001, at 44, 46.47.
9. William Glaberson, Justices May See Task as Calming the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25.
2000, at A12 (reporting that law professors were "startled to learn that the Supreme Court had
agreed to hear an appeal by Gov. George W. Bush"); Knight Ridder News Service, High Court
Intervention Called Unlikely, Nov. 23, 2000, 2000 WL 26097633 (quoting various law professors

stating the Supreme Court intervention in the controversy was possible but unlikely); William
Sherman, Profs Shocked that Justices Step in Election Mess, N.Y. DAILY NEW,.S, Nov. 25, 2000, at
2; see also David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Bush Takes His Case to the U.S. Suprenze Court,

L.A. TLMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at A24 ("Most legal experts agreed that there are long odds against
Bush's actually winning in the Supreme Court if the vote count does not render the case moot.");
Rowan Scarborough, State's Top Court Seen as Voicing Final Word on Vote, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2000, at Al.
10. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also infra notes 1-155 and accompanying text
(discussing the prediction).
11. See infra Part III.A.
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politics scholars, regardless of their own political affiliation, Bush v.
Gore must seem the ultimate academic victory. Yet law professors
might justly rejoin that even if judicial politics models could predict
the outcome, the tools of political science offer little in helping to
understand the subtleties and peculiarities of the opinions themselves. If judicial politics models stop at the 5-4 lineup in Bush v.
Gore, then, at least in thinking about this one case, they offer little
beyond what media pundits already provide. 12 The difference between the judicial politics approach, which proceeds through statistical analysis of databases with a large number of observations, and
that of traditional legal scholars, who largely engage in close doctrinal analysis, helps explain why one scholar has cited this academic divide as a case of "unfortunate interdisciplinary ignorance." 13 Lawyers read but can't count; political scientists count but
don't read.
In this Article, we show how a third field, social choice, can
serve as a link between legal analysis and judicial politics, one that
will allow lawyers to contextualize doctrine and political scientists
to move beyond counting votes. A product of positive economic theory, social choice is most widely known for revealing the possibility
of cyclical preferences when three or more persons are selecting
among three or more options, none of which has first-choice majority support. 14 That is but a special case of collective preference aggregation, and social choice properly understood is as much about
identifying the conditions under which cycling does not arise as it is
about the phenomenon of cycling itself. Although social choice and
judicial politics are ordinarily not considered together, the models
provided by scholars in each field help to explain an aspect of judicial behavior that is outside the other's frame of reference. Judicial
politics scholarship reveals not only that judges' preferences matter, but also that Justices behave in a sophisticated manner in pursuing their policy objectives. 15 Social choice has been used to study
how the Supreme Court's various institutional rules serve to overcome difficulties associated with transforming group preferences

12. See Edward Walsh & James V. Grimaldi, Two Justices Could Hold the Key: O'Connor
and Kennedy May Provide Swing Vote in a Divided Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2001, at Al
(positing that "Gore's lawyers faced the heavier burden ... because the high court's 5-4 ruling
... ordering at least a temporary halt to the manual recounting of thousands of votes in Florida
suggested that a majority of justices is poised to rule the same way on the merits").
13. See Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal Realism:A Case of Unfortunate
InterdisciplinaryIgnorance,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 309-26 (1997).
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part III.
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into a collective output, thus shaping the development of constitutional doctrine.1 6 Our purpose is as much to connect these two fields
as to explain how both can complement legal analysis. The establishment of such a connection is timely, because a growing and influential body of judicial politics scholarship has moved beyond
mere predictions based on Justices' attitudes, emphasizing instead
how judges may deviate from their direct preferences for strategic
gain.' 7 This literature has moved judicial politics scholars' object of
study toward that of law. While the fields are coming together, a
gap persists, one that we believe social choice is uniquely suited to
bridge.
We illustrate the connection between judicial politics and
social choice by applying both disciplines to Bush v. Gore. This
choice may inspire an immediate objection of selection bias, for it is
an extraordinary rather than an ordinary adjudication. Even if we
can show that there is something "political" happening in Bush v.
Gore, the objection goes, that does not mean that political decision
making is commonplace. We will not apologize for choosing a case
that appears to make our argument stronger rather than weaker.
But our analysis is not designed to show that judicial decision making is more often political than legal. To the contrary, our thesis is
that the institutional features and norms of the Supreme Court
sharply constrain strategic behavior. Judicial preferences regarding
how particular cases and issues should be resolved certainly depend, at least in significant part, upon the Justices' attitudes. And
yet, some of the most anomalous features of Bush v. Gore also reveal that Justices behave in response to doctrinal concerns. The
study of a single case, even one as prominent as Bush u. Gore, cannot conclusively establish the persuasive force of judicial politics or
social choice models. But it can provide strong evidence that these
combined theories offer explanations of a number of features of the
case about which traditional doctrinal analysis simply has little to
offer and that neither approach can fully explain on its own.' 8 Of

16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. Using Bush v. Gore to illustrate the political science models we describe also serves a
useful pedagogic purpose. Many law professors will wish to incorporate the decision in their
courses, but because it does not seem to establish a landmark precedent, many will conclude that
they have little to say other than perhaps an endorsement or rejection of its application of constitutional principles. By showing that Bush v. Gore illustrates the value and complementary nature of political science and social choice in enhancing case analysis, we hope to provide law
professors an opportunity to assign an interesting case and illuminate the process of constitutional decision making.
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course, our approach cannot indicate whether the decision was
"right" or "wrong," an issue on which we take no position.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews the
history of Bush v. Gore and breaks down the opinions of the Justices. More significantly, Part II identifies a set of puzzles concerning Bush v. Gore. The primary puzzle is why the per curiam opinion
resolved the case based upon an equal protection analysis rather
than on an alternative ground that many commentators have found
more persuasive. Part II introduces a host of other puzzles as well,
such as why the per curiam opinion seemed to all but resolve a
state law issue despite remanding the case to the Florida Supreme
Court for further proceedings. In Part III, we review two sets of judicial politics theories, and we show how the outcome of Bush v.
Gore reveals the most fundamental insights and weaknesses of
each. The two schools of judicial politics that we consider, attitudinalism and new institutionalism, help us understand the breakdown of votes in the case and provide preliminary-if ultimately
incomplete-answers to the puzzles set out in Part II.
Part IV considers the implications of social choice for Bush v.
Gore. We use the theory to suggest three progressive models that
explain the underlying dynamics that we believe may have contributed to some of the case's more peculiar doctrinal features. Assuming that the Justices voted consistently with the predictions of judicial politics, the case threatened to present at least two anomalies:
first, a result at odds with majority issue resolutions; and second, a
potential judgment impasse. The strategic behavior in Bush v. Gore,
and in particular the decision by the most conservative Justices to
sign the per curiam opinion, may have been an attempt to eliminate
these anomalies. We also will demonstrate that the most common
type of strategic behavior, in which Justices embracing more extreme views of how a case should be resolved adjust their positions
toward that of the median Justice to secure a majority precedent,
provides an unsatisfying account of Bush v. Gore. In addition, by
casting Bush v. Gore along a more complex array of issue dimensions, we show that the various coalitions were such that no Justice
had an incentive to yield on either of the two theories supporting a
judgment for Bush as a means to secure a majority precedent or to
affect the case outcome. Paradoxically, the strategic behavior manifested in Bush v. Gore proves the exception to the rule that opportunities for such behavior are generally limited indeed.
We certainly do not claim to have any special means of revealing the Justices' conscious or subconscious motivations. Thankfully, this is not necessary to our analysis. Instead, judicial politics
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and social choice theory allow us to infer the conditions that likely
gave rise to the dynamics of interactive behavior among the Justices in this one very important case, which effectively decided the
outcome of the 2000 presidential election.
II. THE EVENTS, OPINIONS, AND PUZZLES OF BUSH V. GORE
The circumstances up to and including Bush v. Gore are sufficiently familiar that providing a history might seem unnecessary.
We do so in part because future readers will be less intimately familiar with the circumstances that gave rise to this peculiar case.
And more significantly, even for those for whom the circumstances
are familiar, there is a benefit in presenting a common-if brieffactual foundation for the analysis to follow. We are interested not
so much in the political effect of the Court's decision-although that
certainly plays a role in our analysis-but in how individual Justices approached and resolved individual issues. To undertake this
analysis, some background is necessary. We will limit the description in Parts I.A and II.B, as well as our exploration of the opinions in Bush v. Gore, to those features that are directly relevant to
the later analysis, and we will highlight the case's most puzzling
features in Part II.C.
A. The Events
After the polls closed in the quadrennial presidential election
on November 7, 2000, it became clear that the electoral vote outcome would turn on Florida, where the initial count indicated that
Texas Governor George W. Bush had defeated Vice-President Albert
Gore, Jr., by 1784 votes. 19 Under Florida law, the small margin of
victory triggered an automatic machine recount, 20 producing an
even narrower Bush victory. 21 Gore then requested manual recounts
in four counties. 22 Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris,
ruled that these recounts must be completed within seven days of
23
the election, that is, by November 14, to comply with Florida law.
The deadline appeared impossible to meet, and although a lower
19. At the time, Oregon and Wisconsin remained too close to call, but with their combined
eighteen electoral votes, it was clear that Florida's twenty-five electoral votes were the key to the
election. See Decision 2000, 4:00AM (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 8, 2000).
20. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102.141(4) (2000).
21. David E. Rosenbaum, Bush Holds Slim Lead over Gore as FloridaRecounts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2000, at A24.
22. Id.
23. Richard L. Berke, Republican Rejects Offer that Two Sides Accept a Count by Hand,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at Al.

1856

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:1849

court eventually found that the Secretary had acted within her discretion, 21 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary's decision was contrary to Florida law. 25 Invoking its equitable powers,

that court set a new deadline of November 26, effectively extending
the period prior to certification under state law for twelve days
while correspondingly reducing the contest period in which the certification could be challenged. 26 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari under the name Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board27 and unanimously vacated and remanded the
28
Florida Supreme Court decision.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board was a triumph for
those who favor judicial minimalism.2 9 The Court vacated and remanded the case without issuing any definitive rulings on either
federal or state law. 30 Nonetheless, the Court introduced, without

deciding, several issues that would prove important in Bush v.
Gore. The Court explained that although it ordinarily
defers to a state court's interpretation of a state statute ... in the case of a law
enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elections to state offices, but
also to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant
of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. 3 1

This, the Court suggested, might present a potential problem, because the Florida Supreme Court's opinion discussed, and
therefore may have relied upon, the Florida Constitution "without
regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, Section 1, cl. 2, 'circumscribe [state] legislative
power.' "32 Similarly, the Court expressed concern that "Congress
might deem [the Florida Supreme Court's ruling] to be a change in

24. David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Decision 2000/America Waits: Case Before Florida
Justices May Turn on a Legal Phrase;Law: Palm Beach Uses 'Errorin Vote Tabulation'toJustify
Its Hand Counts. Secretary of State Says a Manual Recount Is Only Valid When the 'System' is
Flawed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at A22.
25. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239-40 (Fla. 2000).
26. The Florida Supreme Court's reliance on the safe harbor date in setting the deadline
and providing for a shortened contest period would prove critical later. See infra notes 67-71 and

accompanying text.
27. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 78.

29. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Broad Virtue in a Modest Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at
A29 (embracing the decision as an example of judicial minimalism); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 758 (2001) (evaluating the minimal.
ism of both election decisions).
30. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78.
31. Id. at 76.
32. Id. at 76 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
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the law" that would deprive the state's voters of their ability "to
take advantage of the 'safe harbor' "33 of 3 U.S.C. § 5.34 The purpose
of the remand was thus to allow the Florida Supreme Court to clarify "the extent to which [it] saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2."35
The immediate issue in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, whether the delay in the certification from November 14 until November 26 was permissible, became moot on the latter date because the partial recounts up to that date still provided

Bush an edge, however slight.36 The Florida Secretary of State thus
certified Bush as the winner of the state's electoral votes. 37 Gore,
however, pursued further legal avenues by relying upon Florida's
provisions allowing for election contests. 38 Along with affected voters, Gore filed several legal challenges. 39 In the case that ultimately
would become Bush v. Gore, the Leon County Circuit Court denied
relief in Gore v. Harris,40 and Gore appealed to the Florida Supreme
Court. 4 1 That court reversed the circuit court's decision to deny a

33. Id.
34. That section provides as follows:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the date fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State.
by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have
been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors,
such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and
made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in
the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of
the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). The Court thus explained that the provision "creates a 'safe harbor' for a
State insofar as congressional consideration of its electoral votes is concerned." Bush, 531 U.S. at
77. "Ifthe state legislature has provided for final determination of contests or controversies by a
law made prior to election day, that determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days
prior to said time of meeting of the electors." Id. at 77-78.
35. Id. at 78. The Supreme Court based its authority to remand for clarification on Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940), which stated that although '[ilt is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions...
[i]ntelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases."
36. Michael Cooper, Talk About Fuzzy Math;Numbers Abound in Florida,N.Y. TIMES. Nov.
28, 2000, at A25.
37. Statements on the Certification of Florida's Votes, N.Y. TiiES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A13
(providing excerpts of statements made by Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris and Agriculture Commissioner Robert Crawford, who was serving on the Florida Election Canvassing
Board for Governor Jeb Bush after Governor Bush recused himself).
38. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102.168 (2000).
39. David Firestone, Contesting the Vote: FloridaJudge Is Asked to Declare Gore the Winner, N.Y. TLhIEs, Nov. 28,2000, at Al.
40. No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1790621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2000).
41. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
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recount for "undervotes," those votes identified as not having registered a choice for any presidential candidate, and it ordered that
such votes be subject to a manual recount. 42 The Florida Supreme
Court decision went further than Gore had requested, ordering that
a manual recount proceed in all counties in which such recounts

43
had not yet taken place.
Shortly after the recount began, however, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued a stay. 44 Although
publishing an opinion accompanying a stay order is uncommon,
Justice Scalia, who concurred in the grant of the stay, explained
that its issuance "suggests that a majority of the Court, while not
deciding the issues presented, believe that petitioners have a substantial probability of success." 45 Oral argument was set for the
morning of December 11, 2000, and on the night of December 12,
the case was decided, and soon along with it, the 2000 presidential
46
election.

B. The Opinions
Immediately upon its release, the opinions in Bush v. Gore
generated media confusion. 47 First, the opinion for the Court was
per curiam, leading some to suppose that more than five Justices
supported it.48 Second, the majority opinion reversed and remanded
to the Florida Supreme Court, 49 making it appear possible that the
Supreme Court had left the Florida court with enough wiggle room
to proceed with a recount. Quickly enough, however, it became clear
that there was little, if any, room to wiggle. Five JusticesRehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-supported the
per curiam opinion. In addition to joining the per curiam, Chief

42. Id. at 1260-62.
43. Id. at 1262.
44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (granting stay and certiorari).
45. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring)
46. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
47. See Mike Allen, A Long Day of Waiting for Decision, Then Chaos; Candidates,Backers
and News Media Scramble for Understanding,WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2000, at A30; Howard
Kurtz, Instant Analysis-and Confusion: Sorting Out a ComplicatedDecision, Live and on Tele.
vision, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2000, at C1.
48. Nonunanimous per curiam opinions are unusual but not unprecedented. An early example is United States v. Peters,3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 121, 129 (1795), in which the Court adjourned to
give the parties a chance to settle, and released the opinion when negotiations faltered.
49. This was consistent with traditional Supreme Court practice in state court cases. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the existence of a remand left journalists,
whether they were familiar with this practice or not, unable to decode the outcome without reading the opinions.
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas signed a concurring opinion. 50 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion.51 Souter filed a separate dissent,
part of which appeared to support the principal analysis of the per
curiam opinion.5 2 Breyer joined Justice Souter's dissent unequivocally. 53 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Souter's dissent except with respect to the portion that expressed partial support for
the analysis contained in the per curiam opinion. 5 4 Finally, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer filed separate dissents, which each of the four
dissenting Justices joined at least in part.5 5 The partial disagreement stemmed from an analytical rift over the merit of the equal
protection claim, which ultimately separated the dissenters into
two groups, Justices Souter and Breyer in one camp (acknowledging
at least the possibility of an equal protection violation) and Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg in another (rejecting the equal protection
challenge along with the remaining claims).
The per curiam opinion held that the Florida Supreme
Court's order of a recount of undervotes throughout the state violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court began its analysis by
noting that although the state legislature is empowered to select a
slate of electors for the President and Vice-president on its own,
without the benefit of a statewide election, once it proceeds by
statewide election, it must ensure that the votes cast are equally
weighted.5 6 The Court noted that the articulated standard for the
statewide manual recount, namely the "intent of the voter," was
"unobjectionable as an abstract proposition.5 7 The difficulty, the
per curiam writers reasoned, was that the Florida Supreme Court
had erred in failing to provide "specific standards to ensure ...
equal application" of the intent-of-the-voter inquiry.5 8 This led to

50. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

51. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).

53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 103-05 (majority opinion) (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
57. Id. at 105-06.
58. Id. at 106. The Court recognized that courts are often in the business of determining
individuals' intent. They argued, however, that "the question is not whether to believe a witness
but how to interpret the marks or holes or scratches on an inanimate object." Id. In other words.
while it may be difficult or impossible to create mechanical rules for evaluating issues like credi.
bility, the Florida Supreme Court presumably could have created objective rules for evaluating
paper ballots.
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different standards being applied both within and across counties. 9
The "[s]tate Supreme Court ratified this uneven treatment" by
mandating inclusion of recount totals from counties with different
standards in the certified total. 60 Several other inconsistencies in
the Florida Supreme Court's approach exacerbated the perceived
unequal treatment: the court's allowance of a recount of all ballots
rather than just undervotes in some counties, 61 the court's inclusion
in the certified vote of partial recounts from one county, 62 and the
court's failure to specify who would count the ballots. 63 In enumer-

59. The Court gave two examples of intra-county inconsistency:
A monitor in Miami-Dade County testified at trial that he observed that three
members of the county canvassing board applied different standards in defining
a legal vote ....
Palm Beach County ... began the process with a 1990 guidoline which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule
that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad,
changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per so
rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal.
Id. at 106-07. One might question, however, whether this intra-county inconsistency is as relevant as inter-county inconsistency for the purposes of equal protection. As long as the members
of the Miami County Canvassing Board all voted on each controversial ballot, and as long as the
ultimate rules adopted in Palm Beach were applied to all controversial ballots, all voters within
the county were treated equally. Thus, intra-county inconsistency might be relevant only insofar
as it exacerbates inconsistency among counties.
60. Id.
61. Id. "The distinction has real consequences," the Court argued, explaining that it would
result in the hand counting of "overvotes," i.e., ballots in which more than one candidate was
named in those counties. Id. at 107. This suggests that the problem is that some overvotes will
be counted, while others will not be. The Court's analysis, however, supports a different point.
The opinion states:
[T]he citizen whose ballot was not read by a machine because he failed to vote
for a candidate in a way readable by a machine may still have his vote counted
in a manual recount; on the other hand, the citizen who marks two candidates
in a way discernable by the machine will not have the same opportunity to have
his vote count, even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the requisite indicia of intent.
Id. at 108. This observation supports the separate claim that there is an inequality between
undervoters and overvoters within counties that do not conduct a full manual recount, not that
voters in different counties are being treated differently. Indeed, Justice Breyer treats this claim
as involving two separate arguments. See infra note 65. The problem with this argument is that
an undervoter is at least arguably differently situated from an overvoter.
62. Id. at 108 ("The Florida Supreme Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in a final certification must be complete."). The apparent inequality is in some
voters having their votes counted while the votes of others are not counted.
63. Id. at 109 CThe county canvassing boards were forced to pull together ad hoc teams
comprised of judges from various Circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting ballots."). Although this equal protection concern seems to sound particularly like a duo
process concern, the remainder of the Court's analysis suggests that unequal counting might
have resulted from the absence of adequate procedural safeguards. Perhaps recognizing, however, that its reasoning dovetails with due process concerns, the Court ultimately concludes that
"it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal
protection and due process without substantial additional work." Id. at 110. The Court, however,
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ating these various flaws, the per curiam opinion issued a rather
strong admonition not to overread the doctrinal implications of the
very opinion it was handing down: "Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many complexities."6
Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the analysis thus
far, or at least with the proposition that "the absence of a uniform,
specific standard to guide the recounts... does implicate principles
of fundamental fairness." 65 Justice Breyer did not, however, conclude that this fundamental fairness problem necessarily amounted
to a constitutional violation. Thus, he noted: "In light of the majority's disposition, I need not decide whether, or the extent to which,
as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place limits upon the
content of the uniform standard."66 These Justices diverged from
the per curiam opinion on the issue of the remedy. The per curiam
opinion noted that the "Supreme Court of Florida [had] said that
the legislature intended the State's electors to 'participat[e] fully in
the federal electoral process' ",67 by taking advantage of the safe
harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5. This statutory safe harbor provision, the majority reasoned, would be triggered only for states selecting their
electors conclusively by December 12.68 "That date is upon us," the
opinion observed, concluding that the appropriate remedy was thus
to reverse the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and remand,6
70
while leaving the Florida Supreme Court little further room to act.

does not offer a doctrinal analysis of why these inconsistencies amounted to equal protection and
due process violations.

64. Id. at 109.
65. Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer disagreed with the propositions that

"the failure to include overvotes in the manual recounts" and the "fact that all ballots, rather
than simply the undervotes, were recounted in some, but not all, counties" raised constitutional

issues. Id. at 144.
66. Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter went further, citing a specific precedent, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). In
Logan, the Court held that a state cannot "terminate a complainant's cause of action because a
state official, for reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily

mandated procedure." 455 U.S. at 424. The majority held that complainant's procedural due
process rights had been violated while the concurring Justices indicated that equal protection
had also been violated. Id. Justice Souter cited this case for the proposition that it is possible for
a uniform statutory standard to be subject to constitutional limits on its content and effect. Bush,
531 U.S. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 110 (per curiam) (citing Palm Beach County Canvasssing Bd.v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original)).
68. Id. There was no controversy that December 12 was in fact the relevant date for the
purpose of the safe harbor.
69. Id.
70. See William Glaberson, With CriticalDecision Comes Tide of Criticism.N.Y. TPMES. Dec.
13, 2000, at A24. Some lawyers for Vice.President Gore and others argued that the Supreme
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Justices Souter and Breyer disagreed, concluding that there might
still be time for the recount to be completed before December 18,
when the electors were scheduled to meet, and that it should be the
71
Florida court's decision whether to forgo the safe harbor.
Justice Stevens rejected the equal protection analysis altogether. Emphasizing that the Florida Supreme Court's "intent of
the voter" standard was "consistent with the practice of the majority of States," 72 Justice Stevens argued that even if various counters
applied different standards, those "concerns are alleviated-if not
eliminated-by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process." 73 The desire to achieve equality cannot be pushed too far, he
argued, for otherwise "Florida's decision to leave to each county the
determination of what balloting system to employ-despite enormous differences in accuracy-might run afoul of equal protection. ' 74 Justice Ginsburg leveled a similar attack: "I cannot agree
that the recount adopted by the Florida court, flawed as it may be,
would yield a result any less fair or precise than the certification
that preceded that recount."75 No Justice was willing to go so far as
to say that use of different voting methods in different areas would
violate equal protection, presumably recognizing that such a holding would have constitutional implications not only for the Florida
recount, but also for balloting practices throughout the nation. The
per curiam opinion sidestepped this issue by stating, "The question
before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing
elections." 76 Justice Souter provided a more direct defense of the
majority's approach. He explained that although the Fourteenth
Amendment "does not forbid the use of a variety of voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction," the inconsistencies in reading votes

Court left room for the Florida Supreme Court to continue the recounts by holding that the safe
harbor date was not as important to the State of Florida as had been indicated earlier. See Von
Drehle et al., supra note 3.
71. Bush, 531 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) C'Unlike the majority, I see no warrant for
this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply with this requirement before the
date set for the meeting of electors, December 1."); id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
('Whether there is time to conduct a recount prior to December 18 ... is a matter for the state
courts to determine. And whether, under Florida law, Florida could or could not take further
action is obviously a matter for Florida courts, not this Court, to decide.").
72. Id. at 125 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous state statutes).
73. Id. at 125.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 109.
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produced on the same kind of voting machine were of "a different
77
order of disparity."
Except for the per curiam opinion, the opinions also addressed the second issue in the case, whether the Florida Supreme
Court's decision constituted a retroactive change in state election
law as established by the Florida legislature, thus violating Article
II of the United States Constitution, in addition to running afoul of
the statutory safe harbor provision. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion acknowledged that "[iun most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to defer to the decisions of state
courts on issues of state law."' 78 He stated, however, that this is because ordinarily "the distribution of powers among the branches of
a State's government raises no questions of federal constitutional
law."79 Article II, in contrast, specifically grants to each state's legislature the power to determine how electors are appointed.8 0 The
Chief Justice thus reasoned that "the text of the election law itself,
and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on
independent significance." 8 * The Florida Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, departed from the legislative scheme in several ways: in according no presumptive validity to the certified candidate, thus divesting certification of significance;8 2 in holding that
improperly marked ballots would constitute legal votes; 8s and in
rejecting the Secretary of State's interpretations of the election code
even though Florida law requires deference to the Secretary's interpretations8 4 The Florida Supreme Court's remedy thus "signifi-

77. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained that there can be "no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights," implying that use of different voting machines could serve some legitimate state
interest, such as the desire to reduce costs. Id
78. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. The relevant provision provides that "[elach State shall appoint, in such Manner as

§ 1, cl.
2.
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors... ."U.S. CONST. art. If,
81. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring).
82. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained.

Underlying the extension of the certification deadline and the shortchanging of
the contest period was, presumably, the clear implication that certification was
a matter of significance: The certified winner would enjoy presumptive validity,
making a contest proceeding by the losing candidate an uphill battle. In its latest opinion, however, the court empties certification of virtually all legal consequence during the contest ....
Id. at 118.
83. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Florida voters are instructed to make sure
that their ballots have been punched correctly. Id. at 119.
84. Id. at 118-20. The Chief Justice noted that the Secretary of State's interpretation was
"reasonable." Id. at 119. This is an essential point, because under the concurrence's analysis, if
her interpretation had been unreasonable, it too would have been a change in the law.
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cantly departed from the statutory framework in place on November 7."85 For Chief Justice Rehnquist and those who joined his opinion, this provided an independent rationale for holding the Florida
Supreme Court decision unconstitutional.8 6
The four dissenters vigorously attacked the theory embraced
by the three concurring Justices. Justice Breyer argued that the
Florida Supreme Court reasonably interpreted Florida law, rhetorically asking "where is the 'impermissible' distortion? 87 Similarly,
though he did not defend the merits of the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of Florida election law, Justice Souter concluded that
"the majority view [in the Florida Supreme Court] is in each instance within the bounds of reasonable interpretation."8 8 His opinion also emphasized that "Article II is unconcerned with mere disagreements about interpretive merits,"8 9 an issue on which Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not take a firm position. In her separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the "Court more than occasionally affirms statutory, and even constitutional, interpretations
with which it disagrees." 90 While recognizing that the Court had in
at least three instances rejected state court interpretations of state
law, 9 1 Ginsburg argued that "those cases are embedded in historical
contexts hardly comparable to the situation here." 92 Article II,
moreover, does not mandate greater scrutiny, because the Framers
"understood that in a republican government, the judiciary would
construe the legislature's enactments." 93 In his separate dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that the Constitution "does not create legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they come-as
creatures born of, and constrained by, their state constitutions."' 94

85. Id. at 112.
86. Id. at 122.

87. Id. at 151 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting). Note that both Justice Breyer and Justice Soutor

evince an implicit agreement with the concurring Justices with respect to the premise that state
construction of state laws is bounded by a reasonableness standard when it implicates a federal

issue. See id. at 112-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Significantly, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy do not indicate whether they share this premise.
89. Id. at 132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 139 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1813)).
92. Id. Justice Ginsburg does not indicate whether these "historical contexts" undermine
the validity of these cases as precedents, or whether she believes that questioning state
interpretation requires a historical context or an importance of type not present in Bush v. Gore.
93. Id. at 141.
94. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The concurring and dissenting Justices also discussed, albeit
more briefly than the Article II issue, the relevance of § 5 to the ultimate disposition of the case. 95 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
that the statute "informs our application of Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, to the
Florida statutory scheme," because the Florida Supreme Court "acknowledged" that Florida election law "took that statute into account."9 6 Rehnquist quoted the Court's unanimous decision in Bush
v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard, stating that " 'a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe harbor' would counsel
against any construction of the [Florida] Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law.' "97 Although the Chief
Justice did not argue that § 5 itself provides a federal law basis for
the Court's overturning an erroneous state court interpretation of
state law, all the dissenters other than Justice Ginsburg explicitly
explained that § 5 was irrelevant to any claimed constitutional violation in the Florida Supreme Court decision. Justice Stevens argued that the section "did not impose any affirmative duties upon
the States that their governmental branches could 'violate,' "98 and
Justice Souter concluded that the "§ 5 issue is not serious." 99 Justice
Breyer noted that the Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard precedent did not "establish that this Court had the authority to enforce
[Article II,] § 1," and added that "nowhere did we intimate, as the
concurrence does here, that a state court decision that threatens
the safe harbor provision of § 5 does so in violation of Article II."10
The other dissenters did not try to reconcile their views with the
earlier case. Rehnquist also did not emphasize that case, presumably because it only hinted at resolution of the federal law issues.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the media focused on the angry
language in the opinions more than on the underlying disputes over
constitutional doctrine. In particular, Justice Stevens's attack upon
the per curiam opinion was the most widely quoted portion of the
various opinions: 10 1

95. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

97. Id. (quoting Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000)).
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., A Nation Waits (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 12, 2000); Battle for the

7uie

House: U.S. Supreme Court Reverses FloridaSupreme Court Decision to Proceed with Recounts
(NBC television broadcast, Dec. 12, 2000); United States Supreme Court Reaches a Decision in
the Case of Bush v. Gore (CBS television broadcast. Dec. 12, 2000); U.S. Supreme Court Rules 5-4
to End FloridaRecount;Decision GisBush a Path to the Presidency (CNN television broadcast,
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What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the
state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed .... Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the
winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly
clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law. 10 2

Taken literally, Justice Stevens's opinion could be construed
to suggest no more than that the majority's approach threatened to
undermine confidence in the state judiciaries because the majority
expressed a "lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of
the state judges." 10 3 Critics, however, read it much more broadly, to
suggest that the majority's approach would undermine confidence
because the Court's action, taken as a whole, was unprincipled and
politically motivated.104 Justice Breyer similarly, though less forcefully, complained that the "Court was wrong to take this case" and
"wrong to grant a stay," and that the "federal legal questions pre.sented, with one exception, are insubstantial."' 10 5 The Justices, it
seemed, disagreed not only about how the case should be decided,
but also about whether the positions embraced on the other side
were respectable as a matter of law.
C. The Puzzles
The puzzles of Bush v. Gore stem largely from the majority
rationale. How did the argument that there was an equal protection
problem with the Florida recount manage to obtain votes of seven
Justices? It is beyond our scope to assess whether the majority's
equal protection analysis was sound, let alone correct, and we concede that one might well devise a persuasive justification. 106 For our

Dec. 12, 2000); Court Decision Is Final but Suspect, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 14,
2000, at A20; Jack W. Germond & Jules Witco~er, Most of High CourtAnointed George II, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 14, 2000, at A27.

102. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. This is probably a fair reading, given that Justice Stevens cannot mean that whenever
the Supreme Court rejects a legal interpretation of a state court as being unreasonable, it is
undermining confidence in state judges.
105. Id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. For an argument that the equal protection analysis of Bush v. Gore was sound, see
Lund, supra note 7. Professor Lund makes the strongest defense of which we are aware in defense of the decision's equal protection analysis. While acknowledging that past cases did not
squarely control the Bush v. Gore decision, Lund points out that the "rationale underlying the
vote dilution cases ... implies that the application of new and discriminatory rules after an election has been held should receive an especially skeptical review by the courts because after-thefact manipulation of voting rules is especially prone to abuse." Lund, supra note 7 (manuscript at
31). Ballot box stuffing has long been seen "as a paradigmatic example of an obvious constitu-
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purposes it is sufficient to note that the Court plainly did not supply one. The opinion is remarkable in equal protection jurisprudence for the lack of attention given equal protection doctrine and
for the superficiality of the bit of doctrine that is discussed. Although the Court alludes to its "one person, one vote" jurisprudence, 10 7 it offers no analysis of any of the cases developing that
rule. Instead, the majority simply states: "The question before us
...is whether the recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court
has adopted are consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and
disparate treatment of the members of its electorate."'108 Most notably, the majority did not explain the origin of its "arbitrary and disparate treatment" approach.10 9
Commentators have been quick to note the odd connection
between this articulated test and the Court's general equal protec0 As Ronald Dworkin has observed, the Florida
tion jurisprudence. 11
Supreme Court recount "puts no class of voters, in advance, at either an advantage or disadvantage.""' The conclusion is not universal; Charles Fried has suggested a reconciliation, noting that
"disparate treatment may violate the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection even if no identifiable class of persons is the target
of the intentional disparity.""n 2 At a minimum, it is puzzling that
legal commentators, rather than the per curiam Justices, have had
to identify a doctrinal source for the Court's approach. To be sure,
the Bush v. Gore Court was operating under extreme time pressure.
Perhaps if the Court had had more time, it would have articulated a
more complete equal protection analysis. Nonetheless, setting aside
the equal protection analysis, the aggregate of the Court's opinions
do not appear to have suffered any notable lack of polish, a result
3
no doubt attributable to overnighters by the Court's law clerks."

tional violation," Lund notes, adding that "any distinction bet%%een adding illegal ballots to the
count and selectively adding legal ballots in a way that favors one candidate over another would
be entirely sophistical." Id. (manuscript at 32). Lund also argues against alternative approaches
that the Court might have taken in reviewing the case. Id. (manuscript at 36-50).
107. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
108. Id.
109. An online search in the Westlaw Supreme Court cases database confirmed that the
phrase "arbitrary and disparate treatment" as a test for a violation of equal protection appears in
no other Supreme Court case.
110. See, e.g., David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein. High Court in Aukuward Spot over Equal
ProtectionRuling, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2000, at Al.
111. Ronald Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53, 54.
112. Charles Fried, 'A Badly Flawed Election:"An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 22,2001,
at 8 n.2 (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)).
113. See Greenhouse, supra note 5 C'By the time three New York University Law Schoul professors arrived at the court on Tuesday morning to interview law clerks for teaching positions,
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Moreover, the Court's waffling on whether it was resting upon a
due process or an equal protection principle adds to the sense that
the Court was invoking the Fourteenth Amendment in a very approximate way.
The fact-specific nature of the majority opinion is also puzzling. There are certainly other Supreme Court cases that seem to
place a great deal of emphasis on facts rather than law. But the per
curiam opinion is notable for its contemporaneous and explicit admonition that its analysis is "limited to the present circumstances." 114 While the Court may be right that "the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities,"" 5 the complications of equal protection law have not generally
scared the Court away from pronouncing general rules." 6 Even if
the Justices thought that the analytical difficulties of creating a
bright-line rule militated in favor of a balancing test, they could
have announced such a test or at least highlighted the factors that
appeared relevant to the case at hand. Some minimalist legal
scholars favor fact-specific rulings based upon normative uncertainty about appropriate doctrine,117 but minimalist judges probably
would have stayed out of the dispute altogether.
Finally, a threshold issue that no opinion addressed also
makes the majority opinion puzzling: standing."8 Under third-party

complete exhaustion had set in, and some clerks who had not canceled their long-scheduled appointments slept through them.").
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
115. Id.
116. David Strauss attributes the equal protection majority's willingness to limit the holding
to the facts of the case without offering broader explanation to a desire to correct an incorrect
determination by the Florida Supreme Court. Strauss argues:
The Court's attempt to limit its holding, with barely a fig leaf of principle, gives
the game away. The majority was not concerned with principle. It smelled a rat
in this case. It thought the Florida Supreme Court was up to no good. It could
not explain what the Florida Supreme Court was up to in terms that engaged
general principles that it was willing to embrace, but it was determined to intervene and stop that court. If the actions of the United States Supreme Court
are to be defended, they must be defended in those terms.
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 751 (2001).
117. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 10 (1999) (noting that "minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down
broad rules").
118. At least, it has puzzled experts on federal jurisdiction. See RICHARD FALLON ET AL.,
SPECIAL UPDATE MEMORANDUM, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (2001) (noting that "[wvithout reference to third-party standing doctrine,
Bush v. Gore... upheld the claim of presidential candidate George W. Bush-not himself a Florida voter-that a partial recount of Florida presidential ballots ordered by the Supreme Court
lacked adequate standards to vindicate Florida voters' equal protection and due process rights to
fair, non-arbitrary counting of their ballots").
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standing doctrine, only voters are presumed able to raise a claim
that their equal protection rights have been violated.119 Indeed, just
weeks before its decision in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court decided Sinkfield v. Kelley, which held that only voters in a gerrymandered district, and not voters in another district necessarily
affected by such gerrymandering, have standing to raise equal protection claims. 120 Even more puzzlingly, the Justices who seem most
vigorously to support third-party standing limitations are Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, the only Justices to rely exclusively on a
third party to raise a claim upon which their equal protection holding rests. For example, in Miller v. Albright, decided only two years
earlier, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy stood alone in concluding
that a foreign-born illegitimate child of an American citizen was
without standing to raise her father's equal protection challenge to
a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Act required her to formalize ties with her father prior to reaching majority as a condition to seeking citizenship, but a similarly situated
child of a U.S. citizen mother would face no time limit.1 21 While no

other Justices joined in their strict reading of third-party standing,
their decision to deny standing proved fatal to the woman's ability
to be naturalized. 12 2 It may be that in Bush v. Gore, the Justices did

not think of the issue, 23 or that the inclusion of voters as intervenors in the lawsuit below, 124 though not in the application for a stay

119. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLERS TIlE FEDERAL COURTAND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 178-87 (4th ed. 199G) (providing an overview of third-party standing
doctrine).
120. The Court found that petitioners had no standing because they had not" 'personally
been denied equal treatment."' Sinkfield, 531 U.S. 28, 29 (2000) (quoting United States v. Hays.
515 U.S. 737, 744-46 (1995)).
121. See Miller,523 U.S. 420, at 445-52 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court recently
resolved the merits of the issue left unanswered by Miller in Nguyen v. INS. 121 S. Ct. 2053
(2001).
122. See infra note 321. This was true at the time Miller was decided. In Ailer, Justice
O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Kennedy joined, in which
she strongly suggested that but for a problem of third-party standing, she would have relied
upon the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to strike down
the provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act imposing different requirements upon
United States citizen mothers and fathers whose foreign-born illegitimate children seek to become naturalized. See 523 U.S. at 445-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Nguyen, Justice Kennedy
wrote for a majority sustaining the very same sex-based classification against a due process
challenge. See 121 S. Ct. at 2057-58. By dissenting, Justice O'Connor maintained a consistent
position in these two cases, while Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority to sustain the law in
Nguyen, reversed course.
123. The issue of third-party standing was not briefed by the parties. See Brief of Petitioners,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949); Brief of Respondents. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (No. 00-949).
124. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
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that the Supreme Court read as a petition for writ of certiorari, 125
was sufficient to overcome the third-party standing concern. 126 At a
minimum, however, it is quite odd that the Court in general, and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in particular, skipped a threshold
issue to which they have recently been critically attentive.
Also mysterious is that Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion did not seem to share the per curiam opinion's defects. The
opinion noted precedents in which the Supreme Court rejected state
court constructions of state law, 127 and although the concurring
analysis worked from a constitutional provision on which there was
relatively little decisional law, it at least provided some doctrinal
support for its construction of Article 11.128 Thus, Judge Fried, a defender of the Court's action, agreed that "the three concurring Justices ... were on sounder ground than the seven who found an
130
equal protection violation."' 29 Similarly, Judge Robert Bork,
Judge Richard Posner, 131 and Professor Richard Epstein 132 have defended the decision by focusing on the reasoning of the concurrence. 133 It is likely for this reason that general criticism of Bush v.

125. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (granting stay and certiorari).
126. Ordinarily, a party that does not appeal a decision cannot obtain the benefit of a successful appeal, because the failure to appeal a lower court decision results in the entry of the
judgment and has res judicata effect. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 398-402 (1981). Bush v. Gore may offer an unusual exception because the deadline on filing
a petition for certiorari for the nonappealing parties had not run by the time the Supreme Court
issued its ultimate decision. Perhaps the Justices recognized this and felt that waiting for the
formality of having the voters file petitions of certiorari would have unnecessarily delayed the
decision.
127. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
128. Id. at 103-06.
129. Fried, supra note 112, at 8.
130. Maureen Dowd, Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A31 ("Robert Bork said
that while he thought the majority five-justice opinion in Bush v. Gore might be debatable, he
deemed the 'concurrent opinion' of three justices ... to be on 'very solid ground.' ").
131. See Benjamin Wittes, Maybe the Court Got It Right: A Judge's Defense of the Florida
Election, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 2001, at A23 (reporting, on the basis of an advance copy of an
article by Posner, that Posner defended the decision on the basis that "[t]he combination of the
state supreme court's decision and its later opinion-which ordered an incoherent and standardless hand recount--effectively rewrote the Florida election code"). Judge Posner provides a proliminary analysis of the recount in Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegonenonto an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001). In that article, he promises a treatment of the Supreme
Court's role in Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and StatisticalAnalysis of the Election
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation,SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
132. See Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct" The
Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 619-34 (2001).
133. Professor (and now Bush judicial nominee) Michael W. McConnell similarly has suggested that while Article II might have supported the Supreme Court's holding, the Court acted
improperly in halting the recount on the basis of an equal protection problem. See Michael W.
McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 674-77 (2001).

2001]

BEYOND COUNTING VOTES

1871

Gore has focused more heavily on the per curiam opinion's rationale
than on those of either the concurrence or the dissents.1 34 Moreover,
the portion of the per curiam opinion most criticized, according to
an update to the preeminent federal jurisdiction casebook, 135 was its
analysis of why the December 12 deadline required reversal. The
authors of the per curiam opinion could respond to this criticism by
noting that they remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court,
but this disposition merely reflects the traditional Supreme Court
practice of remanding all state court cases for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. 136 Indeed, this tradition emphasizes the
puzzle of why the per curiam opinion presumed a particular resolution of the state law issue, rather than, consistent with the purpose
of the tradition, allowing the Florida courts to resolve the issue.
The concurring opinion's approach avoided this problem altogether.
Though that opinion might have been styled a reverse and remand
if it had been the majority opinion,1 3 7 it identified defects that, if

134. Even humorous accounts have focused more on the equal protection analysis. See, e.g.,
Maureen Dowd, The Bloom Is off the Robe, N.Y. TZIMES, Dec. 13, 2000. at A35 (offering a fictional
dialogue in which Chief Justice Rehnquist states, "Mr. Boies, you fail to grasp the concept of
equal protection for the conservative justices who want to retire. I'm 76. Sandy is 70. We started
out long ago, working our hearts out for Barry Goldwater, and we're pooped.).
135. FALLON ET AL., supra note 118, at 5 ("The most-criticized aspect of the Supreme Court:s
December 12 ruling was its decision, after having found an equal protection violation, that no
recount could proceed.").
136. See generally FALLON ET AL, supra note 119, at 507-09 (discussing the remand practice
of the Supreme Court). It is also worth noting that on December 11, 2000, one day prior to the
Supreme Court's issuance of Bush v. Gore, the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion pursuant to the Supreme Court remand in Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard. See Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). In that opinion, the Florida
Supreme Court, in the context of evaluating the rights of voters within the contest period, asserted that although the Florida statutes set no specific deadline for manual recounts, such recounts must be completed within a reasonable period of time. Id. at 1285.86. The court further
stated: 'In the case of the presidential election, the determination of reasonableness must be
circumscribed by the provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5, which sets December 12, 2000, as the date for
final determination of any state's dispute concerning its electors in order for that determination
to be given conclusive effect in Congress." Id. at 1286 n.17. This does not necessarily resolve the
question whether manual recounts during the protest period must meet the same deadline, especially if the Florida Supreme Court determined that an extension beyond December 12 was necessary to the application of other provisions of the Florida election code as that court construed
it, or in the absence of an Article II violation as needed to reconcile the Florida election code with
the demands of the state constitution. For an article expressing a contrary view, in treating the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris as conclusive on the December 12 deadline for purposes of any further action in Bush v. Gore, see Lund,
supra note 7 (manuscript at 58-61).
137. It is possible, of course, that the concurring Justices would have ignored the tradition of
including a remand, or would have included language specifically indicating that there was nothing for the Florida Supreme Court to do on remand. It is worth noting that the concurrence
closed by stating "we would reverse," rather than by saying, "we would reverse and remand.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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genuine, time could not cure. 138 It thus needed to make no assumptions about how the Florida courts would resolve state law issues.
The concurring opinion also seems more attractive in the
sense that it coheres better with the history of the election controversy. The Palm Beach County Canvassing Board opinion alluded
to the Article II issue, but not to the equal protection problem, 139
even though the "intent-of-the-voter" standard was as much an issue in the earlier case as in Bush v. Gore. Moreover, the concurring
opinion in Bush v. Gore corresponded to the mantra of the Bush
camp throughout the post-election controversy. While the Gore
camp's cry was "count the votes," 140 the Bush camp's was "follow the
rules."'141 Both of their messages reflected appeals to common sense,
albeit appeals pointing in opposite directions. The equal protection
claim suffered a notable lack of rhetorical flourish. Though partisans mentioned the inconsistency with which the ballots were being
counted, this point was usually made in conjunction with the argument that ballots ought to be counted according to the procedure
allegedly provided by law, a machine count. The per curiam opinion
thus rested, in a highly visible case, on a legal argument that did
not resonate in the court of public opinion. At a minimum, the per
curiam opinion's reliance on an analytically dubious-and certainly
thin-argument cannot be rested upon its public appeal.
Even if the equal protection analysis proved fatally flawed,
that alone does not establish that the Court reached the wrong outcome. Moreover, the puzzle extends as much to Justices Souter and
Breyer as to Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and the concurring
Justices. Indeed, the puzzle may not be one puzzle, but three. Why
did Justices O'Connor and Kennedy find the equal protection argument more appealing than that presented in the concurrence? Why
did Justices Souter and Breyer go out of their way to indicate
agreement with the peculiar portion of the per curiam opinion when

138. In particular, the concurrence's argument that the Florida Supreme Court was inappropriately removing the presumptive effect of the certification by allowing recounts in the contest
phase presumably would have prevented new reqounts, regardless of how much time was allowed. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
139. The per curiam opinion did emphasize the ambiguous nature of the state court ruling,
but only in terms of how the ruling applied state law, not in terms of the court's approach to tho
intent-of-the-voter issue. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000)
(per curiam).
140. Al Gore Defends His Decision to Contest Florida'sPresidentialElection (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 27, 2000).
141. David Espo, Associated Press, Nov. 22, 2000, 2000 WL 29129990 (reporting Bush
spokesman James A. Baker III's comment that the Florida Supreme Court "has changed the
rules and has invented a new system for counting the election results").
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they disagreed strongly enough in any event to dissent in a case in
which the per curiam authors emphasized the case's lack of precedential value? And perhaps the greatest mystery, why did the concurring Justices not simply concur in the judgment and rest entirely upon their seemingly more appealing independent rationale?
The result, after all, would still have been five votes for Bush regardless of whether they concurred in the per curiam opinion.
Though psychological speculation can be used to address all of these
questions, we hope to show that our combined technique drawn
from judicial politics research and social choice theory provides a
more useful framework.
III. JUDICIAL POLITICS APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL VOTING
In this part, we show how two schools of political science,
both within the general field of inquiry known as judicial politics,
help provide insights on Bush v. Gore. Both schools, attitudinalism
and the new institutionalism, are the heirs of a twentieth-century
political science tradition that has sought to study judicial behavior
scientifically. Early attempts, such as Jerome Frank's use of psychoanalytic theory, 142 were influential in advancing the cause of
legal realism but failed to produce robust models. 4 3 Beginning in
the middle of the twentieth century, however, political scientists, in
particular those who came to be called behavioralists, began to rely
heavily on statistics. In 1948, C. Herman Pritchett authored a statistical study on the previous ten years of Supreme Court decisions
premised on the theory that judicial decision making was essentially political and thus susceptible to study like other forms of political activity. 144 Political scientists soon began using statistics explicitly to support generalizations about judicial behavior, and two
books published in the mid-1960s emphasized that judicial behavior

142. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 13-31 (1930) (arguing that judges may act
as "father substitutes" in their exercise of social authority).
143. For a skeptical assessment of the possibility of integrating psychoanalysis and legal
theory, see Joseph Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence,77 YALE LJ.1053 (1968). For
broader assessments of Frank's philosophy, see ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICON'OCLAST AS
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK's IMPACT ON AMERICAN L4V,' (1985); and JULIUS PAUL, THE LEGAL
REALISM OF JEROME N. FRANK (1959).
144. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND

VALUES, 1937-1947, at 20 (Quadrangle Books 1969) (1948). This was not the first work that could
be called behavioralist. See, e.g., Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of
Personal, Political, and Ecorwrnic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 U. ILL L.REV. 96
(1922).
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was a predictable phenomenon. 145 Glendon Schubert's The Judicial
Mind articulated a theory emphasizing that Justices' decisions reflect their policy leanings.146 Walter Murphy, in contrast, argued in
The Elements of Judicial Strategy that Justices' decisions reflect
strategic considerations that take into account the preferences of
other actors in the judicial process. 147 These claims are, with much
refinement, the central tenets of attitudinalists and new institutionalists, respectively.
A. Attitudinalism
Attitudinalism is perhaps the most straightforward modern
application of judicial politics research to Supreme Court decision
making. The theory posits that Justices, like political actors, have
"attitudes" concerning public policy and that these attitudes determine how they vote in particular cases. 148 For example, a Justice
whose attitudes are relatively conservative is likely to vote against
expansive interpretations of the Fourth Amendment,149 at least
when that Amendment might be used to inhibit the activities of law
enforcement. The opposite could be said about a Justice who is relatively liberal. In short, attitudinalists insist, outcomes in Supreme
Court cases depend not so much on the merits of the legal arguments as on how Justices react to the facts of individual cases, and
the Justices' attitudes are strong predictors of their reactions. 150

145. For an early assessment of these and related works, see Samuel Krislov, TheoreticalAttempts at PredictingJudicialBehavior, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1966).
146. GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965).
147. See WALTER MURPHY, THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
148. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 64. Attitudinalists explain that Justices are able
to turn their attitudes into votes because they generally "lack electoral or political accountability,
ambition for higher office, and comprise a court of last resort that controls its own jurisdiction."

Id. at 69.
149. The Fourth Amendment is just an example, but one that attitudinalists have found easy
to study because "the situational context-the facts-in which law enforcement authorities conduct searches and seizures are readily identifiable and limited in number." Id. at 216. Analysis
reveals, for example, that the Court as a whole has been more likely to uphold searches in places
of business than in homes. Id. at 216-18. A possible critique of the attitudinalists' focus on the
Fourth Amendment is that this Amendment essentially presents a mixed question of law and
fact. Attitudinalists, however, have shown that attitudes are predictive in other areas tending to
include pure questions of law, such as federalism and taxation. Id. at 244. For an excellent empirical analysis of Supreme Court decision making in another fact-specific area, see Tracoy
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
323 (1992), which focuses on death penalty cases.
150. Attitudes, supplemented by other variables such as where a search or seizure took
place, can be used to predict individual Justices' votes in Fourth Amendment cases with 75%
accuracy. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 229. Overall, Justices' attitudes are highly statistically significant, with p < 0.001. Id. at 229-31.
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"Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he [was] extremely liberal." 151
At first blush, Bush v. Gore might well appear to be the consummate reflection-perhaps even a vindication-of this theory.
This was a decision destined to have an unmistakable effect on public policy because if Bush won, he would almost certainly be elected
President, while if Gore won, a continuing recount conceivably
could lead to the opposite result.15 2 Just as an attitudinalist might
suspect, the five most conservative Justices on the Court favored
Bush, while the four most liberal dissented, effectively favoring
Gore.153 An attitudinalist would not insist that any of the Justices
were being disingenuous, for psychological motive is irrelevant to
the approach. Attitudinalism makes a prediction about how the
Justices are likely to vote, ana this case provides an additional datum in support of the theory.
The case is not merely just one more data point for a regression, though, because of Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth's surprising prediction in the seminal work presenting the attitudinal model
quoted at the outset of this Article. The quotation is noteworthy in
part because, even in the period between the election and the decision in Bush v. Gore, the consensus among most academics, at least
law professors, 5 4 was that Supreme Court Justices would try to
avoid any involvement in election controversies. 151 While Segal and

151. Id. at 65.
152. Although some insisted that Bush and Gore held quite similar policy positions, others
argued that in fact their positions were more sharply in contrast than the positions of competing
presidential candidates in recent elections. CompareAmerican Home Truths: Offering an Alternative to Bush 'n" Gore, THE GUARDIAN, July 5, 2000, 2000 WL 23928865 (agreeing with Ralph
Nader's assessment that Bush and Gore were Tweedledum and Tweedledee) with Jonathan
Alter, The Real Stakes in November: The Supreme Court Is Just the Beginning-Why This Seemingly Ho-Hum Race Actually Matters, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000. at 26, 26 (discussing policy
differences between Gore and Bush).

153. Classifying Justices as liberal or conservative presents some difficult empirical issues.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, MeasuringPoliticalPreferences, 10 AM. J. POL Sc. 261,
266-84 (1996) (exploring some problems associated with one popular measure). Nevertheless, the

contention that even before Bush v. Gore, the five more conservative Justices would be those who
voted for Bush is uncontroversial, because of the many important cases producing 5-4 splits
along this divide. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Supreme Question, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000,

at 18, 18-19 (referring to "familiar 5-4 splits between the court's more liberal and more conservative members").
154. See sources cited supra note 9.
155. Law professors predicting that the Court would not involve itself in the case noted the
Court's reputed aversion to involving itself in political controversies, but the political question
doctrine received little attention. This may be because in Baker t. Carr the Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to an election districting controversy, rejecting the suggestion
that the controversy was a political question. See 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). "It is the relationship
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Spaeth did not predict that the Court would in fact involve itself in
such a case, they did not seem to think such involvement unlikely,
and they further thought that upon accepting such a case, the Justices would not be able to, or would choose not to, place their attitudes aside. Such a view might have seemed to be just another example of the attitudinalists' cynicism about legal process prior to
Bush v. Gore. Score one for attitudinalism.
The attitudinalist approach of correlating the Justices' votes
with their apparent political leanings is subject to several important counterarguments, but it reveals a fundamental truth. Surely
it cannot be a coincidence that the nine Justices happened to sort
themselves in a way that placed the five generally viewed as conservative on the side of the Republican and the four generally
viewed as liberal on the side of the Democrat. 156 This is nothing
more than an appeal to common sense, and Bush v. Gore does illustrate that the attitudinalists' regressions do not identify a surprising trend in decisions. Rather, they state what we already know.
Everyone recognizes that Justices' views matter, and that Justices
who are perceived as relatively conservative are more likely to vote
in a way that people would generally label conservative than are
Justices who are perceived as relatively liberal. This attitudinalist
insight is subject to criticism not because it is untrue, but because
it is trivial. 157

between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'" Id. at 210.
Of less fame but greater relevance was McPherson v. Blacker in which the Court held that the
political question doctrine did not prevent it from reviewing state counting of electoral votes. See
146 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1892); see also United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,
456-59 (1992) (rejecting a challenge under the political question doctrine to the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to decide whether Montana was entitled to an additional member of the House of
Representatives).
156. The chance of randomly selecting five Justices of nine and ending up with the five regarded as conservative is 1 in 126.
157. That Supreme Court decisions depend on Justices' ideological predilections might be
trivial in part because Supreme Court decisions do not represent a random sample of all disputes. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 13, at 289 C'[I]f
the attitudinal model were limited to Supreme
Court cases lacking a clear resolution under the legal model, the model's significance would seem
trivial. In cases that have no answer under the legal model, it is hardly surprising that other
factors influence the decision."). As Professor Cross notes, attitudinalists have responded to this
critique in part by identifying attitudinal phenomena in lower court decisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey
A. Segal et al., Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 243
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995). Though the set of all appellate cases is a larger universe, it too is not a
random subset, as the vast majority of cases never reach this stage. Thus, one might argue, oven
if attitudes are important in reported cases, the "legal model" might be successful in explaining
settlement decisions in the shadow of the law.
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Nonetheless, Bush v. Gore presents an unusually clean test
of the attitudinal model. The case is unusual (if not unique) in that
the consequence of the legal issues for public policy seem diametrically opposed to the consequence of the disposition of the case in
terms of the election at issue. The two primary issues in the case,
as we have seen, were whether the Florida recount violated the
Equal Protection Clause and whether the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the state's election law constituted a change in the
law, thus violating Article II or undermining the statutory safe
harbor provision. In the abstract, the public policy consequences of
vigorously applying equal protection guarantees would seem more
enticing to the liberal than to the conservative Justices. 1 Similarly, the conservative Justices would seem more likely to defer to
the Florida courts' interpretation of their own law, rather than label an interpretation a change in the law. 159 Even if other issues
would turn on attitudes in a manner consistent with the Court's
deciion, these issues seem less salient.1 60 Endorsement of Bush's
arguments, however, would lead to a result, the election of a Republican president, less attractive to liberals than to conservatives.
The existence of such a conflict might at first seem to make
attitudinalism an unfalsifiable theory. If the Justices vote for their
presumed preferred candidate, it is because of their attitudes, and

158. The alignment, of course, need not always be 5-4. For example, in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from a
decision striking down a state constitutional amendment prohibiting legislative, executive, and
judicial action protecting homosexuals from discrimination. Moreover, there may be some cases
in which the conservatives advocate a more expansive view of equal protection, such as in the
affirmative action context. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(presenting the same 5-4 split as in Bush v. Gore, with the majority applying strict scrutiny to a
racial classification benefiting allegedly disadvantaged business enterprises). This only strengthens the attitudinalist case, indicating that Justices on opposite sides of the spectrum may switch
sides in equal protection cases depending on whether the plaintiff is a member of a minority
group. It does not, however, necessarily indicate ideological inconsistency.
159. The first Bush lawsuit, The New York Timnes noted, "presents an irony too delicious for
many observers of the continuing federalism debate to resist." Linda Greenhouse, Recount Fight
Widens as Court Case Begins: As Bush Camp Looks to Federal Court, Gore SupportersEmbrace
States'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at Al.
160. One might argue that conservatives are generally more skeptical of judicial authority
and were thus more inclined to see the Florida Supreme Court as illegitimately assuming power
belonging to the legislature. A problem with this argument is that the conservative Justices on
the Rehnquist Court had not previously in any context questioned state court decisions on state
law. Indeed, the conservative Justices have generally argued that state court judges are as competent as federal court judges, even with respect to vindication of federal rights. See, eg.,
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 723 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("It would be a strange constitution that regards state courts as second-rate instruments
for the vindication of federal rights and yet makes no mandatory provision for lower federal
courts (as our Constitution does not).").
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if they vote for their presumed preferred legal theory, it is because
of their attitudes. 16 1 But the case is unusual in that the importance
of any potential precedent from the case in terms of public policy,

though not insignificant, seemed likely to be small relative to the
public policy effects that would turn on the outcome, in part because the outcome of the case would likely affect the composition of
the Court itself. 162 Thus, if attitudinalism is taken to mean that
Justices will vote to maximize their net public policy preferences,
weighted by the importance of those preferences, Bush v. Gore was
a chance for the Justices to establish a datum at odds with attitudinalism. Had the lineup of the Justices been completely reversed,
that would indicate that the Justices cared about legal considerations more than policy considerations, perhaps encouraging a
reconceptualization of attitudinal theory. That is not how the case
turned out.
Indeed, Bush v. Gore helps undermine a significant critique
of attitudinalism.163 Just because liberal Justices tend to vote more
liberally than conservative Justices does not mean that legal

161. This is reminiscent of one of the major criticisms of the theory. See SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 1, at 361 (acknowledging this to be "[tihe most damning criticism of the attitudinal
model in earlier days"). One cannot know whether a particular doctrinal position is "liberal" or
"conservative" unless and until liberal or conservative Justices assume that position in a given
case. Once Justices viewed as liberal or conservative line up as they do in a new controversy,
attitudinal scholars then cast the revealed preferences in ideological terms. As applied here,
there is a seeming tension between the ideological direction of doctrine on the one hand and of
the outcome on the other. Of course this is also a case in which outcome overwhelms doctrine.
But it is only because the jurists revealed that truth with their votes that we can know with
certainty that the conservative position subordinated federalism concerns in favor of expanded
equal protection principles as needed to generate the case outcome for Bush, and that the liberal
position advanced the cause of federalism and subordinated equal protection concerns in an
unsuccessful effort to generate a case outcome favoring Gore.
162. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Ready to Walk a Very Fine Legal Line, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2000, at A13 ("[Tihe justices are now in a position to shape the outcome of a presidential
election in which not only the court itself but individual justices featured prominently as campaign issues.").
163. For an example of this critique, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model, L. & CTs. NEWSL., Spring 1994, at 6 (reviewing JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). Professor Rosenberg
argues:
[U]nder the Legal Model Properly Understood, judges apply a set of interpretive
canons, a set of principles that guide them in interpreting the Constitution,
statutes, precedent, and derive an outcome. They are driven not by outcomes
but by interpretive philosophy. And, in accord with the sort of scientific procedure that Segal and Spaeth apply, a group of'judges,' if provided a set of facts
and told to employ a given interpretive philosophy, should reach similar outcomes. It follows from the Legal Model Properly Understood, for example, that
it matters a great deal who the President nominates to sit on the Court because
different interpretive philosophies will produce different outcomes.
Id. at 7.

2001]

BEYOND COUNTING VOTES

1879

method is pure subterfuge, critics argue. Rather, it may show only
that legal methods are contested and that different Justices embrace different interpretive theories. Some theories tend to produce
results that correlate with what many view as conservatism, while
other theories produce results that correlate in the opposite direction. Thus, the repeated instance of the same 5-4 splits does not
indicate that Justices are engaged in crude public policy calculations. For all we can tell from the pattern of decision making, Justice Scalia may be a leftist who happens to have settled on an interpretive method that, in the world that we live in, appears to generate more conservative than liberal decisions.'" Thus, the argument concludes, while it may be that Presidents choose Justices
based upon anticipated results, this does not mean that Justices
choose outcomes on a similar basis. 165 Bush v. Gore seems to undermine this argument, given the apparent inconsistency of the
Justices' votes with their theoretical-meaning doctrinalorientation. 6 6 Simply put, if Justices embrace a doctrinal approach
that generally correlates with a particular ideological bent, in a
case with sufficiently high stakes that thwart the expectations of
that approach, the Justices appear at least temporarily willing and

able to set it aside.
Let us now consider three objections to the attitudinal
model. The first objection is that Bush v. Gore proves that judicial
decision making is at least sometimes apolitical, for Justices Ste-

164. Perhaps more plausibly, a Justice's political ideology relative to the rest of the Court
may change over time. Consider Justice Frankfurter, who joined the Court as a progressive liberal in an era where liberalism was moving in the direction of increasing judicial intervention
into state and federal legislative processes. Without changing his own ideological predilections,
he became regarded as a conservative within the Warren Court. Yet at least one proxy for Frankfurter's ideology commonly used by attitudinalists, namely a variable based on statements made
about him at the time of his confirmation, still rates him as relatively liberal. See Jeffrey A.
Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 557, 559-61 (1989).
165. On this account, perhaps the most political decision that a judge or Justice makes is the
decision when to retire, since this may affect the ideology of the judge's successor. See James F.
Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits:-Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 579-93 (1995) (demonstrating that courts of appeals
judges are more likely to retire when the President is of the political party of the President who
appointed them).
166. Frank Michelman articulates this point well, noting "the apparent difficulty of mapping
the judicial votes cast, or the legal issues with respect to which they were cast, onto any cognizable grid of constitutional principles and ideals, or competing sets of them, that independently
might explain the Courts division over these issues." Frank . Michelman, Suspicion, or the New
Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 680 (2001). Michelman later emphasizes, "after all, it's not particularly to the Court's conservative ideological wing that you would normally look for a somewhat daring doctrinal innovation on behalf of voting rights." Id. at 685.
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vens and Souter, both appointed by Republican Presidents, sided
with Al Gore, the Democratic candidate. Indeed, many political science studies that code Justices for attitudes use the political party
of the appointing president as one relevant proxy. 67 This imperfection could mean that attitudes do not always determine decision
making. Attitudinalists, however, do not claim that attitudes are
perfectly predictive of Supreme Court voting. In many cases, attitudes will prove conflicting, leaving the result indeterminate, and
those who embrace even the best social science theories well understand that they cannot explain perfectly all social phenomena. But
the attitudinalist who reads Bush v. Gore can say with some pride
that seven-out-of-nine ain't bad.
More significantly, the attitudinalist would retort that political party is not a perfect proxy for attitudes. This explains why
some of the most powerful attitudinal studies advance the model by
ignoring party and using decision making in one set of cases as an
independent variable to explain decision making in another set. 6 8
That other studies have found attitudes to be significant despite
using an independent variable as crude as political party is a strike
for attitudinalism, not against it.169 Although attitudinalists may
not be able to measure attitudes perfectly, their ability to explain
much of judicial voting with a relatively weak measure suggests
that they would be able to explain even more of it if measurement
difficulties could be overcome. Bush v. Gore only strengthens the
attitudinalist case in this regard, because the two outliers are easily explained as Justices for whom party affiliation has proved to be
a poor predictor of attitudes. 170 Thus, even if one proxy for atti-

167. The use of this variable, however, is more common in studies of the courts of appeals
than in studies of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmakingon U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO STATE L.J. 1635, 1677-86 (1998); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1738
(1997).
168. Segal and Spaeth themselves rely heavily on this approach. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 1, at 225 (noting that "the use of past voting behavior to predict what occurs subse-

quently exceeds conventional levels of significance for 18 of the 21 issues into which criminal
procedure has been divided").
169. For an overview of studies demonstrating that political party affiliations can be prodic.
tive of decision making, see Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposalfor Improv.
ingAnterican Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220-24 (1999).
170. Conservatives have been disappointed in both Stevens and Souter, concluding that they
turned out to be more liberal than expected. See, e.g., Paul A. Gigot, Supreme Politics: Who'd
Replace Justice Stevens?, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at A14 ("While the justice appointed by
President Gerald Ford likes to claim Republican credentials, you can bet he doesn't want to be
replaced by another Antonin Scalia, a staunch conservative."); Ramesh Ponnuru, Empty Souter,
NA'L REV., Sept. 11, 1995, at 24; see also A Look at the Court, ARIZ. REPUB., Dec. 11, 2000, at AG
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tudes-political party affiliation-can explain only seven votes,
when broadened to include other, superior proxies, attitudinalist
theory can explain all nine.
The second objection, to which we have alluded already, is
that Bush v. Gore was an exceptional case and that attitudinalism's
success in explaining Justices' votes cannot be extrapolated to other
cases. The easy retort is that this is why attitudinalists advance
their case through regressions rather than analysis of individual
cases. The purpose of analyzing Bush u. Gore cannot be to prove the
attitudinalist case, but to show its reflection. That Bush v. Gore, an
exceptional case, is consistent with a model advanced by scrutiny of
largely run-of-the-mill cases, 171 assuming any Supreme Court cases
can be so called, cannot undermine the theory. Perhaps the high
stakes nature of Bush v. Gore provides an explanation for Justices'
voting their attitudes that cannot be extrapolated to other cases,
but at least it in no way falsifies the model. Indeed, it strengthens
the model by indicating that one contingency in which one might
expect that the theory would break down-high stakes and high
media scrutiny-in fact does not undermine its robust claims.
An additional answer, however, is that the importance of
Bush v. Gore only strengthens the attitudinalist case. If Justices
are more likely to vote their attitudes in more important cases than
in less important ones, then the data that seem inconsistent with
attitudinalism are the less important data. For example, the Supreme Court issues many unanimous opinions. This is not inconsistent with attitudinalism, for it may be that all of the Justices' attitudes about certain issues are the same, but attitudinalism does not
have much to say about such cases. 172 Even if these cases were

(noting in anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision that both Stevens and Souter were once
considered moderate or conservative but were now considered liberal). A counterargument might

be that Stevens and Souter are in fact conservative, but that ideology does not explain judicial
voting. In any event, the consensus that Stevens and Souter are, by today's standards, liberal,

existed well prior to the decision in Bush v. Gore.
171. Some attitudinalist studies focus on relatively important Supreme Court cases. For an

analysis of how the importance of a case may be measured and a review of the literature assessing how case importance affects decision making, see Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring
Issue Salience, 44 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 66 (2000).

172. The problem dates back to early behavioralist work. Pritchett, for example, suggested
that nonattitudinal factors such as precedent explained unanimous decisions. See PRITCHrIT,
supra note 144, at 25-31. Attitudinalists have sought to identify why the Supreme Court often
decides cases unanimously. See Saul Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision
Making on the U.S. Supreme Court. Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL BEHAVIOR 75.
82-85 (1987); Harold J. Spaeth, Consensus in the Unanimous Decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 72 JUDICATURE 274, 275-81 (1989); see generally Thomas R. Hensley & Scott P. Johnson.
Unanimity on the Rehnquist Court, 31 AKRON L. REV. 387, 392-94 (1998) (discussing the attitudinalists' approach to the problem of unanimity). Critics, however, have pointed out that the
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flatly inconsistent with attitudinalism, the advocate of the theory
could still find solace in being able to explain the "important" cases,
assuming that the unanimous opinions tend to be the less important ones. 173 Bush v. Gore by itself does not prove that attitudinal
explanations will work better in more important cases than in less
important ones, but Bush v. Gore provides evidence that is as
strong as any data point on this issue could be.
The third objection to attitudinalism is simpler and yet more
forceful: So what? Even if attitudinalism helps us understand votes
on the merits of cases, it explains nothing about the inner dynamics
of judicial opinions. Though attitudinalists acknowledge that their
approach cannot explain judicial reasoning, they deprecate what
they refer to as the "legal model." 174 This term is intended to convey
the notion that law, neutrally applied to a new set of facts, is expected to generate consistent and predictable answers, and that its
failure to do so renders law as a discipline analytically suspect. The
use of the term "legal model" is thus synonymous with legal formalism, a discredited jurisprudential theory since the legal realism
movement. The obverse of legal formalism-what the attitudinalists intend to convey by negative implication-is that the very
flexibility of doctrine renders judicial opinions just so many words.
It is this disparagement of the law that has made the attitudinal
model anathema to lawyers, 175 who generally believe that the arsheer volume of unanimous decisions demonstrates that "it]he impact of a body of common legal
rules on a group of constrained voters can be dramatic." Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem:
Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 959 (1990); see also Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 743, 777-78 (2000) C'[T]he fact that the Court rules unanimously in nearly 40% of
its argued cases suggests either that there is a strong core of agreement among the Justices
about the law's requirements in a significant percentage of cases, or at least that their disagreements are not sharp enough to provoke a dissent."). Attitudinalists, in any event, can predict
that in certain contexts, unanimous opinions are unlikely. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at
223-24 ("At the level of the individual justices we could have predicted with considerable confidence that no death penalty case in either direction would ever be decided unanimously because
of the behavior of Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall at the liberal extreme, and Rehnquist at the
Conservative extreme."). For new institutionalist approaches to Supreme Court unanimity, see
sources cited infra at note 206.
173. There are obvious exceptions, including Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,
531 U.S. 70 (2000). See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
174. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 62 (referring to the "meaninglessness of the legal
model").
175. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 131 (1996) (suggesting that "it is likely that many [lawyers] would reject out of hand
the idea that the justices' policy preferences are the primary basis for decision"). Lawyers sometimes seem to misunderstand the point. Judge Wald, for example, argues in response to an attitudinal study, "[a]ny assumption, therefore, that judges intentionally act in alignment with the
party from which they sprung is extremely problematic. When the judge's decisions and the
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guments in judicial opinions are what is important, if for no other
reason than that doctrine is the language through which legal arguments must be presented to those with the power to decide cases.
Moreover, for academic lawyers who are not merely, or even primarily, interested in predicting case results from legal doctrine, the
label "legal model" is entirely misleading. Bush v. Gore may reveal
that Justices are occasionally disingenuous in their willingness to
bend doctrine to their advantage, but even this conclusion derives
from a prior identification of which arguments liberals and conservatives would tend to prefer.
To assess this critique, let us return to the center of the puzzle that animates this essay: Why did Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the election statutes constituted an
impermissible change in Florida law, sign on to the per curiam
opinion, which rested upon equal protection? Even if attitudinal
theory can provide a persuasive answer, academic lawyers can still
protest that predicting the judgment vote only scratches the surface
of difficult and salient cases because it ignores the underlying dynamics of argument and the obvious importance of doctrine to the
deciding Justices, who otherwise would not have labored over developing acceptable theories consistent with their preferred outcomes. If attitudinal theory cannot provide a plausible answer to
this inquiry, then its scope is limited indeed, for that would suggest
that attitudinalism can explain only one aspect of voting behavior,
why Justices vote for one outcome rather than another.
The attitudinalist could answer by pointing out that a
breakdown of individual opinions may seem to make the attitudinalist case even stronger. The three Justices generally considered
to be the most conservative found that Bush should win for essentially two independent sets of reasons. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy subscribed only to the equal protection theory, joining only the
per curiam opinion and not the Chief Justice's opinion adding the
theory that the Florida Supreme Court's decision constituted an
illegal change in the law. Moving toward the left of the Court, Justice Souter, probably the most conservative of the Court's four lib-

party's view do coincide, it is far more likely that the same life experiences that channel a judge's
choice of political parties also guide her judicial decisionmaking." Patricia M. Wald, A Response
to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999). Attitudinalists, however, do not maintain
that judges vote along party lines because they are following the commands of the party, only
that different judges, perhaps because of differences in "life experiences," have different ideologies, which necessarily shape how they tend to resolve cases before them.
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erals, 71 6 and Justice Breyer agreed with the equal protection theory,
disagreeing only with the remedy. Justice Stevens, probably the
most liberal Justice, 177 and Justice Ginsburg not only expressed
strong dissatisfaction with the Court's ruling, but also rejected any
claim of a constitutional violation in the case. In addition, only Jus178
tice Stevens's dissent suggested a loss of trust in the judiciary.
Thus, Justices whom one would expect would care most about the
public policy impact of the election were most emphatic in their
views. In this analysis, we can posit that the conservatives signed
onto the per curiam opinion because it gave additional support for
the outcome.
Although this answer shows that the breakdown of Justices
within each group voting for a particular outcome seems to reflect
attitudes, this is not a prediction of attitudinal theory. A judge
seeking to maximize public policy should be indifferent as to
whether the desired public policy result is achieved for one reason
or for two. If anything, the conservative Justices should have concurred only in the judgment of reversal, because that would have
allowed them to achieve the desired result (Bush's election) without
strengthening equal protection law in a way that seems counter to
their apparent beliefs. If strong attitudinal preferences cause
judges to be emphatic, perhaps that is owing to some expressive
function in judging. 179 In other words, emphasis might provide satisfaction that is independent of the result. Conservatives might vote
conservatively because they want to be seen as conservative and
liked by their fellow conservatives. 180 The more justifications lead-

176. In each of the Supreme Court terms from 1995 through 1998, Justice Souter agreed
with Justices Thomas and Scalia, generally considered the most conservative Justices, a higher
percentage of the time than any of the other liberals. See The Supreme Court 1998 Term-The
Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 402 (1999); The Supreme Court 1997 Term-The Statistics,
112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1998); The Supreme Court 1996 Term-The Statistics, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 432 (1997); The Supreme Court 1995 Term-The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368
(1996).
177. In the same Supreme Court terms, Justice Stevens agreed with Justices Thomas and
Scalia a far lower percentage of the time than any of the other liberals. See sources cited supra
note 176.
178. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. On expressive theories of law, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, PrincipledLimitations on
Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997); and Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
180. The desire of people to be well thought of by those who generally agree with them helps
explain the phenomenon of "group polarization," in which discussion among a group that disagrees with a separate population tends to move the group further away from that separate
population. Cass Sunstein explains that group polarization
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ing to the conservative result they offer, the more conservative they
might seem. The same analysis could be true in reverse for liberals.
If true, this at least would force a significant modification of attitudinal theory, which insists that judges seek to maximize their effect
on public policy through their votes cast on case outcomes, not that
they use opinions as a vehicle of self-expression. 181
There is more that attitudinalism cannot explain. Why did
the Supreme Court wait until Bush v. Gore to help Bush's cause,
rather than resolving the issue in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board? Why did some Justices in the minority agree with
the authors of the per curiam opinion that there was an equal protection violation, while disagreeing on the remedy? Why did Justice
Stevens assert that the resolution of the case would undermine
faith in the courts, an outcome ironically exacerbated by the statement itself? Why was the majority decision "per curiam," rather
than signed by its author, presumably Justice O'Connor or Justice
Kennedy? Why did the Chief Justice's concurrence cite cases generally seen as decided by liberal Courts to support its case? Why did
any of the Justices choose to write opinions at all?
No model of judicial politics can be expected to offer definitive answers to all these questions, and certainly neither political
science nor social choice can resolve the ultimate normative question: Who, if anyone, was right? But it would help political science
to develop a complementary theory that provides plausible answers
to puzzles about why individual Justices signed onto, ignored, or
rejected particular theories, and some explanation of how legal argument and attitudes intersect. At times, even attitudinalists seem
to acknowledge that various legal arguments can be assessed in
terms of plausibility. For example, Segal and Spaeth state, "If Michael Dukakis filed a suit arguing that he should be declared win-

is based on the commonsense intuition that any individual's position on an issue is partly a function of which arguments presented within the group seem
convincing. The choice therefore moves in the direction of the most persuasive
position defended by the group, taken as a whole. Because a group whose members are already inclined in a certain direction will have a disproportionate
number of arguments going in that same direction, the result of discussion will
be to move people further in the direction of their initial inclinations. The key
is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed (speaking purely
descriptively) in a particular direction. Hence there will be a shift in the direction of the original tilt.
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE LJ.71. 89-90
(2000).
181. Though there is a small literature on the expressive function of judging, that literature
tends to emphasize that judicial decisions will be a reflection of public attitudes, not that judges
make decisions as a means of self-expression. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 374-78 (2000).
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ner of the 1988 presidential election, and if the Supreme Court had
to decide the case, we would not expect the votes in the case to depend on whom the justices voted for in the election." 182 No Justice,
they say, would grant credence to "meritless cases."1 83 Whether a
case has merit, however, is often controversial, and Justices often
go to considerable lengths to establish that their position has more
merit than the opposing one. A more refined theory than attitudinalism is needed to show why they bother.
B. New Institutionalism
Frustration with attitudinalism has led political scientists to
embrace a school of thought that adherents have called the "new
institutionalism."'8 4 The approach cabins attitudinalism by postulating that although Justices seek to advance their policy preferences, the institutional contexts in which they operate may affect
how they do so. Although the new institutionalism is not easily
categorized, it can be divided into two rough camps, which Sue
Davis has dubbed "rational-choice institutionalism" and "historicalinterpretive institutionalism." 185 The rational choice variant characterizes Justices as strategic actors who contemplate how decisions
that they make might affect other decision makers, including other
members of the Court as well as members of other political
branches. The historical-interpretive approach maintains that particular institutional roles inform the actor's institutional perspective. On this view, Justices act as they do in part because institutions condition their views of how they are supposed to act.
As suggested above, these perspectives may be complements
rather than substitutes, and they may each help explain some important features of judicial decision making. Consider, for example,
the most basic question about Bush v.Gore: Why did Justices write
opinions at all? A rational-choice institutionalist might argue that
Justices write opinions because they wish to persuade other institu-

182. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 70.
183. Id.
184. The term originates in James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism:
OrganizationalFactors in PoliticalLife, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 741 (1984), which emphasized politics as a vehicle through which "individuals develop themselves, their communities, and
the public good." Rogers Smith was the first to import the new institutionalism into judicial
politics scholarship. See Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence,the "New Institutionalism,"
and the Futureof Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SC. REV. 89, 98-107 (1988).
185. Sue Davis, The ChiefJustice and JudicialDecision-Making: The InstitutionalBasis for
Leadership on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 135, 137 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
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tional actors that they have disposed of the case properly in an effort to gain their support and so that the other actors do not seek to
overturn their decisions. 18 6 Though such overturning is a smaller
danger for constitutional than f6r statutory decision making, 8 7
even constitutional decisions can be overruled or overturned by
constitutional amendment. 188 And even though remote, there is at
least a theoretical possibility that other actors, typically the President, will refuse to abide by the decision and precipitate a constitutional crisis. In Bush v. Gore, there might have been a danger that
Congress would have ignored the Supreme Court decision when
counting electoral votes or that the losing candidate would have
refused to concede defeat. 189 Neither of these occurred. And though
the possibility to most observers seemed vanishingly small, 9 0 given
the existing practice of justifying decisions in opinions, failure to do
so in an epochal case would have appeared sufficiently bizarre that
the chances of overruling or of precipitating at least a crisis of confidence would have been higher than usual.
The historical-interpretive institutionalist, meanwhile,
would maintain that Justices write opinions because they believe
that justifying decisions is part of their job. This is not an inevitable aspect of judging, but a function of historical context.' 9 1 Indeed,

186. Sometimes, however, Justices may be able to effect their policy preferences best if Congress does overturn the Court's decision, and therefore they may encourage Congress to do so.
See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Ocerride: CongressionalReversals of
Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503, 504-21 (1996).
187. For a historical review of congressional reversals of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory interpreta.
tion Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (overturning Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)); id.
amend. XVI (overturning Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); id. amend.
XIV (overturning Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)); id. amend. XI (overturning Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
189. These theories are not altogether unrelated, as the Constitution assigns to the President
of the Senate, who was then Gore, the task of counting the votes. Id. amend. XII (The President
of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted."). Gore might have argued that the counting of
the electoral votes was a political question for Congress in general and the President of the Senate in particular. Gore, of course, did not do so, instead overruling objections from his supporters
to the Florida electors. Edward Walsh & Juliet Eilperin, Gore Presidesas Congress Tallies Votes
Electing Bush; Black CaucusMembers Object as Fla. Numbers Are Accepted, VASH. POST,Jan. 7,
2001, at Al.
190. Of course, it was not always vanishingly small, and rational choice institutionalists
have been able to cast new light on the emergence of judicial review. See Lee Epstein & Jack
Knight, On the Struggle for JudicialSupremacy, 30 L. & SOC'Y REv. 87, 89-112 (1996).
191. Even appeals court judges decline to write opinions in many cases. For a critique of
summary dispositions in the federal appellate courts, see Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal
Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and
Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995), and see also
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Supreme Court Justices make many decisions, such as votes on certiorari, which are generally not explained. 192 For the historicalinterpretive institutionalist, opinion writing is not solely a function
of a strategic calculation, but *also a reflection of institutional
norms. Such norms can change. For example, Supreme Court Justices used to issue opinions seriatim, with each Justice explaining
his reasoning on the merits. 193 Today, of course, a Justice who
merely signs onto someone else's opinion ordinarily does not explain
the reason for doing so, with the presumption being that one signs
onto an opinion because one agrees with-or at least is willing to
acquiesce in-its reasoning, except to the extent elsewhere indicated. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas do not explain why they signed onto the per curiam opinion,
and though their signatures attest to endorsement of the opinion,
any pragmatic reason for joining it remains unstated. Though the
break from the practice of seriatim opinions was sudden, 9 4 changes
in norms can take place over long periods of time as well. Indeed,
one of the mysteries that historical-interpretive institutionalists
have sought to resolve is why the frequency of dissent has greatly
195
increased in this century.
The new institutionalism would amount to little, if all it
could do was to explain such practices as opinion writing, and without consensus about the best explanation at that. The same kinds of
reasoning, however, can resolve some of the mysteries that attitudinalism fails to answer. To illustrate, we will start with some of
the easier mysteries and work up to the more challenging ones.
Consider again the observation that no Supreme Court Justice
would have held that Governor Dukakis was the true winner of the
1988 presidential election. 196 The historical-interpretive institutionalist would explain that this is because there are shared legal
and cultural understandings about the quality of legal arguments.
There are some legal propositions that everyone would label either
"acceptable" or "unacceptable," and given our cultural understand-

Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice:A Critique,69 HARV. L. REV. 707 (1956) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for resolving cases summarily).
192. Bush v. Gore is a rare exception in that Justice Scalia explained at least his own decision to grant a stay. 531 U.S. 1046, 1046-47 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (granting stay and
certiorari).
193. E.g., John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practicesof the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 139-43 (1999).
194. Id. at 143.
195. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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ings of law, no argument for a Dukakis victory could have been offered with a straight face. 197 The rational-choice institutionalist
would add that a decision contrary to what everyone viewed as unambiguously persuasive would have negative repercussions for the
decision maker, either defiance or at least some reputational loss.
The institutionalist recognition that legal reasoning is a cultural constraint on judges does explain more than why some decision making options seem altogether unavailable, which the attitudinalists already seem to concede. For once we accept that legal culture can brand certain arguments in this manner, we must recognize that legal argument is not just mumbo-jumbo, that even if legal reasoning is culturally determined, there are stronger arguments and weaker ones from the perspective of a particular legal
culture. Yet because there is no algorithm with which to measure
the quality of arguments,198 there will be many cases in which everyone recognizes that there are competing "reasonable" arguments
to be advanced. Moreover, there will be borderline cases in which
some people will believe that there is an unambiguous answer to
the legal problem with which all reasonable jurists would agree,
while others will maintain that different answers are plausible, or
that the result is unambiguous but in the opposite direction.
The new institutionalist recognition of the role of legal argument does not make judicial attitudes irrelevant. Attitudes may
help explain both how a jurist is likely to resolve a case in which
the jurist recognizes that there is no unambiguous answer and
whether or not a case has an unambiguous answer. If the law is
genuinely ambiguous on a particular issue, even given whatever
commitments a particular judge has made to abstract principles of
legal interpretation, then the judge might as well resolve the issue
in the way that advances the judge's public policy preferences.
Moreover, attitudes are psychological, and even if our understanding of psychology is too shallow to produce robust explanations of

197. The best argument we can come up with for a Dukakis victory is that then-VicePresident Bush, by virtue of his alleged participation in the Iran-Contra scandal, might be found

to "have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the" Constitution, so that he is ineligible to
"hold any office, civil or military, under the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XTV, § 3. This

shows that at least a bad argument can be constructed to support even the ridiculous proposition
that Dukakis was the victor; we will leave a dissection of the argument to the reader. Thus, the
claim that no court would embrace the proposition is true not simply because no argument what.

soever can be constructed. It must be because there are shared understandings about what
makes arguments sound.

198. Moreover, in the constitutional context, a variety of different types of arguments can be
made, and there is no single principle by which these arguments can be compared. E.g., PHIUP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982).
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attitudes, the theory of cognitive dissonance implies that, ceteris
paribus, judges are generally likely to find arguments that advance
their policy preferences more appealing than arguments that do
not.199 Just as any individual is less likely to accept data that represent a vehement affront to his or her most strongly held world
views, 20 0 so too is a judge less likely to find persuasive a legal argument that seems to point in the wrong direction. 20 1 This may explain the apparent inconsistency between presumed preferences on
equal protection and federalism in Bush v. Gore. Just as Americans
seemed to divide along party lines in their views of the fairness of
the Florida recount, 2 2 so too desired outcomes may have colored the
Justices' genuine assessments of the merits in the Supreme Court.
This reconceptualization can help provide a theory explaining judicial views in Bush v. Gore that is more sophisticated than
that offered by attitudinalism. For the five conservative Justices
who voted for Bush, both issues in the case presumably seemed susceptible to reasonable disagreement. Though the Justices in the
majority implied the basis of their disagreement with dissenters,
neither the per curiam opinion nor Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence ever attacked the dissents directly, perhaps indicating a
recognition that their views, though different, were reasonable.2 3

199. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Third Best Choice: An Essay on Law and History, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 537, 556-62 (1990) (exploring how cognitive dissonance theory might affect judicial decisions).
200. For examples and evidence, see LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957).
201. Psychologists also have termed the tendency of people to reject evidence that undermino
their theories as "confirmation bias." See generally Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confir.
mation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987)
(explaining and analyzing concept of "confirmation bias"). As a legal commentator explains:
[W]hen asked to assess the validity of a hypothesis, subjects systematically
search available information for theory-confirming, at the expense of theorydisconfirming, data. They not only evaluate theory-confirming evidence as being more relevant than theory-disconfirming evidence but also have better rocall for the former than the latter. Indeed, people have a good deal of difficulty
in searching for and recognizing theory-disconfirming information. They accept
theory-confirming evidence at face value, whereas they subject theorydisconfirming evidence to critical evaluation. Unsurprisingly, this results in a
rather powerful bias toward confirming tentative judgments or beliefs. This
enormous quantity of empirical evidence suggests that Title VII's assumption of
a blank slate from which employers make decisions is wholly unsupportable.
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrinination and Equal Employment Opportunity,47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1210-11 (1995).
202. See, e.g., Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Poll Finds Most Want Recount as Last Word,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2000, at A20.
203. There are certainly many cases in which the same majority has directly confronted arguments offered by the same dissenters. E.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 924, 933-34 n.4 (2001).
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One of the dissenters, in contrast, explicitly questioned the integrity of the per curiam approach and outcome, while another stated
that "the federal legal questions presented, with one exception, are
insubstantial." 20 4 These Justices thus may well have felt that the
issues were at or beyond the unambiguous threshold. Certainly this
is not the only case in which a majority or concurring opinion author has declined to reply to his dissenters. And the failure to respond directly to criticism might simply reflect time constraints in
drafting. But it is worth at least considering the alternative thesis
that the asymmetry reflects a divergence in the confidence interval
concerning how the dispositive issues should be resolved. If this
were so-implying that the dissenters were more confident in their
analyses than were those who authored the per curiam opinion and
concurrence-then one might imagine the more strongly held views
of four to persuade a more ambivalent majority of five.20 And yet,
Court rules afford each Justice a single vote without regard to
strength of conviction. And thus, because each Justice receives one
vote, regardless of degree of confidence, Bush was able to prevail.
This is, however, just one plausible story, and a further consideration of the role of dissent in new attitudinalist scholarship
may provide different ones. New attitudinalists demonstrate that
there was once a norm rendering dissents extraordinarily rare, but
that this norm changed beginning about 1940.206 Dissents may expose faulty reasoning by a majority, and scholars have shown that

204. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 144 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. In addition to the problem discussed in the test there are two further difficulties with

this prediction. First, it has no empirical support. Indeed, even commentators who believe that
there is strategic behavior in federal courts acknowledge that there is no evidence for vote swap-

ping across cases. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2331 & n.101 (1999). The new institutionalist explanation is that
there is a norm against such behavior that various constraints, such as the constraint that
judges explain their decisions in a consistent way, promote. See id. at 2334-62. Second. even if
some Justices are only weakly confident that their legal determination is correct, that does not
mean that they have only a weak preference for that outcome. Bush v.Gore may be an illustration of this; even if the Justices ruling for Bush felt that the issues were debatable, that does not
mean that they would have been almost as happy with the alternative outcome.
206. For a table demonstrating the dramatic decline in the percentage of unanimous Court
opinions, see David M. O'Brien, InstitutionalNorms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUIONALIST APPROACH 91, 92-94 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). Explorations of the reason for the decline include Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, AM.

J.

POL. SC. (forthcoming 2001),

available at

http://artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/ep-stein/research/Norm.html; Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and
Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1158 (1992); and Thomas G. Walker et al., On
the Mysterious Demise of ConsensualNorms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL 362
(1988).
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dissents circulated among the Justices often result in changes in
the majority opinion. 207 The puzzle is why dissents today often survive the internal debate, even though they have no immediate or
predictable effect on the law, especially in a case like Bush v. Gore
in which there is little hope for a dissent to be vindicated by a later
Court. One commentator has suggested that the practice of dissent
is demanded by norms of democratic legitimacy, 20 8 but this normative defense does not provide a positive explanation for the practice.
Moreover, the term legitimacy itself is susceptible to competing
definitions. Thus, if one instead defines judicial legitimacy as basing decisions upon agreed-upon materials and a common jurisprudential method, 209 then the increased frequency of dissents threatens to undermine legitimacy. Moreover, dissents risk undermining
the perceived legitimacy of the Court when, as in Bush v. Gore, they
are dismissive or disrespectful of the majority's views.
One answer is that a circulated dissent will have a chance of

influencing the majority only if the threat to publish the dissent is
credible. Sometimes, evidence indicates, separate opinions are
withdrawn, 210 but a Justice who often failed to follow through on a

207. Professors Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck offer a dotailed empirical model of what they term "the decision to accommodate" a requested change in a
draft opinion. See FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE
COLLEGIAL GAME 94-124 (2000). Although requests to accommodate often come in the form of
memos, they sometimes come through circulation of first drafts of separate opinions. Id. at 11314. Lee Epstein and Jack Knight offer the following explanation:
[Olur suspicion . . . is that the justices occasionally use these writings as bargaining tools. They demonstrate to the writer that she cannot count on support
if she does not adjust her opinion in ways suggested in the dissent or concurrence. By this logic, a writing circulated by the non-opinion writer that is never
published or that changes in form when it is published provides some evidence
of strategic interaction.
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 76-77 (1998) (footnote omitted).
208. See Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practiceof Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J.
2235, 2246-58 (1996) (arguing that although the rule of law cannot justify the practice of dissont,
the practice may be justified through the constitutional commitment to deliberative democracy).
209. Cf. Amartya K. Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Reexamination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53
(1977), reprinted in AMARTYA K. SEN, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 158 (1982) (positing that
judgment-based decision making is grounded in agreed-upon norms).
210. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Justices will withdraw separate opinions only when
the author of the majority opinion accommodates their concerns. Professors Epstein and Knight
give an example from memoranda concerning United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). After Justice White wrote an opinion, Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Stewart circulated concurring opinions. Justice Stevens eventually withdrew his separate opinion when Justice White modified his opinion to meet at least Justice Stevens's objections, but Justice Brennan, even though he explicitly indicated in a memorandum that he would
withdraw the concurrence if his concerns were satisfied, ended up publishing a revised version as
a partial concurrence. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 207, at 67-70.
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threat to dissent would lose credibility. 211 The dissents of the Justices in the minority in Bush v. Gore may represent those Justices'
carrying out their credible threats to dissent. The threats, however,
may or may not have been explicit. It would be more typical in the
Rehnquist Court for votes simply to be taken in conference with
little discussion.212 Repeated dissents issued over time in the event
of disagreement, with more vituperative dissents saved for either
more important cases or for cases in which the minority believes
that the majority's position is entirely unwarranted, may make explicit threats unnecessary.
This suggests two possible accounts of the dissents in Bush
v. Gore, each corresponding to a game-theoretic model. 213 The first
game is analogous to a prisoners' dilemma, in which two prisoners
would be best off if neither ratted out the other, but in which it is in
each prisoner's interest to rat out the other regardless of what the
other prisoner does. 2 1 4 In the judicial context, the disagreeing Jus-

tices in each case must choose whether to expose the majority, recognizing that everyone will be best off across a range of cases if no
one dissents. Because the game is repeated, payoffs from unlimited
iterations are possible such that a cooperative solution might appear dominant.215 This might help to explain why the Court was
able to maintain a norm of non-defection for so long. In an infinitely
repeated prisoners' dilemma, a "tit-for-tat" strategy might emerge
in which cooperation by a Justice in one period induces cooperation

211. That dissents may represent carrying out of credible threats may explain the relatively
low dissent rate on the courts of appeals. See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1616 n.72 (2000).
212. See O'Brien, supra note 206, at 110 ("In comparison to Burger. Chief Justice Rehnquist
discouraged lengthy exchanges at conference ....
").
213. Although new institutionalists do not generally frame their models in this manner, providing a game theoretical cast on these models is useful at least in developing a preliminary
explanation for the strategic behavior that new institutionalists observe. For articles articulating
explicit game theoretic approaches to judicial decision making, see Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Ganie-Th7eoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETO,:
HALL L. REV. 736 (1993); Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L
ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994); and Edward P. Schwartz, Policy, Precedent,and Power.A Positive Theory of Supreme CourtDecision-Making,8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 219 (1992).
214. For a more rigorous treatment of the prisoners' dilemma, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL.
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35 (1994), and see also MAXWELL L STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 540-51, 961-67 (1997).

215. Of course, to the extent that the Justices anticipated an end point, they faced the phenomenon of unraveling, which serves to restore the original prisoners' dilemma payoffs, and thus
the norm of mutual defection. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFOMATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO GAME THEORY 88-89 (1989); see also Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox,9 THEORY &
DECISION 127 (1978) (providing an early illustration of the problem). But see David M. Kreps et
al.,
Rational Cooperationin the Finitely Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245,
245-47 (1982) (explaining why cooperation may occur even in finite-period prisoners' dilemmas).
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2 17
by another Justice in the next. 216 But this norm is not inevitable,
particularly in an ideologically divided Court in which some Justices are consistently likely to be in the minority. Because there will
be few opportunities for the Justices typically in the majority to pay
back the Justices typically in the minority by not dissenting in
cases in which the alignments are reversed, cooperation may break
down. For example, Justice Breyer's opinion, which methodically
dissects the majority's analysis, may reflect that he had little reason not to identify areas of disagreement. Even if his dissent marginally undermines the Court's legitimacy, Justice Breyer may
benefit from it if he believes that it demonstrates his own integrity
or consistency or simply the rightness of his own analysis.
The second game, focusing on the possibility of a threat in an
individual case, is "chicken," referring to the dangerous real-life
game in which two teenagers speed cars toward a cliff, each hoping
that the other applies the brakes first.2 18 This can take place at the
level of the individual case. Justice Stevens may have hoped that
one Justice would have been so concerned about the effect of an angry dissent in such a controversial case on either the reputation of
the individual Justice or on the Court as a whole that the Justice
would have switched votes. So viewed, a potential divergence exists
between the incentives to affect-or at least try to affect-the behavior of other Justices, and the incentives to preserve the appearance of decorum on the Court. The problem with challenging an opponent to a game of chicken, of course, is that both sides may go off
the cliff, and this might be what occurred in Bush v. Gore. The
Court, of course, will survive the crash, 219 and Justice Stevens may

216. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20-37 (1984) (report-

ing that the simple tit-for-tat strategy defeated other strategies in a round robin competition
among algorithms).
217. Even if tit-for-tat defeats other strategies in a tournament structure, that does not moan

that it will defeat other strategies in equilibrium. Indeed, it can be deductively proved that once
any strategy becomes sufficiently dominant, there will be another strategy that can defeat it.
See, e.g., Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation, 91 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 290, 295 (1997). Moreover, more complex game theory models show that institu-

tional context can affect the equilibrium that results, with relatively small defections potentially
unraveling a previously stable equilibrium. See Kenneth G. Binmore & Larry Samuelson, Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Gaines Played by FiniteAutomata, 57 J. ECON. THEORY 278, 288-98
(1992).
218. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 214, at 44.
219. See Jess Bravin, Election 2000: High Court's Deep Divisions Have Almost Always
Healed-So Far,WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A19. Indeed, the Court not only will survive the
crash, but the Court's political capital might remain largely unaffected by the ultimate decision.
Liberals tend to favor a more activist Court and conservatives tend to favor a minimalist, nonactivist court. Cf. The Nearest Run Thing, NAT'L REV., Dec. 31, 2000, at 13, 13 (responding to
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have believed that the small chance of persuading a Justice in the
majority to switch sides was worth the cost.
New institutionalism cannot tell us which of these competing
explanations for Justice Stevens' actions is more persuasive. There
may be elements of truth in both, and on another level, both may
abstract from the complex reality of the case. Nonetheless, new institutionalism at least provides a basis for furnishing an explanation of a phenomenon-a dissenting jurist calling into question the
integrity of the opposing Justices-that traditional legal and attitudinal approaches cannot. 220 The new institutionalist literature
thus transcends attitudinalism's insistence on the irrelevance of
legal argument and confirms lawyers' instinctive sense that Justices use majority opinions and dissents to argue over legal issues.
This acknowledgment of doctrine's relevance is critical, because
doctrine is the vehicle through which courts affect the conduct of
the state, the shape of institutions, and the nature of countless interactions regulated by law. Lawyers advising their clients, including the government, about how to shape their conduct to avoid litigation and adverse judicial decisions do not simply read cases for
their facts and outcome votes. Now that new institutionalism has
helped us understand how the Justices have acted giuen their voting coalitions, we can mine it for an understanding of how the voting coalitions in Bush v. Gore formed.
To start, new institutionalism can provide a theory explaining why Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the per curiam's
analysis of the equal protection issue. It could be, of course, that
Souter and Breyer genuinely agreed that the different manual recount standards in different counties posed an equal protection
Justice Stevens's statement that the "'nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian'" of the law was undermined by stating that "[ia]fter decades of capricious and arbitrary
decisions, we can only hope so"). If this conservative decision is regarded as activist, that is
unlikely to cause liberals to reject the Court's institutional power to be activist in the future.
Failing victories in the political process, liberals well appreciate that the Court remains a helpful
last bastion. And conservatives, while generally preferring the Court to remain out of the political process, certainly will overcome whatever reticence they have to benefit from a victory that
itself will solidify the Court's own conservative base through subsequent judicial appointments.
So viewed, Bush v. Gore is reminiscent of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). a
case that appeared unlikely to have provoked a constitutional crisis given that the two Republican-controlled political branches had no incentive to upset the Court's ultimate ruling, denying a
Federalist judicial appointment even while staking out the power of judicial review.
220. Legal theorists also would have trouble understanding such an attack. Ronald
Dworkin's account of legal interpretation, for example, explains that "when judges disagree, at
least in detail, about the best interpretation of the community's political order... each judge still
confirms and reinforces the principled character of our association." RONALD D.ORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 264 (1986). Direct attacks on another Justice's integrity would seem to defeat the purpose of dissent on his account.
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problem. This is a simple attitudinal explanation, except that it
seems odd that they would find an equal protection problem when
the ordinarily more liberal Justice Stevens did not. Another possibility is that Justices Souter and Breyer were attempting to lure
some of the Justices who ended up in the majority, particularly Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, to their side. Such attempts at maneuvering are familiar stories of the new institutionalist literature.
New institutionalist scholars, supplementing data with anecdotes,
have unearthed memoranda indicating that Justices at least sometimes are willing to vote in ways inconsistent with their first-choice
policy preferences, or ideal points, in an attempt to forge successful
majority coalitions. 22 1 Indeed, it is central to the new institutionalist rejection of attitudinalism that Justices' professed policy preferences will deviate from their actual policy preferences because of
strategic attempts to ensure that the case holding is as close as
222
practically possible to their ideal point.
While we cannot yet explore conference memoranda to ascertain whether this is what happened in Bush v. Gore, and while
these memoranda may prove inconclusive even once available, there
are clues indicating that this is a plausible account of Bush v. Gore.
Interestingly, newspaper reporters covering the oral argument 223 in
Bush v. Gore sensed that Justices Souter and Breyer were attempting to find some common ground with the conservatives on the
Court. 224 Although Justices O'Connor and Kennedy did not defini-

221. Lee Epstein and Jack Knight are particularly successful in uncovering examples of such
maneuvering. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 207, at 92 (arguing that Chief Justico
Burger took a position "at odds with his sincere preference" because he "thought that he could
attract sufficient support for the establishment of a good faith exception [to the exclusionary
rule] only by taking the eradication of the rule off the table").
222. Keith Whittington explains:
[T]he attitudinal model posits that a judge will vote so that the case outcome is
as close to her preferred position as possible ....
Rational choice scholars, by
contrast, assume that the constraints faced by justices are more severe and also
that some of those constraints are mutable. Notably, the choices of relevant actors may be interdependent. As a result, in order to achieve their desired outcome, it may not be enough for judges to act sincerely. They may need to act
strategically, in the sense of understanding and anticipating the likely responses of others to the judge's own actions. Judicial decisions may not simply
reflect judicial attitudes, but may also reflect the larger strategic environment.
Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach:PostbehavioralistApproaches to JudicialPolitics, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 611-12 (2000) (review essay).
223. The official transcript does not identify the questioners by name. See Official Transcript,
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) 2000 WL 1804429. For a transcript including identification of Justices, as transcribed by a private media organization, see George W. Bush v. Al
Gore, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at S1.
224. William Glaberson, Contesting the Vote: The Legal Battle; Justices Trying to Find Middle Ground, Legal Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at Al.
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tively express their positions, both Justices indicated general skepticism about the Florida Supreme Court's decision to allow recounting of ballots. 225 Moreover, both indicated some openness to the

equal protection claim, 226 and both expressed some skepticism about
the Article II claim. 227 Eventually, of course, the attempt failed,

225. A New York Times editorial summarized, "The comments of the two potential swing justices on the election case-Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor--suggested they
were inordinately troubled by the Florida Supreme Court order to hand-count disputed ballots."
Nine Votes for History, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2000, at A32. A news article in the same paper,

however, quoted prominent law professors as concluding that these Justices appeared undecided.
Glaberson, supra note 224 C([S]ome experts said... two of the justices who had agreed with
Justice Scalia on Saturday, Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M. Kennedy, appeared undecided about certain issues."). Our assessment is that both statements are correct. While
O'Connor and Kennedy both suggested that they were disturbed by the Florida Supreme Court's
action, they used the oral argument as an opportunity to consider the strengths and weaknesses
of different arguments, apparently showing preference for the equal protection claim.
226. Justice Kennedy asked Gore's lawyer, David Boies, about whether there must he a uniform standard in counting ballots and Boies replied, "I think there is a uniform standard ....
The standard is whether or not the intent of the voter is reflected by the ballot." George Ml:
Bush
v. Al Gore, supranote 223. To that Justice Kennedy answered:
That's very general. It runs throughout the law. Even a dog knows the difference in being stumbled over and being kicked. We know it. Now, in this case,
what we're concerned with is an intent that focuses on this little piece of paper
called a ballot. And you would say that from the standpoint of the equal protection clause, each-could each county give their own interpretation to what intent means, so long as they are in good faith and with some reasonable basis
finding intent?
Id. Without allowing Boies to respond in a full sentence, Justice Kennedy added, "But here you
have something objective. You're not just reading a person's mind. You're looking at a piece of
paper ....This is susceptible of a uniform standard. And yet you say it can vary from table to
table within the same county." Id.
Justice O'Connor was less active in this line of questioning, but she did ask Boies, "Well, why
isn't the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it
couldn't be clearer. I mean, why don't we go to that standard?' Id. O'Connor indicated some
discomfort with Bush's equal protection argument but seemed to be seeking a satisfactory answer. O'Connor asked Theodore B. Olson, Bush's attorney, "Well, there are different ballots from
county to county too, Mr. Olson, and that's part of the argument that I don't understand. There
are machines; there's the optical scanning. And then there are a whole variety of ballots; there's
the butterfly ballot that we've heard about and other kinds of postcard ballots. How can you have
one standard when there are so many varieties of ballots?" Id. When Olson responded that "the
standard should be that similarly situated voters and similarly situated ballots ought to be
evaluated by comparable standards, O'Connor replied, "Then you'd have to have several standards, county by county, would it be?" Id. After Olson agreed, O'Connor asked no further questions on this issue.

227. Justice Kennedy asked the first question, requesting that Olson tell him the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction. After Olson cited Article II, Kennedy responded, "[Tlo say that the Legislature of the state is unmoored from its own Constitution and it can't use its courts and it can't use
its executive agency-even you, your side, concedes it can use a state agent-seems to me a holding which has grave implications for our republican theory of government." Id. Justice O'Connor
soon followed up by stating, "I have the same problem Justice Kennedy does, apparently, which
is,I would have thought you could say that Article II certainly creates a presumption that the
scheme the Legislature has set out will be followed, even by judicial review, in election matters."
Id.
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with the Justices disagreeing about whether the Florida courts
should be allowed to resolve the deadline issue, or whether the
Florida courts' professed desire to take advantage of the statutory
safe harbor demanded a resolution that would allow the Florida
Supreme Court no room to maneuver. 228 Nonetheless, this initial
dialogue might have had an effect on the final opinions.
New institutionalists have not systematically studied oral
arguments, perhaps because their Socratic form makes it difficult
to code whether a Justice is embracing a particular position or
merely probing the weaknesses of the alternative. Many lawyers
have lamented that it is often difficult to predict how a judge will
vote on a case from questions in oral argument. 229 Nonetheless, just
as new institutionalists identify attempts at coalition formation in
and after conference, so too might oral argument serve as a preliminary opportunity for signaling, negotiating, revealing focal
points, 230 and for forming ultimate coalitions. Oral argument is, after all, typically the Justices' first opportunity to discuss the merits
of cases together, and commentators have noted that oral argument
in the Supreme Court often seems to be among the Justices more so

To the extent that these Justices expressed concern that the Florida Supreme Court might
have created a new law, they focused more on 3 U.S.C. § 5 than on Article II. Justice Kennedy
pressed Gore's attorney Boies on whether § 5 required a determination of whether a law was
"new" or "old," but he did not state a belief that Article II demanded that the Supreme Court
make the same distinction. Justice O'Connor later characterized the position that a legislature
must "give special deference to the legislature's choices insofar as a presidential election is concerned," as a "tenable view anyway, and especially in light also of the concerns about Section 5."
Id.
228. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
229. As one commentator noted, "The Justices are notoriously hard to read. What seems to
be a Justice's obvious inclinations at oral argument can be quite deceptive when the opinions are
released and votes made known." Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Plan.
ning Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 208 (1997).
230. Focal points may be particularly important in cases in which the outcome is more important to some Justices than the reasoning, and when there will be little time for negotiation. If
a Justice is intent on garnering a majority for an outcome, then that Justice will want to consider
which of various arguments for achieving that result are particularly salient, rather than focus
in conference on an issue that seems tangential to other Justices. Selection of different possible
arguments for resolving a case may thus be what Thomas C. Schelling has referred to as a "tacit
coordination" game. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54 (1979). Schelling
explains:
When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understand.
ing on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will
find each other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet,
so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is "obvious" to
both of them.
Id. Similarly, two Justices eager to coordinate their arguments for a particular resolution will
seek out the "obvious" argument for that resolution, and oral argument may help solidify one
argument relative to others without explicit negotiation.
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than between the bench and counsel. 231 New institutionalism thus
suggests that Justices may use questions and comments in oral argument as a subtle way of staking out positions and forming alliances more so than to seek guidance from counsel as to how to re-

232
solve the case.

Though other limited opportunities for bargaining may exist
later in the opinion-writing process, there are reasons Justices may
prefer to provide preliminary signals about future bargaining at
oral argument. First, post-argument opportunities to negotiate may
prove scarce, 233 especially given the lack of discussion in conference
in the Rehnquist Court. 234 Second, Justices attempting to persuade
colleagues seen as "swing voters" will want to make a concession to
those Justices before the Justices on the other side of the Court are
able to make their own concessions to push the judgment and holding in the opposite direction. Third, because oral argument is public-though not usually published235-adoption of positions at oral
argument may be seen as potential bonds to facilitate bargaining. 236
231. See Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court 1997 Term-Foreword:The Limits of Socratic

Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1998) (noting that Justices often "ask questions of counsel
that sometimes seem aimed more at their colleagues"); id. at 40 n.193 (citing oral arguments "in
which the attorney appears to be cast in the role of ventriloquist's dummy").
232. A similar dynamic may occur in quite different settings. See Kimberly A. Moore & Maxwell R. Stearns, The Law and Economics of Survivor (Feb. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors) (demonstrating similar behavior among participants forming alliances on the
television show Survivor).
233. Professors Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck explain:
Once justices react to a draft and make known their views regarding its content, an author will consider whether he or she already has a majority opinion
coalition prior to deciding how to respond to a justice who seeks further
changes in the majority opinion. Opinion authors who have already secured a
winning coalition have little incentive to make additional changes to the opinion.
MALTIZAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 105 (citation omitted); see also id. at 136-37 (noting that
"[w]orkload pressures are likely to be exacerbated at the end of a term" and that "end-of-term
pressures may compel justices to join an opinion, rather than hold out for subsequent drafts).
Even with ample time to negotiate after oral argument in many cases, the existence of a norm
discouraging explicit tradeoffs among issues in a case, see supra note 206, may lead Jusuces to
negotiate through informal signaling, which may be more difficult on paper than in person.
234. See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 223 (noting that official oral argument transcripts do not identify the
questioner).
236. This may help explain why the Supreme Court allowed an audiocast of the oral arguments in the two election cases immediately after the argument. The concession was remarkable
given the Supreme Court's past refusal to budge on the issue. Cf. Departments of Connerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary,and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1997: Hearings Before
a Subcomrn. of the House of Rep. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 31 (199G) (quoting Justice Souter as announcing that "the day you see a camera coming into our courtroom it is going to
roll over my dead body"). Radio may be less intrusive than television, though the difference in
presentation is slight, particularly given the technology that television stations employed to
animate the audiocasts. See Peter Marks, Contestingthe Vote The Media; Without Pictures, TV
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In private negotiations, in contrast, Justices may be able to withdraw concessions initially made with little effect on public reputation, a strategic bargaining problem that may undermine prelimi237
nary agreements.
All of these may have been factors in Bush v. Gore. The Justices' desire to decide Bush v. Gore quickly may have increased the
need to "negotiate" during oral argument. The negotiation, of
course, ultimately broke down, apparently over the issue of whether
December 12 was a deadline to which the Supreme Court was required to adhere for purposes of any remedial action on remand.
But once Justices Souter and Breyer expressed approval for the
equal protection argument, they may have determined that they
could not back down from it, or at least could not ridicule the position. It is thus not surprising that Justices Souter and Breyer indicated sympathy with that aspect of the per curiam opinion. It
might, after all, undermine their credibility in such an important
case to label such an issue "insubstantial" after having appeared to
embrace that position just one day before. Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, in contrast, had no such need to hedge. At the same time,
it is not surprising that Justice Breyer hedged by not explicitly concluding that the per curiam opinion's resolution of the equal protection issue was sound. 238
If this argument explains the votes of Justices Souter and
Breyer, it provides an equally good account of the votes of Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy. By indicating at oral argument, and perhaps at conference, that they too were sympathetic to the equal protection claim, 239 they might have seemed overtly strategic had they

Networks Were Scrambling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at A9 (noting that the networks were able
to demonstrate graphically who was asking and answering particular questions). Undoubtedly,
the importance of the case partially explains the Court's decision, though it might seem that in
an important case, the Justices would be even more hesitant about television technology. A com.
plementary explanation is that some Justices eager to reach an accommodation thought that a
public oral argument, allowing Justices to commit implicitly to certain positions, would help.
237. This distinction between signaling to bond at oral argument without necessarily doing
so in private conferences is parallel to that of combining votes with published opinions by jurists
and simple voting without offering published justification by legislators. The former operates as
a bond that imposes constraints on doctrinal maneuverability. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Mis.
guided Renaissanceof Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1276-81 (1994) (positing that published
opinions inhibit judicial logrolling while voting without published explanations promotes legislative logrolling); see also supra note 205 (noting the absence of logrolling by judges). The latter
facilitates logrolling by allowing legislators to shift from previously assumed positions on public
policy. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 82-86 (1989) (discussing legislative

logrolling).
238. See supranote 66 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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mysteriously abandoned the argument in the opinion they wrote or
joined, particularly if they had then joined an opinion relying on an
argument about which they had signaled skepticism. 240 Similarly,
this provides a possible explanation of why Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy did not find standing to be a threshold problem. 241 Of
course, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might well have not noticed
the standing issue and might have found the equal protection argument substantively more appealing than the Article II argument. 24 This leaves unanswered, however, the question of why
O'Connor and Kennedy did not explicitly disagree with the concurrence's Article II analysis. Though a failure to address an issue
made irrelevant by resolution of another issue is not unusual, 243 one
possibility is that expressing explicit disagreement in the opinion
would have made the per curiam designation more difficult, given
the designation's implicit suggestion that all joining members authored-and thus accepted-its content. Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy might well have preferred a "per curiam" designation both
to increase the appearance of broader support for the outcome on
the closely divided Court and to deflect any criticism to a larger
2
base of Justices. "
A desire to accommodate this diffusion of responsibility provides a partial explanation of the ultimate mystery, why the Chief

240. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
241. See supranotes 118-26 and accompanying text.
242. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may have worried that signing onto the Article IIargument might seem inconsistent with their federalism jurisprudence. Though the more conservative Justices faced the same problem, for the conservative Justices to endorse an equal protection argument would seem equally inconsistent. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. however, had
sometimes not agreed with the conservatives on equal protection issues. See, eg., United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (agreeing with majority that male-only admissions policy at state
military institute violated the Equal Protection Clause).
243. It might, however, be more common practice at least to indicate that the resolution of
one issue makes it unnecessary to address the other, especially when other Justices explicitly
Young, 121 S.
treat the issue. For example, in a case decided shortly after Bush L. Gore, Seling L'.
Ct. 727 (2001), Justice O'Connor explicitly indicated that its holding gave it "no occasion to consider" a further question, id. at 736, which Justice Scalia nonetheless chose to address in a concurrence, id. at 737 (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. Of course, it was readily apparent that the per curiam opinion was the only opinion to
which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had affixed their names. Nonetheless, the media also
recognized that five Justices had signed onto that opinion, so any attack on its reasoning presumably would be levied against all five per curiam Justices. See Charles Lane, Decision Sharpens the Justices'Divisions,WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al (concluding "by process of elimination ...that O'Connor and Kennedy had provided the fourth and fifth votes to decide the case for
Bush," but not indicating a belief that these Justices were likely more sympathetic to the equal
protection claim than were the concurring Justices). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might have
been particularly concerned about diffusing responsibility if they believed that critics would find
the equal protection argument less defensible than the Article II argument.
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Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas signed onto the per curiam
opinion. In this case, there appears to be a fairly clear departure
from the ideal point of the three Justices holding the most consistent conservative views in the case. New institutionalists have developed models predicting to whom the Chief Justice will assign the
task of drafting the opinion when the Chief Justice is in the majority and therefore entitled, by a longstanding Supreme Court practice, to choose the opinion author. The theory predicts that in 5-4
cases, because the Chief Justice can afford to lose no Justices if he
is to maintain his preferred judgment, he is most likely to assign
opinions to the marginal Justice, whose views are closest to those of
the minority coalition. 245 Thus, it appears plausible to infer that
Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the opinion to O'Connor or Kennedy to secure their continued support. 246 And along with Justices
Scalia and Thomas, he may have remained part of the majority coalition, despite analytical reservations, because failing to do so
would have risked antagonizing the marginal Justices and encouraging them to defect.
This story leans heavily on explanations that combine elements of psychology with elements of rational choice. The picture
that emerges is of strategic jurists seeking to optimize the Court's
output based upon anticipated reactions to their own conduct. The
concurring Justices joined the per curiam to avoid a form of retaliation in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy would concur in the
judgment on separate or narrower grounds, thus highlighting the
fractured composition of the judgment majority. Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy declined to criticize the concurring Justices with
whom they disagree to avoid signaling that the presidential contest
turned on their minority doctrinal predilections. Justices Souter

245. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 49-50. A countervailing factor is that the Chief
Justice is more likely to assign an opinion to someone ideologically aligned with him in more
important cases, as measured by the proxy of the number of amicus briefs filed. Id. at 50.51. The
authors do not indicate how these effects interact, and whether the Chief Justice is still more
likely to assign a 5-4 case to the median Justice than to an ideologically allied Justice in an
important case.
246. It is impossible to tell from the opinion itself, at least barring linguistic analysis,
whether O'Connor or Kennedy was the author. Indeed, it is conceivable that one of the other
members of the majority wrote the opinion. For example, the Chief Justice himself might have
written the opinion, confident in his ability to keep O'Connor and Kennedy on his side. On this
story, the opinion eventually was split into two when O'Connor and Kennedy indicated that they
did not want explicitly to endorse or dissent from the Article II analysis; the splitting necessitated the opinion being labeled a per curiam so that Rehnquist would not have been the principal
author of two different opinions. Though this is a plausible story in the abstract, Jeffrey Rosen
has attributed the opinion to Justice Kennedy, presumably on the basis of anonymous sources.
See Rosen, supra note 5, at 51.
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and Breyer expressed continued support for the equal protection
analysis, even though the remaining Justices who nominally embrace it had all but prevented correction of the problem through a
remand, having signaled support for the claim at oral argument.
We do not doubt that some significant truth lies beneath each of
these explanations. But we also remairi unpersuaded that they provide a complete account of even the most significant dynamics that
gave rise to this peculiar and important case.
Nonetheless, the simplest alternative explanation, in some
ways the obverse of this strategic portrait, is not persuasive either.
This explanation emphasizes the Court as a collegial institution,
one in which Justices at least try to show a united front, particularly in controversial cases. This conception may explain Bush v.
Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard satisfactorily, 2 47 as another
example along the lines of Brown v. Board of Education,28 in which
the Court's members strenuously sought to avoid any signs of defection as they ventured into an area previously thought by many to be
off limits. 249 It is harder to understand from the analysis thus far,
however, why, once the 5-4 split became a fait accompli, those Justices in the judgment majority remained sufficiently concerned with
the appearance of a united front that they incurred major doctrinal
sacrifices to maintain it. It is especially perplexing since the concurring Justices willingly exposed the absence of a true agreement
with the remaining per curiam authors by producing an opinion
resting almost entirely on separate grounds. And it strains credulity to suppose that Justices Souter and Breyer continued to embrace the equal protection argument to bolster the appearance of a
united front, when they could have done so by signing a stillnarrower partial concurrence rather than an opinion labeled as a
dissent, with no change in the outcome of the case. In sum, we have
little doubt that the Justices pursued behavior that can properly be
viewed as strategic in Bush v. Gore, but we are less persuaded that
the judicial politics account for that behavior completes the story.

247. The media certainly interpreted the decision in this way. See, e.g.. Frank J. Murray,
FloridaCourt Rejects Gore 'Contest', U.S. Supreme Court Voids Hand Count, WASH. TIM!ES. Dec.

5, 2000, at Al ("To achieve the 9-0 vote that many analysts called crucial to acceptance in such
an inflamed political climate, the high court's seven-page opinion said the state court 'relied in
part'on the Florida Constitution to counter dictates of the U.S. Constitution.").
248. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

249. For a discussion of how Chief Justice Warren was able to achieve unanimity in Brown,
see S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL 690 (1971). The Justices
also demonstrated the strength of their unanimity in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1. 4 (1958), by

separately listing all nine Justices as joint authors of the opinion.
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IV. SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF BUSH V. GORE

We now shift to a social choice framework. Social choice informs the institutional constraints on strategic behavior that confront deciding Justices. This approach, we believe, will better explain the incentives for, and the nature of, the bargaining arrangements that affected the judgment and doctrine of Bush v. Gore. Social choice proves valuable in this setting because it provides the
basis upon which to build models that explain the persistence of
institutional rules that have the benign effect of limiting cycling
and the corollary result of shaping and limiting opportunities for
strategic behavior. In Part IV.A, we introduce the framework of social choice as it relates to the Bush v. Gore decision. 250 Part IV.B
then introduces the most elementary social choice model, involving
a unidimensional issue spectrum, primarily as a point of departure,
to show that the unarticulated assumptions of attitudinalism represent a special case of collective preference aggregation. 25 1 This special case proves robust in predicting the Justices' votes on the disposition of Bush v. Gore, but less so in assessing either the nuances
of law or details of the voting alliances in the case. This Part further reveals the conditions under which opportunities for gains
from trade arise between and among Justices in a given case.
In Part IV.C, we relax the assumptions from the unidimensional model to develop a more nuanced account of Bush v. Gore.
This more complex model provides a means with which to identify
multiple dimensions that lurk beneath the surface of both the attitudinal model and the unidimensional social choice model. It also
provides a means of framing some of the limits on strategic behavior that lie at the base of the new institutional analysis. This model
helps reveal the anomaly that while a majority supported a judgment for Bush, absent some strategic interaction among members
of that majority, the winning coalition risked disclosing separate
majorities on issues that the Court as a whole agreed were logically
controlling in the case in a manner consistent with a ruling for
Gore. Such anomalies can arise only when the Court possesses overlapping majorities, such that the outcome vote and separate majority resolutions of identified dispositive issues point in opposite directions. This analysis reveals the possibility that the Supreme
250. This part builds upon the model developed in MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 97-156 (2000).

251. Professors Segal and Spaeth do discuss briefly social choice to point out the "meaninglessness of the legal model," but do not systematically explore the implications of dimensionality
for their own model. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 62-64.
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Court was so closely divided that, just as the choice between a
popular vote count and the Electoral College controlled the outcome
of the presidential election, so too the choice between two hypothetical Supreme Court decision-making rules, one focused on the
outcome vote and the other focused on majority issue resolutions,
would have determined whether the Court ruled for Bush or for
Gore. In short, the case could have produced yet another venue for
Bush to chant "follow the rules," and for Gore to retort "just keep
counting." By signing onto the per curiam opinion, the concurring
Justices formally eliminated the anomaly and signaled that the
equal protection analysis was not only a Condorcet winner, but indeed a first-choice majority winner. The social choice analysis thus
helps to build upon the judicial politics accounts to construct a more
robust story as to why the Justices went "beyond counting votes,"
instead forging a seemingly disingenuous equal protection alliance,
given that Bush would have won regardless of whether the concurring Justices had simply struck out on their own.
In Part IV.D, we describe yet another lurking anomaly that
might have affected the nature of the ultimately controlling coalition in favor of Bush. Based upon reasonable assumptions, we demonstrate that a preliminary round of voting-for example at conference-might well have revealed the absence of a majority in support of a single judgment or a single mandate under a nominal remand judgment. If the concurring Justices had declined to join Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who might have given the remand
content, then effectively no disposition-a remand in name only, a
true remand, or an affirmance-would have commanded five votes:
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas would have supported what in effect
would have amounted to a straight reversal; 252 O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer would have favored a remand, though possibly
with disagreement as to the breadth of the Florida Supreme Court's
mandate; and Stevens and Ginsburg would have favored affirmance. Had this occurred, yet another manifestation of bargaining
might have taken place with implications for the final outcome. The
primary difficulty in such a situation is not confusion-although
especially in a case of this magnitude that is certainly a problem in
its own right-but more importantly the incentives the situation
provides for strategic behavior. If clarity is desired, concessions

252. We say "in effect" because the concurring opinion, despite its conclusion that "we would
remand," might, if it had garnered five votes, have been a remand in name only, leaving nothing
for the Florida Supreme Court to do. See supra text accompanying note 138; infra notes 339-40
and accompanying text.
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must be made, and the result for some Justices is necessarily to
produce an outcome that is other than their first-choice disposition.
Assuming O'Connor and Kennedy could have found common ground
for instructing the Florida Supreme Court on remand with Souter
and Breyer, Stevens and Ginsburg would have had little to lose and
much to gain by signing onto that judgment. The possibility of such
a coalition, we will show, helps to explain why the O'ConnorKennedy and Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas camps might have compromised in forging a common basis for a limited mandate on remand.
A. The Problem of Social Choice
Social choice grows out of the seemingly simple insight that
under specified conditions one of the primary attributes of individual rationality-the assumption of transitive preference orderings-cannot be assumed for groups of three or more persons. If
three persons are selecting among three options-A, B, and C-and
none of those options has first-choice majority support, it is possible
for the group as a whole, unlike a rational individual, to have intransitive preferences. To illustrate, imagine that three persons are
selecting among the listed options and that Pi prefers ABC, P2 prefers BCA, and P 3 prefers CAB. 253 Under these conditions, there is no
first-choice majority candidate. If we assume that the decision
makers vote solely based upon the merits of presented alternatives
when confronted with binary comparisons, 254 we will discover that
while P1 and P 3 prefer A to B, and Pi and P2 prefer B to C, the

group as a whole does not therefore prefer A to C. Instead, P2 and
P3 prefer C to A. This hypothetical illustrates that under specified
conditions groups of three or more persons with transitive individual preferences can cycle by unlimited majority rule over binary
comparisons.
For historical reasons, this phenomenon of collective intransitivity is known as the Condorcet Paradox. The Marquis de Condorcet not only provided an early account of the paradox, 255 but also
253. This notation is a shorthand, indicating that P prefers A to B to C. P2 prefers B to C to
A, and P 3 prefers C to A to B.
254. In the language of social choice, we are assuming compliance with the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. See STEARNS, supra note 250, at 88-92 (defining and explaining independence criterion).
255. For informative discussions of Condorcet and his writings on the paradox, see lain
McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's Theory of Social
Choice?, 73 PUB. CHOICE 445 (1992); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1231 (1988), and see also Stearns, supra note 237, at 1221-25 (collecting authorities).
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provided a partial solution to the problem of collective preference
aggregation that underscores the limited conditions under which it
can arise. 256 To illustrate, assume that the preferences of P 3 are
CBA, rather than CAB. With this set of preferences, there is no cycle. Instead, making the same assumption about principled decision
making, Pi and P2 prefer B to C, and P 2 and P3 prefer B to A. Regardless of whether the group as a whole prefers C to A (which it
does with P1 and P3 controlling), option B is a dominant second
choice. This option B is referred to as the Condorcet winner, which
simply means that option, in the absence of a first-choice majority
7
candidate, defeats all others in direct binary comparisons.2
For purposes of analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore, we can begin with the second of these two very elementary paradigms in which a Condorcet winner exists. In doing
so, we do not intend to suggest that when a Condorcet winning option is present, all institutions employ rules that discover it. Nor do
we intend to suggest that when problems of collective intransitivity
arise, the group cannot find some means of generating a seemingly
rational outcome. In fact, mechanisms for avoiding this anomaly
abound. Institutions can develop any number of mechanisms that
facilitate choice by allowing members to put weights upon, rather
than merely rank ordinally, their preferences. Such strategies include pricing mechanisms to reveal preferences in private markets;
strategic voting, meaning casting ballots based upon non-merit criteria to avoid-or derail-decision paths that might lead to a leastdesired outcome; and vote trading, a kind of barter system that
achieves an imperfect commodification of preferences that is routinely employed in legislatures. 258 Alternatively, the group can designate another person or institution to choose the outcome on their
behalf, as courts of law do in establishing default rules that will
control in the absence of a specific agreement.2 9 Or the group can
seek to become a single unit, as is the case with a firm, in which
one person, focusing upon an agreed-upon objective like profit, has
achieved the necessary institutional stature with which to make
decisions on behalf of the group as a whole. Or the group can,
through political processes, designate a leader, who can act on be-

256. See STEARNS, supra note 250, at 44-45.
257. See id. at 47 (defining Condorcet criterion).

258. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 237, at 82-83; Hovenkamp, supra note 172, at 962-63
(discussing logrolling).
259. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 613-25 (1998) (providing and critiquing the traditional economic account of
the role of default rules).
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half of constituents using the coercive power of the state. Or the
group can precommit to proscribe certain outcomes, effectively limiting the choice set of some members. This is not intended to exhaust the possibilities, and those familiar with Arrow's Theorem
will recognize this presentation as the shadow of what the theorem
proves: any effort to solve the problem of collective intransivity will
necessarily sacrifice some aspect of collective decision making that
260
appears defensible on normative grounds.
For our immediate purposes, it is not necessary to consider
the intricacies of the theorem except to state formally what we have
already suggested. Different institutions respond differently to the
problems they confront as a consequence of the difficulties associated with collective preference aggregation. Thus, while legislatures routinely countenance-indeed encourage-practices that
thwart decisions based solely upon principled assessments of presented alternatives, appellate courts have developed a set of practices or norms that facilitate a pattern of bonding commitments
that, while not preventing all manner of strategic interactions, nevertheless raise the cost of strategic behavior to individual members
relative to other institutional settings. While we have already discussed oral argument as a venue for bonding, students of law and
judicial politics are well aware that the publicity attendant oral argument is short-lived. But published opinions live on in infamy. The
custom of publishing a set of justifications to accompany a judgment vote, whether with the controlling majority, in concurrence, or
in dissent, not only serves to express views concerning the argu-

260. Arrow's Theorem, which is best understood as a generalization of the Condorcet paradox, proves the inability of a collective decision-making body to ensure collectively rational-or

transitive--outcomes, while simultaneously satisfying four conditions that Arrow thought essential to fair collective decision making: (1) range: the collective decision-making rule must select
its outcome consistently with the members' selection from all conceivable rank orderings over
three available alternatives; (2) independence of irrelevant alternatives: in choosing between
paired alternatives, participants must select solely based upon the merits of the options presented and without considering how they might rank options yet to be introduced; (3) unanimity
(or the Pareto criterion): if a move from the status quo to an alternative state will improve the
plight of one participant without harming others, the institution must make the move; (4)
nondictatorship:the group cannot systematically select the preferences of one member against
the contrary preferences of the group as a whole. See STEARNS, supra note 250, at 49. The thee.
rem was initially presented in KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

(1951), and revised to correct a mathematical error in the original proof in KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize in

Economics for this proof in 1972. For an accessible summary of Arrow's proof, see MUELLER,
supra note 237, at 384-99. The presentation of the theorem's criteria in this note are taken from
the simplified proof, set out in William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social DecisionalRules, 74
Q.J. ECON. 507, 507-35 (1960).
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ments raised or upon which the other Justices rest their contrary
positions, but also and more importantly, it raises the cost to the
Justices of departing from their expressed beliefs in future periods.
That is not to suggest that opinions present intractable limits on
future conduct; certainly they do not. 26 1 But the need to justify departures with an audience of jurists whose job it is to identify your
inconsistencies, a media who will sell more copy the more outrageous their depictions of Court output, and an academy of scholars
who secure tenure off your mistakes, undoubtedly raises the cost
relative to other institutional contexts that lack this important institutional norm. This brief introduction to social choice provides an
apt starting point for translating what we already know about Bush
v. Gore into social choice terms.
B. The UnidimensionalModel
The preferences that give rise to a Condorcet winner-ABC,
BCA, CBA 26 2-reflect a group whose members agree upon the relevant issue spectrum, and whose views of the underlying issue can
be cast along that spectrum. In short, a single option, B, dominates
because it represents a median along a single normative issue dimension.2 63 A dominant normative issue dimension is certainly
common enough. Different people add different amounts of salt to
their pasta. Those with high blood pressure might prefer none to a
little to a lot; those with low blood pressure might prefer the opposite. Persons of moderate taste most likely will prefer a middle
amount and then rank either none or a lot as their second choice.
While one always can construct a story, it seems odd to imagine a
person who most prefers a lot of salt to none to a middle amount, or
none to a lot to a middle amount. While such people might exist, as
a general matter we can safely assume that most persons whose
first choice is an extreme position will hold a more conventional set
of preferences over the remaining alternatives. If three people holding different first choices and conventional preferences over the re-

261. Occasionally, a Supreme Court Justice will explicitly admit to an inconsistency. See,
e.g., Linda Greenhouse, A Changeof Mind and a Deft Mea Culpa, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 30, 2000, at
A22 (noting Justice Souter's admission, in City of Erie u. Pop's A., 529 U.S. 277, 316 (2000).

that he had changed his mind on a particular issue).
262. The discussion in the text would be unaffected by reversing the second and third ordinal

rankings of the person who ranks B first, thus producing collective rankings of ABC, BAC, CBA.
Under either set of preferences, B emerges as the Condorcet winner.
263. Indeed, the term "median" means the midunit on a single dimensional scale, in which
the normative criterion for evaluation is strictly the number of entries on either side without
regard to their relative weight.
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maining alternatives were required to instruct a chef as to how to
prepare a group meal (and assuming no need to defer to the person
with high blood pressure for health reasons), they would likely
come to a resolution in favor of the median position favoring a little
salt.
The attitudinal model rests upon the very assumption
needed to generate a unidimensional model of group decision making. While attitudinalists do not claim that their regressions account for the votes of every Justice in each case, as a general matter
they assume that Supreme Court cases can be cast along a single
dimensional issue spectrum that reflects a conventional liberal-toconservative political ideology. 264 That is, after all, what attitudinalists, as opposed to say the Pointer Sisters, mean by Attitude. In
a world with two options, Bush, a conservative, or Gore, a liberal,
attitudinalists assume that the conservatives would choose Bush
and the liberals would choose Gore. Attitudinalist scholars, of
course, are substantially more sophisticated than that. They well
recognize that someone might be conservative for one type of issue
and liberal for another. 265 They also understand that even if one
codes attitudes based upon voting patterns over a large set of substantive doctrinal areas, those patterns will provide an imperfect
set of proxies for predicting votes in a case that tests views in an
entirely new area. 266 But the attitudinal model presumes that however many discrete views the Justices have respecting the resolution of a case, those views can generally be cast along a single liberal-to-conservative issue spectrum. And based upon the number of
Justices that favor a liberal or conservative outcome in any given
case, they can reliably predict the most often binary outcome choice.
Just as the general case in our salt hypothetical likely captures the vast majority of real-world preference orderings, the attitudinal assumption is borne out in a very high proportion of Supreme Court cases. What attitudinalist scholars are unable to account for in their model, however, are those cases in which the
preferences of the Justices do not lie along a single normative issue
dimension and in which there are no stable endpoints against

264. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 68 (providing a figure of "attitudinal space" consisting
of a one-dimensional axis, with different Justices and case scenarios situated at different points).
265. Justice Marshall, among all Justices on the Warren Court was found to be the most liberal in federal taxation cases, but the twelfth most liberal (out of seventeen Justices) in what
attitudinalists classify as economic activity cases. Justice Douglas, in contrast, was the most
liberal in economic activity cases and sixteenth in tax cases. Id. at 246-47.
266. Id. at 252-54.
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which to identify a dominant median, or Condorcet-winning, position.267 Before considering the implications of such a set of prefer-

ences for Bush v. Gore, we will now formalize the opinion within a
single dimensional issue spectrum. We will show how this model
identifies the constraints on strategic behavior that Justices face in
a unidimensional case, but then reveal the caricature-like quality of
the picture of Bush v. Gore that emerges. In Table 1, we fit Bush u.
Gore onto the model.
Table 1. A Unidimensional Social Choice
Model of Bush v. Gore
(A) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
(concurring)
Florida Supreme
Court decision
violates Article II
and equal protection

(B) O'Connor,
Kennedy
(per curiam)
Florida Supreme Court
decision violates equal
protection only; Florida Supreme Court's
expressed desire to
receive benefit of safe
harbor prevents timely
remand for corrective
remedy satisfying
equal protection
Broad mandate to correct
state judicial intervention
4
in elections

(C) Souter, Breyer
(dissenting)

(D) Stevens,
Ginsburg
(dissenting)
Florida Supreme Court Florida Supreme
decision violates equal Court decision does
protection only; safe
not violate Article
harbor provision is not H or equal protecmandatory, thus pertion
mitting timely remand
for corrective remedy
satisfying equal protection
0

Narrow mandate to correct
state judicial intervention
in elections

The single dimension along which we can cast the various
opinions, or opinion groupings, involves the permissible extent of
Supreme Court intervention into state court decisions that affect
the selection of electors for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Along this normative issue spectrum, it is fairly easy to
cast each opinion from those that would allow the broadest set of
grounds for Supreme Court intervention to those that would allow
the narrowest. Social choice analysis reveals that when the positions of the Justices fall along a naturally ordered spectrum, the
narrowest grounds rule ensures that the median position will ex-

267. To be fair, attitudinalists claim no more than the power to predict case outcomes, and
even in cases that result in the phenomenon of multidimensionality and asymmetry, described
infra Part IV.C, attitudinalists can generally predict the judgment. The point in the text is simply that the attitudinal model provides no basis for considering the relationships between and
among doctrinal camps in such cases.
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press the Court's holding. 268 The narrowest grounds doctrine states,

"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." 26 9
When the Court strikes down a law on constitutional grounds, the
rule seeks the opinion consistent with the outcome that would
strike down the fewest laws. Conversely, when the Court sustains a
law against a constitutional challenge, the narrowest grounds opinion is that opinion consistent with the outcome that would sustain
the fewest laws.
Although the opinion consistent with the outcome that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds states the holding under
the Marks doctrine, for now we are not interested in finding the
controlling opinion. Instead, we are interested in plotting all opinions along a single normative issue dimension, including those that
are too narrow to afford relief, and that therefore become dissents.
After placing the various opinions along the spectrum, we will consider the implications of the narrowest grounds rule for any incentives to engage in strategic behavior. Because Bush v. Gore overruled a state court decision, the broadest opinion is that which
would strike down the most state rulings, while the narrowest is
the opposite. While the Court produced a majority opinion in the
form of a per curiam, for expositional purposes, it is helpful to treat
the case as if the per curiam opinion represents the views of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor only, in which case lower courts construing the case would have been required to apply the narrowest
grounds rule. Otherwise, the fact that the per curiam opinion received majority support belies the need for such analysis.
The broadest position is expressed in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion. Rehnquist would have allowed Supreme Court reversal of a state supreme court opinion that interferes with a state election of a slate of presidential and vicepresidential electors when the decision either represents so marked
a departure from the acceptable norms of statutory interpretation
as to constitute a change in the state-legislated election rules in
place prior to the election, in violation of Article II, or when the decision results in inconsistent treatment of voters in recount proce-

268. See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of

ConstitutionalLaw, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 329-39 (2000) (providing social choice analysis of
narrowest grounds rule); see also STEARNS, supra note 250, at 124-39 (same).
269. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotations omitted).
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dures, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The next broadest position was expressed in the per curiam opinion, which, by subtracting those in concurrence, we can deduce represents the views
of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Although these Justices did not
explicitly disagree with the concurring opinion's analysis, we will
assume that Justice O'Connor and Kennedy disagreed with the
Chief Justice on the Article II issue. In this somewhat narrower
analysis, a state supreme court's arguably dubious interpretation of
state election law is insufficient to trigger a violation of the Article
II grant to state legislatures to create rules governing such elections, but inconsistent treatment of state voters in manual recount
procedures constitutes an equal protection violation, albeit one for
which considerations of timing prevent a true remand to produce a
corrective remedy on the case facts. Slightly narrower still, Justices
Souter and Breyer agreed that the state ruling violates equal protection, but disagreed that timing considerations prevented a remand. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court could itself determine
whether under state law the binding deadline is December 12, the
date Bush v. Gore was issued, or December 18, the date the electors
were scheduled to meet. And finally, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
embraced the narrowest position, finding no constitutional violation
and voting to affirm the Florida Supreme Court. Table 1 uses a
double vertical line to separate those whose views were consistent
with the case judgment from those whose views are too narrow to
afford relief, and thus who ended up in dissent.
The simple unidimensional model requires that the positions
of the Justices fit along a single normative issue spectrum, and Table I shows that at a surface level, the various opinions appear susceptible to such an interpretation. In this analysis, it is easy to locate as the Condorcet winner the views embraced by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. And in fact, their views, as expressed in the per
curiam opinion, were ultimately controlling. Notice that Bush v.
Gore can be cast along a single issue dimension even though it involves more than a single substantive legal issue. As Table 1 reveals, it is possible to devise a normative issue spectrum at a metalevel that subsumes' both the Article II and equal protection issues
in the case. While we are able to cast the various positions along a
single issue dimension, we do not maintain that this is the best
means of understanding the positions taken by the various Justices.
As we will show below, by relaxing the assumptions needed to generate this simple model, we can develop a more nuanced account of
Bush v. Gore. But if we accept the premises articulated above, then
we can readily see why the minority views held by Justices Ken-
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nedy and O'Connor were dominant. If we label the views of the concurring Justices "A," the views of O'Connor and Kennedy "B," and
the views of those in partial or complete dissent "C," then it is easy
to formalize the social choice analysis. The single dimensional issue
spectrum implies that the conservative members would rank their
preferences ABC and that the liberal members would rank their
preferences CBA. The second- and third-choice ordinal rankings of
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are irrelevant. Whether their rankings are BAC or BCA, B emerges as the Condorcet winner.
This presentation of Bush v. Gore is premised upon the very
assumptions that underlie the attitudinal account. It is for that
reason that attitudinal theory suggests rather limited opportunities
for strategic interactive behavior on the Court. 270 In this model, for
example, the O'Connor and Kennedy position is necessarily
bounded. It is bounded on the political right (the left of Table 1) by
the broad assertion of authority to overturn state supreme court
decisions that affect manual recounts arguably in violation of
preexisting state election law for the selection of presidential and
vice-presidential electors. And it is bounded on the political left (the
right of Table 1) by the narrow assertions of authority embraced by
those who would find a constitutional violation but then allow a
remand to effectuate a remedial order preceding the resumed recount, which could result in victory for Gore. If we assume that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were committed to a result that would
ensure a Bush victory, but did not want to suggest the broad power
of the Supreme Court to second-guess state court decisions construing state law, then their space along this issue spectrum was necessarily constrained. And it is quite possible that the constraint itself
required them to walk a sufficiently fine line that the opinion that
they ultimately produced seemed analytically hollow to many Court
observers. 271 The unidimensional model thus can help explain the
narrow, fact-specific nature of the per curiam opinion.
For the multidimensional analysis to follow, it will be helpful
to consider the nature of, and limits on, strategic interactions that
can arise in a unidimensional setting. The social choice model demonstrates that when the opinions can be cast along a unidimen-

270. Attitudinalists acknowledge but discount the possibility that Justices may act strategically in taking into account Congress's potential interaction. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra
note 1, at 239 ("Although anecdotes can be told of occasional justices who switched votes in rosponse to political pressure from Congress and elsewhere... no systematic evidence of Congressional influence on the justices' decisions exists.").
271. See supra Part II.B.
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sional issue spectrum, the narrowest grounds rule substantially
limits opportunities for strategic bargaining. If the opinions are
truly aligned along such a spectrum, within any single case there
appears to be little or nothing that Justices who would embrace a
broader or narrower view than that of the median jurist can do to
force the median jurist to move in their direction. 2 2 Along the single normative issue dimension that characterizes such cases, the
question arises what the conditions are that would produce opportunities for gains from trade, thus encouraging a move away from
the ideal point of the median jurist. If the only concern that a median jurist had were to express the holding of the Court, then the
narrowest grounds rule would eliminate virtually any opportunity
for gains from trade in a single case. Unless the Justices taking a
more extreme position consistent with the expressed views of the
median Justice are willing to jump over to the dissenting position,
or unless the dissenters are willing to jump over and embrace the
views of the broader concurrence in the judgment, then those embracing these more extreme positions can do little or nothing to undermine the power of the median Justice to express the holding of
the Court. And if the broader concurring or narrower dissenting
Justices are willing to jump over the median to embrace each
other's views, then we must reject the characterization of the case
3
as truly resting upon a single normative issue dimension.2
This analysis, however, does not capture the whole story. We
assumed that the median Justice was motivated only by a desire to
state the holding. The median Justice is also strongly motivated to
establish a precedent.2 7 4 And to do that, she needs not only to stand
in the median position, but also to command the support of a major-

272. We assume that Justices do not logroll across cases. See supra note 237. While new institutionalists have identified observed manifestations of strategic behavior, to our knowledge,
they have only observed such behavior along a single normative issue dimension within a given
case. There is no case of which we are aware in which a verifiable instance of trading across
cases has been demonstrated. For general discussions of strategic interactions among Justices,
which we conclude to be consistent with this analysis, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT. supra note 207;
MALTZNIAN ET AL., supranote 207.
273. This is ultimately a matter of definition; a single normative issue dimension assumes

that those taking an extreme view will rank the positions closer to them over those that lie farther away. For a general discussion of dimensionality, see STEARNS, supra note 250, at 71-77.
274. Applying Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), lower courts will treat the nar-

rowest grounds decision as binding, but the Supreme Court need not attach the same stare decisis value to a non-majority opinion as it would a majority decision. See, e.g., Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (stating that the "degree of confusion following a splintered
decision ...is itself a reason for reexamining that decision").
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A median Justice who does not initially command a majority,
or who does not anticipate commanding a majority based upon an
opinion that rests on her ideal point, has two complementary methods of trying to secure majority support. First, she can try to write a
sufficiently convincing opinion that she will persuade the requisite
number of colleagues to join to create a majority. Second, if that
alone proves inadequate to garner majority support, she can move
toward one of the wings of the Court in an effort to secure whatever
additional support is needed. Of course those who embrace a more
extreme set of views, either in concurrence or in dissent, have an
incentive to try to encourage the median Justice to move in their
direction, for example by moving themselves part of the way toward
the position of the median Justice.
The Justices' incentives to achieve a majority might not be
absolute. It is possible to imagine Justices preferring to defer final
resolution of an important question of constitutional law in the
hope that future appointments will change the Court's composition
in a manner that bodes well for an even more favorable future ruling than one that rests somewhere between the ideal point of the
median Justice and their ideal point. It would be unusual, however,
for Justices on both extremes of the Court to be mutually optimistic
about the future. 276 Ordinarily, at least one set of Justices will see
the median Justice's resolution of the issue as a favorable move
from the status quo. If both wings of the Court agree that they
would prefer to resolve the case without stare decisis value, it is
likely because the Justices on the side toward which the proffered
opinion moves existing doctrine feel constrained by their prior opinions. Such constraint, however, is unlikely in a case that truly reflects a unidimensional issue continuum and is more likely to exist
when the group that appears to represent a median position actually has expanded the underlying dimensionality of the case in
some fundamental and seemingly problematic way. Setting aside
this possibility, most often we can safely assume that Justices on
one of the wings of the Court will generally prefer to create a precedent that moves doctrine in their preferred direction. They will thus
ity.275

275. In a case that lies along a single normative issue dimension, no majority can form that
does not include the median Justice.
276. Mutual optimism, of course, is not an unknown phenomenon, and civil procedure commentators have identified it as a prime reason that many cases do not settle. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed
Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2225-26 (1993); George Loewenstein et al., SelfServing Assessments of Fairnessand PretrialBargaining,22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993).
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attempt to form a coalition with the median Justice. Because the
median Justice also will have an incentive to attain five votes, the
Justices on an extreme may seek a compromise in which the median Justice moves a bit toward their position.277
These insights drawn from the unidimensional social choice
model largely complement the empirical observations and models
developed in the new institutionalist literature. The new institutionalists have strengthened the attitudinal account by demonstrating that while Justices who are motivated by policy considerations
tend to vote on the outcome consistently with their ideological
predilections, they also are willing and able to anticipate and respond to the behavior of their colleagues to affect the substantive
development of doctrine as it emerges in the cases that they are
deciding. 278 While judicial politics scholars embracing the rational
choice approach have documented cases in which Justices have engaged in mutual accommodations, resulting in moves from ideal
points to forge majorities capable of generating a precedent, their
observations have been partially limited by the absence of a model
that explains how the underlying dimensionality of the case affects
the nature and limits of such strategic interactions. In our view, the
social choice model developed here enriches the new institutionalist
account by revealing not only the opportunity for gains from trade
that are empirically observed, but also the limits on such opportunities. In addition, as we will demonstrate in the next part, neither
the attitudinalists nor the new institutionalists have explored systematically the implications of relaxing the assumption of a unidimensional issue spectrum in any given case.
The prior discussion has assumed that all gains from trade
arise within a single case. Although rational choice institutionalists
have identified moves along a given issue dimension within a single
case, to our knowledge, no one has uncovered a verifiable instance
of logrolling across cases. The historical-interpretivist institutionalists might attribute this to a strong norm barring such behavior.
But as yet, these scholars have not developed a model that can be
used to explain why this behavior has proved dominant in appellate

277. Some unidimensional cases in which no coalition is formed may be explainable as reflecting the bilateral monopoly problem. See generally Michael Abramowic,

Market.Based Ad-

ministrative Enforcement, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 197, 247 n.149 (1998) (providing an overview of
the problem). That is, because both the median Justice and the Justices on an extreme will benefit from a majority coalition, they may bargain over just where they should meet. Sometimes,
such bargaining may result in a failure to agree, especially if institutional norms make Justices
hesitant to bargain explicitly.
278. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 207, at 79-88.
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courts, when it has not proved dominant in other institutional contexts, including, most notably, legislatures. 279 Again, the social
choice model developed here complements this judicial politics account. The very incentive to produce opinions that are sufficiently
persuasive to encourage other Justices to join in an effort to secure
majority support results in a kind of bond that, although not preventing future departures from expressed views, certainly raises
the cost relative to that in other institutional contexts in which individuals need not provide a written justification for their decisions
for or against collective output. The institutional custom of published opinions imposes a significant constraint on judicial logrolling across cases, especially in the Supreme Court.
If we are correct in positing that most, if not all, strategic accommodation between the Justices arises within individual cases,
then we must consider the role stare decisis nonetheless plays in
encouraging strategic voting behavior. Because the Supreme Court
grants greater stare decisis weight to majority opinions than to
fractured panel opinions, Justices may be willing to make modest
moves from their ideal positions to secure a necessary majority. For
example, the median Justice may decide that achieving a stable
precedent is more important than having the holding represent his
or her preferred position. And since those in concurrence or dissent
have power over whether the ultimate position taken by the median
jurist will simply state the holding, or also carry precedential force,
the median Justice operates as a monopsonist with the power to sell
to either of two sets of buyers, one to the right and one to the left.
This element of competition slightly favoring the median jurist
might limit extreme moves in favor of the other side, but it also
does present potential for gains from trade. This theoretical observation appears consistent with some of the most recent literature
surveying changes from originally circulated drafts to final decisions in response to suggestions of those needed to forge successful
0
majorities. 28
What we can label a "unidimensional stare decisis game" involves not only gains from trade between the median Justice and
those to one side, but also the efforts of those on either side to prevent gains from trade from being realized in the opposite direction
and thus at their expense. To illustrate, consider a case with a 4-1-4

279. For an analysis of this question, see Stearns, supranote 237, at 1257-87 (comparing the
Supreme Court and Congress using Arrow's Theorem criteria).
280. See MALTZMAN ETAL., supranote 207, at 94-124.
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split. 28 1 As we have already seen, the median Justice has the potential to move in either direction along the issue spectrum, trading off
the Justice's view of which of the competing approaches is more satisfying based upon the willingness of the other camps to move toward the Justice's own ideal point. At the same time, the Justices
in either camp might preemptively express a willingness to moderate their views in an effort to prevent the median Justice from moving in the other direction. From the perspective of the side making
such a move, it is likely preferable to secure a precedent that is watered down relative to their ideal point but that moves doctrine in
their preferred direction than to risk having a precedent that takes
an even more extreme view from that of the median Justice, moving
doctrine in the opposite direction.
While the unidimensional social choice analysis provides a
model for framing the observations of judicial politics scholars concerning strategic bargaining, the fact remains that the Court sometimes fails to produce a majority. And many, probably most, fractured panel cases appear to reside along a single issue dimension.
This includes, for example, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,282 the very
decision that Justice Powell was assessing in Marks v. United
States when he articulated the most well-known statement of the
narrowest grounds rule.2 3 Such cases reveal that Justices either
sometimes fail to behave strategically when a suitable opportunity
appears to have presented itself or that their efforts at strategic
bargaining sometimes fail. While the theory of efficient markets
4
eschews systematic failures to realize potential gains from trade,
one of the insights developed in the new institutionalist literature
focuses on the very few opportunities available between an assigned
opinion author and those with whom he or she can form a majority
to reach a middle ground. 285 Certainly other factors might also pre-

281. The 4-1-4 split is chosen simply for expositional purposes. The same analysis applies for
any set of three camps in which two of the three camps possess the necessary votes to form a
majority.
282. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
283. For a breakdown of the various Memoirs opinions along a single dimension based upon
Justice Powell's analysis in Marks, see STEARNS, supra note 250, at 124-29.
284. The theory has been analyzed particularly in financial market settings. See, e.g., Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383. 41316 (1970); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets. II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1582-86 (1991). Even
the weak form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis suggests that individuals are not
systematically failing to take advantage of gains from trade. Cf. Lawrence A. Cunningham, From
Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 559-63 (1994) (discussing different variants of the hypothesis).
285. See supranote 233.
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vent mutual gains from trade, including stubbornness, hedging
against the possibility of benign personnel changes on the Court
(for example following a presidential election), and of course the
constraints that prior published opinions pose. We do not claim to
have exhausted all of the dynamics that underlie potential strategic
interactions among Supreme Court Justices. For our present purposes, however, it is not necessary to provide a complete account.
As the next part shows, we believe Bush v. Gore is not best characterized by a unidimensional issue spectrum, and as a result, any
negotiations that occurred, for example between the Justices in concurrence and the remaining Justices in the per curiam coalition,
were not the product of a desire to secure a precedent on the per
curiam opinion's equal protection analysis. Bush v. Gore cannot easily be understood as a case driven by concerns for stare decisis because it seems highly improbable that those in concurrence who
blinked first cared much (or even a little) for the substantive precedent that the per curiam opinion produced. Moreover, it is difficult
to imagine why the concurring Justices willingly compromised their
positions, giving the holding of the case greater stare decisis
weight, only then to proceed to insist upon including a fact-specific
disclaimer that effectively announces no meaningful stare decisis
286
impact.
In short, the unidimensional model cannot provide a complete account of the strategic interactions that likely characterized
Bush v. Gore. While it might appear that we are back to where we
started, namely that the Bush v. Gore per curiam resulted from a
conservative majority seeking to present a united front, the unidimensional analysis has significantly furthered our understanding of
the opportunities for, and limitations on, strategic interactions
among the Supreme Court Justices. In addition, and perhaps more
importantly, by making explicit the conditions that are assumed,
but not expressly articulated, in the attitudinal account, and by
showing them to be a special case of collective preferences, we can
now consider the implications of relaxing those assumptions upon
any strategic interactions that might have taken place. We are thus
now ready to consider the implications of assessing multiple issue
dimensions on the dynamics of interactive bargaining in Bush v.
Gore.

286. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (noting that the analysis was "limited to the present circumstances").
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C. The MultidimensionalModel
To develop the multidimensional model, we must revisit the
problem of social choice with which Condorcet was initially concerned. Recall that with collective preferences ABC, BCA, CAB, majority resolutions of each binary comparison produce the result A
preferred to B preferred to C preferred to A. This is the Condorcet
paradox. Unlike the preferences that give rise to a Condorcet winner-ABC, BCA, CBA-the former preferences produce no dominant outcome because the preferences of one of the members defy
the assumption of a single dimensional issue spectrum. 287 By ranking his preferences CAB, the third member has implicitly rejected
the apparent issue spectrum-A to B to C-in favor of another in
which the extreme positions-end points A and C-are preferable to
the apparent middle position along the spectrum, B. It is this combination of issue spectrums that creates the possibility of a collective intransitivity.
There is nothing inherently illogical about holding preferences that defy a seemingly obvious, or conventional, spectrum, at
least in certain circumstances. Recall that it seemed difficult to
imagine a person who prefers a lot of salt to none to a middle
amount, or a person who prefers none to a lot to a middle amount.
Instead, most persons who prefer an extreme position will then prefer an intermediate amount to the opposite extreme amount. Such
preferences, of course, mirror the unidimensional issue spectrum
used to depict Bush v. Gore in Table 1. While this pattern is likely
the most common, there are also conditions under which preferences will not fit this pattern. For example, imagine that three persons are selecting among three weight loss plans: (A) vegetarianism, which for simplicity we assume to consist of all vegetables; (B)
a mixed diet, which includes both vegetables and meat in moderation; and (C) the Atkins Diet, which for simplicity we assume to
consist only of meat. By recognizing that dietary preferences based
upon these considerations can be cast along two dimensions, it becomes possible to construct a set of preferences among three persons that would result in cycling by unlimited majority rule. This
could occur, for example, if the group were required to select a single diet for all to follow.

287. To be precise, one can characterize cyclical preferences in either of two ways. namely
three sets of unipeaked preferences that lie along more than a single issue dimension, or three
sets of preferences one of which has more than a single peak, along a single issue dimension. In
fact, this proves to be two ways of expressing the very same intuition. See STEARNS. supra note
250, at 75.
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Assume that P believes-rightly or wrongly-that although
extreme diets might be most effective, he strongly dislikes the idea
of a meat-only diet and would thus prefer a mixed diet to a meatonly diet even at the expense of optimal weight loss. If so, his ordinal rankings are ABC. Assume that P2 enjoys all kinds of food, but
that if forced to forego meat or carbohydrates, she would prefer to
forego the latter. Her preferences are BCA. And finally, assume
that P3 is persuaded that the extreme diets are most likely to be
effective and that while he has a preference for a meat-only diet
over a no-meat diet, he is sufficiently concerned about weight loss
that if the Atkins Diet is unavailable, he would choose vegetarianism. His preferences are CAB. 288 The options that give rise to these

cycling preferences are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Diet Selection Options in Two Dimensions
with Potential Cycling Preferences

Believes extreme
diets are more
effective
Does not believe
extreme diets are
more effective

Preference for meat diet over
no-meat diet
(C) Atkins Diet

Preference for no-meat
diet over meat diet
(A) Vegetarian Diet

(B) Mixed Diet

Under these stated assumptions, the preferences of the
group as a whole, if required to select a single diet plan by unlimited majority rule, would cycle. While we can articulate the options
as resting along a seemingly logical single dimensional issue spectrum-all vegetables, mixed diet, all meat-with Pi holding extreme preferences as his first two ordinal rankings, a more meaningful account recognizes that the three prospective dieters are confronting a choice set that lies across not one dimension, but two. In
each case, the three would-be dieters are weighing the competing
concerns about weight loss against their culinary preferences. It is
this combination of group preferences over more than a single issue
dimension that has the potential to produce a collective intransitivity.
This is most easily demonstrated by imagining three people
who were not concerned about dieting to lose weight and who were

288. This is not the only set of preferences that result in an intransitivity. For the six possible ordinal rankings over ABC (ABC, ACB, BAG, BCA, CAB, CBA), two sets of combinations
(ABC, BOA, CAB and ACB, CBA, BAC) result in a collective intransitivity.
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responsible for developing a menu in which the options were (A) all
vegetables, (B) a mixed platter; and (C) all meat. If Pi had a strong
preference for meat, P2 had a preference for the mixed platter, and
P had a strong preference for vegetables, then it is difficult to
imagine their seizing on other than option B as the dominant, Condorcet-winning, choice. Each member embracing an extreme view
would prefer second that option that provides a platter that caters
to some, but not all, of his or her culinary preferences to one that
caters to none. As a result, we can credibly posit that with but one
issue dimension, culinary preference, the resulting ordinal rankings
would be Pi: ABC; P 2 : B[AC,CA]; and P3: CBA, where the bracketed
entries are in the alternative. In the first hypothetical, it was only
because we assumed that P3 had a peculiar conception about what
constituted an effective diet and that he was willing to subordinate
culinary concerns to engage in what he viewed as the most effective
diets for his first two choices that we were able to create a set of
preferences that generated a cycle.
Thus far we have established that the introduction of a second issue dimension is a necessary condition for generating cyclical
preferences. We have not demonstrated that it is sufficient. In fact,
it is not. The introduction of a second issue dimension has the potential to produce a cycle, but it is possible to have a Condorcet
winner across two dimensions. To illustrate, assume that three persons are again selecting a menu. Assume that Pi ranks the vegetarian menu, option A, first, due to his moral beliefs. Assume that P2
ranks the mixed platter, B, first, because she is not on any special
diet and prefers variety in her meals. Finally, assume that P3 ranks
the all-meat menu, C, first, because he is on the Atkins Diet. In this
case, there are again two normative dimensions affecting the
group's choice. While one person has selected his first choice based
solely upon moral considerations, another has selected it based
solely on concerns for weight loss. The third person rejects either of
these two independent normative bases for selecting a lopsided
menu. Even though the menu selection is based upon considerations that lie along two issue dimensions rather than one, under
reasonable assumptions we can nonetheless identify a Condorcet
winner. Because Pi is a vegetarian, he will rank second a mixed
menu, which provides some food that he. can eat consistently with
his diet. And conversely P3 will also rank the mixed diet second for
the same reason. The second- and third-choice ordinal rankings for
the person not on either special diet are irrelevant because regardless of what those preferences are, the resulting preferences-ABC,

1924

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:1849

B[AC,CA], CBA-produce option B as the Condorcet winner. Table
3 presents the resulting preferences across two dimensions.
Table 3. Menu Selection in Two Dimensions
with Potential Condorcet-Winning Option
Vegetarian
Not vegetarian

I On Atkins Diet

I Not on Atkins Diet

(C) All meat

(A) All vegetable
(B) Mixed platter

Before applying these insights to Bush v. Gore, it is important to note that there are Supreme Court cases that fit each of the
paradigms represented in Tables 1 through 3.289 We have already
seen that it is possible, based upon clearly defined, but potentially
refutable, assumptions, 290 to fit Bush v. Gore itself onto a unidimensional issue spectrum, represented in Table 1. And recall that in
announcing the narrowest grounds rule, Justice Powell cast the
opinions in Memoirs v. Massachusetts along a single dimensional
issue spectrum. The various opinions in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke291 can be well-characterized as fitting an intermediate category, one with two normative issue dimensions but
292
yielding a Condorcet-winning opinion.
In Bakke, a twice-rejected applicant to the University of
California at Davis Medical School sued, claiming that the medical
school's quota-based affirmative action program violated his equal
protection rights. 293 The case produced several opinions, of which
three are most relevant for our immediate purposes. Writing in partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Brennan would have
sustained the quota-based affirmative action program under intermediate scrutiny, on the ground that remedying the present effects
of past discrimination was an important governmental interest that
the program substantially furthered. 294 Writing in partial dissent

289. For an article that places several Supreme Court plurality opinions into these three
categories, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes: Miller v. Albright in
Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 (1999), and see also STEARNS, supra note
250, at 97-156 (presenting social choice model of individual case decision making).
290. For a discussion of the implications of relaxing the assumptions needed to place the
various Bush v. Gore opinions along a'single normative issue dimension, see infra notes 305-06
and accompanying text.
291. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
292. The discussion of Bakke that follows, including Table 4, is adapted from STEARNS, supra
note 250, at 130-33.
293. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275-77.
294. Id. at 345, 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and partial concurrence, Justice Stevens would have prohibited any
use of race in state institutions of higher learning on the ground
that the practice violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 295
In an opinion, the relevant parts of which no one else joined,
Justice Powell distilled the case into two issues: (1) whether the
medical school can use race at all in admissions; and (2) if so,
whether it used race in a permissible manner.29 Justice Powell
agreed with Justice Brennan that the use of race was permissible,
but he disagreed with the test to evaluate its proper use and on
what constituted an acceptable rationale under the chosen test.M
Justice Powell determined that the medical school was not competent to make the requisite factual findings regarding the present
effects of past discrimination or to effectuate a remedy for any resulting violations that it identified. 298 But he further concluded that
the school could use race to further its compelling interest in diversity in an academic setting. 299 While Justice Powell insisted upon
strict scrutiny, Justice Brennan would have upheld the so-called
benign use of race by applying intermediate scrutiny in cases involving sex-based classifications. 300 On the second issue, Justice
Powell, again alone on this point, determined that while the quotabased system violated equal protection, the medical school could
use race in the manner that Harvard University uses race, as one
factor among many in the context of an integrated admissions program. 30 1 Table 4 depicts the preferences in Bakke.
Table 4. Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke
with Multidimensional and Symmetrical Preferences
State may consider race
(A) Brennan (plus three
others)

State may not consider race

State properly considered
race

State did not properly

(B) Powell

(C) Stevens (plus three oth-

consider race

ers)

The effect of Justice Powell's ruling was to strike down the
U.C. Davis affirmative action program but to leave in place the possibility of a future program that would satisfy equal protection.

295. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
296. Id. at 281-82, 287-88, 305-06 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
297. Id. at 307-10.

298. Id. at 309.
299. Id. at 311-12.

300. Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. Id. at 316-23 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
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Given this result, even though the case lies across two dimensions,
it is easy to explain why the Powell opinion emerged as the Condorcet winner. In Table 4, we assume that if Justice Stevens had
reached the equal protection issue, he would have determined that
Davis's use of race violated equal protection, even if there had been
no federal statute prohibiting the use of race. 30 2 If we were to make
the contrary assumption, we would construct a cycle even though
there is no indication of unstable collective preferences in the actual opinions. Based upon this assumption, it is intuitive that Justice Brennan would rank second the views of Justice Powell, which
provide some possibility of future race-based affirmative action, to
those of Justice Stevens, which would allow none. And it is equally
intuitive that Justice Stevens would rank second the view of Justice
Powell, which at least restricts the scope of state-based affirmative
action programs, to the expansive view of Justice Brennan. Regardless of Justice Powell's second and third ordinal rankings, his opinion, B, represents the Condorcet winner. Before moving on to Bush
v. Gore, it is important to note one feature of the Bakke decision.
Based upon our stated assumptions, Justices Brennan and Stevens
agreed upon how to define the relevant issues in the case, but they
resolved those issues in opposite fashion. Their opposite resolutions
of those issues produced opposite judgments. In contrast, Justice
Powell resolved one issue in favor of the Brennan and Stevens
camps along with one part of the two-part holding. Under these
conditions, it is easy to understand why Justice Powell was allowed
to issue the judgment for the Court even though no one agreed with
the relevant portions of his opinion that distinguished the Harvard
and Davis affirmative action programs and that determined that
while Davis could not use race to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination, it could use race to further its compelling interest in
diversity in an academic setting. In order for the Brennan or Stevens camps to rank the other's opinion ahead of that of Justice
Powell, they would have had to prefer opposite resolutions of both
underlying issues, leading to an opposite judgment, over a favorable
resolution of one of the two issues, leading to a partially favorable
holding.303 In short, Bakke, at least under our stated assumptions,

302. In other words, we assume that Justice Stevens would have reached the same judgment
based upon either of the two proffered theories of the case.
303. Though this seems analytically possible-perhaps Brennan was determined to avoid the

Powell distinction because that distinction might lead to more litigation than an absolute posi.
tion-it seems unlikely in this particular case. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakko, 438
U.S. 265, 332 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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reveals the characteristic feature of symmetry, meaning that opposite resolutions of identified dispositive issues lead to opposite
judgments. In a multidimensional case with symmetrical features,
that opinion affording each of the others a partial victory necessarily emerges as the Condorcet winner.
We have now shown that fractured Supreme Court cases
that can be cast along either a single issue dimension or along two
dimensions with symmetrical preferences can generate a Condorcet
winner. We are now ready to explore the most intriguing category of
fractured Supreme Court decisions, that in which there is more
than a single issue dimension but in which there is no Condorcet
winner. To do so, we return to Bush v. Gore. Imagine that the Justices are divided on the resolutions of two discrete sets of issues:
first, whether the Florida Supreme Court decision represents a retroactive change in state election law in violation of Article II; and
second, whether the Florida Supreme Court decision, by allowing
differential standards in manual vote counts, violates equal protection.
Table 5. Bush v. Gore in Two Dimensions
with Asymmetrical Preferences

Florida Supreme
Court ruling should
be reversed on the
basis of Article II
Florida Supreme
Court ruling should
not be reversed on
the basis of Article II

Florida Supreme Court ruling
should be reversed on the
basis of equal protection

Florida Supreme Court
ruling should not be
reversed on the basis of
equal protection
(A) Rehnquist, Scalia.
Thomas

(C) O'Connor, Kennedy

(B) Sourer, Breyer,
Stevens, Ginsburg

Table 5 operates from several assumptions, each of which we
will carefully articulate and explair. The first assumption derives
from a simple premise that each of the Justices will insist upon an
internally consistent opinion. This simply means that if a Justice
believes that conditions X and Y must be met to affirm, she will reverse if neither X nor Y is met, or if only X or only Y is met. Unless
this assumption of internal consistency is met, then it is impossible
to comprehend why the Justices produced or signed onto opinions
identifying or rejecting each of these possible constitutional
grounds for their judgment votes. In this case, we assume that all
nine Justices agreed that to reverse the judgment of the Florida
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Supreme Court, that court's ruling must be found to have violated
either Article II, equal protection, or both. Because these two
grounds are disjunctive, reversal can occur even if a majority is
split on which of the two grounds is met, provided that all members
in the majority agree that at least one of the two grounds is met. To
affirm, conversely, a Justice must find that neither ground is met.
The second and third assumptions reflect inferences about
the views of the Justices who in fact signed the per curiam opinion.
The second assumption applies only to the members of the A camp:
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. We assume that the concurring
Justices signed onto the per curiam resolution despite disagreeing
with it on the merits. We make this assumption for two reasons.
First, beyond an opening sentence stating agreement with the per
curiam's equal protection rationale, nothing in their separate opinion suggests an equal protection basis for reversing the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court. 30 4 And second, as we have noted
above, 305 with the notable exception of affirmative action, in which
the conservatives embrace a more expansive view of equal protection than the liberals, the equal protection analysis appears to be in
tension with the general jurisprudence of these three conservative
jurists, and that includes the issue of voting rights. Thus, while
they joined the per curiam, to highlight the anomaly surrounding
that important feature of the opinion, we present the Justices in the
A camp as if they had not yet decided to do so, and as if they are
considering resting solely upon the ground represented in their presumed ideal point, namely an Article II violation resulting from a
retroactive change in the Florida election law established by the
state legislature.
The third assumption is largely the converse of the second.
We assume that the B group, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who
alone remain in the per curiam camp after we remove the concurring Justices, preferred to reverse only on equal protection grounds.

304. We will, of course, concede that, setting aside the opening sentence of the concurring
opinion, the absence of evidence of agreement is not evidence of absence of agreement. But when
we add to such an absence of evidence of direct support for the central rationale of the per curiam
opinion the per curiam's limiting language suggesting that the holding applies only to the caso
facts, and the generally restrictive views on equal protection among the concurring Justicessetting aside affirmative action, but certainly including voting rights-we think it fair to infer
the strong possibility that the concurring Justices joined the per curiam's equal protection analysis based upon strategic concerns. That said, we also concede that this supposition is ultimately
a premise upon which our analysis rests, rather than a proposition that is proved by our analysis
itself.
305. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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This assumption is easy to defend given that it is entirely consistent with the opinion that they ultimately joined, and given that
nothing in the per curiam opinion expresses agreement with the
views held by the concurring Justices on the Article II issue. We
recognize that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy may not necessarily
306
have disagreed with the conservative Justices' Article II analysis;
perhaps they simply preferred that the opinion rest on one ground
rather than on two. 30 7 Whether they preferred not to rest in part on
the Article II argument because they disagreed with it or because
they found it extraneous is not relevant to the analysis that follows.
The fourth assumption involves the two groups of dissenting
Justices, Justices Souter and Breyer (who found an equal protection
problem but who would have remanded to cure it) and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (who found no violation of equal protection or
Article II). Strictly for expositional purposes, we will assume that
the four dissenting Justices found no constitutional violation to
support a reversal. We make this assumption, which is fully consistent with the opinions written and joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, because it enables us to simplify the presentation of the
anomaly that the multidimensional and asymmetrical model of
Bush v. Gore presents by grouping all four dissenting Justices together in one box. This is obviously not the position that Justices
Souter and Breyer took (which we indicate by placing their names
in italics), but relaxing the assumption does not change the analysis. Given our other assumptions, seven of nine Justices believed
that there was no equal protection problem, so that even if Souter
and Breyer believed that there was an equal protection violation,
I

306. We will later reconsider the possibility that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were sIM-

pathetic to at least part of the Article II analysis. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
307. Linda Greenhouse notes that for "Justice O'Connor, the broadly worded Rehnquist opinion may have violated her rule that the court should decide cases on the most narrow ground

possible. The holding of the per curiam was as narrow as possible, 'limited to the present circumstances,' it said." Greenhouse, supra note 5. While Greenhouse might be correct that this was

Justice O'Connor's reasoning, it is important to set out two clarifications. First, the claim seems
to confuse the proposition that a case should be resolved on the narrowest grounds with the
proposition that a case holding should be limited to present circumstances. Though Justice
O'Connor's opinions may be more fact sensitive than those of some Justices, she does not always
refrain from announcing a holding unambiguously applicable in other cases. See, e.g., Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) C(W]e hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of
Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Second, there is an important dis-

tinction between resolving a unidimensional case on the narrowest possible ground and resolving
a multidimensional case on only one ground rather than two. Even if Justice O'Connor prefers

not to consider issues that need not be addressed given her resolution of other issues, that does
not explain why she would prefer the equal protection analysis over the Article 11 analysis.
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their votes would not make a difference, with five of nine Justices
still believing there to be no such violation.
These assumptions allow us to identify the central anomaly
of Bush v. Gore, which we contend may have caused the concurring
Justices to embrace a position with which they disagreed on the
merits. As the discussion of Bakke reveals, adding a second issue
dimension in a case does not itself prevent a Condorcet-winning
opinion from emerging. But comparing Tables 4 and 5 reveals a
critical difference between the relationships between and among
the opinions in Bakke on the one hand, and in Bush v. Gore on the
other. Table 4 shows that in a case such as Bakke, characterized by
the two features of multidimensionality and symmetry-meaning
that opposite issue resolutions of identified dispositive issues produce opposite judgments-the opinion that affords each of the other
two principal opinions a partial victory with respect to the resolution of one issue will emerge as a dominant second choice. Thus,
when these two characteristic features are present, unlimited binary comparisons by majority rule over the packaged resolutions of
identified dispositive issues coupled with a judgment does not yield
a collective intransitivity.
Now let us compare Bush v. Gore. Table 5 reveals unique
characteristics that belie a claim of symmetry. As a result, this case
generates a possible set of cyclical preferences by unlimited majority rule over the packaged resolutions of dispositive issues coupled
with a judgment that each box represents. The anomaly arises because the identified dispositive issues are disjunctive. Following the
internal consistency assumption, a Justice can vote to overrule the
Florida Supreme Court if he 'or she finds that the ruling violates
either Article II or equal protection. But a Justice can vote to affirm
the Florida Supreme Court ruling only if he or she finds a violation
of neither Article II nor equal protection. The anomaly arises because the two opposite sets of resolutions of identified dispositive
issues-the lower court ruling violates Article II but not equal protection or the lower court ruling violates equal protection but not
Article II-both lead to the same judgment, namely to reverse. In
contrast, from the perspective of either camp A or C, a favorable
resolution of one of the two identified dispositive issues-finding no
Article II violation (favoring the O'Connor camp) and no violation of
equal protection camp (favoring the Rehnquist camp)-produces the
opposite judgment, namely to affirm.
In a case of lesser magnitude, we might well imagine the
Justices possessing rank orderings over the remaining alternatives
that would generate either of the following intransitive preference

20011

BEYOND COUNTING VOTES

1931

orderings: ABC, BCA, CAB or CBA, BAC, ACB. The unique characteristic of these preference orderings is that in each case, one of the
camps favoring reversal ranks second the opinion closer on the rationale but opposite on the judgment and third the opinion that is
farther on the rationale while reaching the same judgment. The
other camp does just the opposite. There is no reason to assume, a
priori, that a Justice should necessarily care more about achieving
a common resolution on an important doctrine, even if doing so
yields an opposite judgment, or more about achieving the same
judgment, even if doing so requires sacrificing her preferred resolution on both identified dispositive issues. And that is precisely our
point. Under these fairly unusual conditions, there simply is no
available decision-making rule-like the Marks rule in a unidimensional context 308-with which to identify a dominant second choice,
or Condorcet winner. And that is because given this set of preference configurations, it is possible to devise ordinal rankings for
which no Condorcet winner is available. Instead, the Court employs
its outcome voting rule, which allows the majority vote on the
judgment to control, even if the result is to produce a judgment in
tension with majority resolutions of identified dispositive issues. 3 9
While this set of conditions is unusual, it is not unique.
Scholars have surveyed such cases and proposed a variety of solutions to avoid the perceived problem of a judgment that is at odds
with the majority resolutions of each issue logically necessary to
produce it.310 Others have defended the outcome voting rule against
these proposals, claiming that the alternative approach elevates
issues over outcomes, 311 or that a regime that rested primarily on

308. The same analysis that applies in a unidimensional case applies in a multidimensional
symmetrical preference case. See STEARNS, supra note 250, at 75-77.
309. For an analysis of the relationship between outcome voting and the narrowest grounds
rule, see id. at 99-156, which presents the rules as complementary, with outcome voting ensuring
an outcome in all but three-judgment cases, and the narrowest grounds rule ensuring in a fractured panel case that if an opinion consistent with the outcome represents a Condorcet winner, it
will express the Court's holding.
310. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1, 56-59 (1993) (proposing that the Supreme Court elect
issue or outcome voting in each case by majority rule); David G.Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues
and Outcomes, Guidance and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (1996) (offering a "stopping rule" in response to challenges that their
proposed issue voting rule would be indeterminate); David G.Post & Steven C. Salop. Rowing
Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Afultijudge Panels,80 GEO. L.J. 743, 770.72 (1992)
(proposing that the Supreme Court should switch to issue voting).
311. See John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to
Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1021.25 (1996) (arguing against issue voting
proposals on grounds that they would increase the problem of doctrinal indeterminacy and undermine the integrity of rule of law); John M. Rogers, "IVote This Way Because I'm Wrong:"The
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issue voting would generate a kind of strategic behavior among the
Justices in identifying what the dispositive issues are. 312 While it is
beyond the scope of this Article to review, let alone resolve, these
debates, we contend that Bush v. Gore does provide an important
datum in support of the outcome voting rule. Specifically, it reveals
one important constraining effect such a rule places on judicial behavior by encouraging not only principled-meaning nonstrategic-articulation of issues, 313 but also principled resolution of
issues.
To demonstrate, we begin with an observation from the
unidimensional model. Recall that in a potentially fractured panel
decision resting along a single normative issue dimension, 314 the
additional value of attaching stare decisis to an opinion that represents even a partial move from the status quo toward the ideal
point of those embracing more extreme views creates an opportunity for gains from trade with the median Justice. If the median
Justice is willing to move slightly off his or her ideal point, and if
one of the camps embracing a more extreme view is willing to move
toward the median position, then the two groups can improve their
overall position by securing a majority precedent. For the median
Justice, this elevates the status of the opinion that he or she would
otherwise issue from one that merely states the holding to one that
does so with stare decisis effect. For those who form a majority coalition with the median Justice, this secures a precedent that, although not moving doctrine to their ideal point, at least moves it in
a favorable direction.
One might well imagine that the introduction of a second
dimension, and a combination of preferences that results in a voting
anomaly characterized by asymmetry, would also provide an oppor-

Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439, 459-74 (1991) (criticizing vote switch by
Justice White in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), inter alia on the ground that
doing so elevates issue resolutions over outcome resolutions).
312. See Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes PrincipledIssue Identification:
A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1062-65 (1996) (arguing
against issue voting proposals based upon insights drawn from social choice and demonstrating
that outcome voting promotes principled identification of issues); see also STEARNS, supra note
250, at 99-124 (comparing issue and outcome voting regimes).
313. See STEARNS, supra note 250, at 122-24 (explaining how outcome, as opposed to issue,
voting promotes principled issue identification).
314. The same analysis that applies along a single dimension also applies in a multidimensional case with symmetrical preferences. Gains from trade arise because either camp that is not
a Condorcet winner can gain by enhancing the stare decisis value of the Condorcet winning opinion and by encouraging a move in their direction on the point of disagreement with the author of
that opinion.
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tunity for gains from trade. To evaluate this seemingly plausible
supposition, it is important to consider, from the perspective of each
camp in Table 5, whether a move to the position of the other camps
in exchange for producing a majority precedent places them in a
more favorable position. Because this stylized depiction of Bush v.
Gore represents a paradigm, our observations about the limits on
strategic behavior that such a case presents can be fully generalized to cases characterized by multidimensionality and asymmetry.
After revealing the limits on strategic behavior, we can identify the
narrow set of conditions under which such a gain from trade is
plausible and show why those conditions appear not to have been
met in Bush v. Gore.
Table 5 reveals that the Justices in camp A-Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas-confront three possible choices. First, they can
issue an opinion concurring in the judgment that rests solely on
Article II grounds. Assuming that the other two camps-B and Cdo not reach a compromise producing a majority opinion for the opposite result, 15 this strategy would likely produce a fractured panel
decision in which two separate camps provide opposite rationales in
support of a judgment to reverse. Second, the Justices in camp A
can concede on the point of disagreement with the dissenting Justices in camp B-Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg-thus elevating the dissenting opinion to majority status. For two reasons,
we would suggest that in most but not all cases of this type, such an
exchange is implausible. First, from the perspective of the Justices
in camp A, it would change the disposition from a desired reversal
to an affirmance. Second, it would provide a single rationale consistent with the judgment to reverse, and thus a precedent opposite
their preferred resolution of the Article II issue. Third, the Justices
in camp A can concede their point of disagreement on the equal protection issue with the members of camp C. While it appears that
this is exactly how camp A proceeded, we contend that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas did not do so to secure
gains from trade of the sort discussed above. Such an exchange appears implausible, at least if motivated by the willingness to trade
off a decision on their ideal point to secure a desired majority
precedent. Without engaging in this strategy, the members of camp
A would ensure the same judgment, namely a reversal. In addition,
by engaging in this strategy, the members of camp A would secure a

315. We will defend this assumption below. See infra text preceding note 316 (explaining why
the same analysis that applies to the Scalia camp also applies to the Breyer camp).
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majority disposition, and thus a precedent, on a point of law with
which they appeared to disagree.
The same analysis that reveals the disincentive for camp A
members to move off their ideal point also explains the disincentive
for camp C members to move off their ideal point. Conceding a point
of disagreement with the dissenters-camp B-will produce a disfavored judgment based upon a rationale with which they disagree.
Conceding a point of disagreement with those in camp A will not
change the outcome, but doing so will generate a precedent on a
point of law with which they disagree. And finally, the dissenters,
camp B, have no incentive to move off the ideal point and to embrace the positions of either camp A or camp C. This follows from
the disjunctive relationship between the issues. By staying put,
they reveal that a majority disagrees with the resolution of each
identified dispositive issue necessary to secure the opposite result.
By moving to one of the other camps, the members of camp B not
only would still face the outcome opposite that which they prefer
but also would provide a majority rationale, and thus a holding consistent with that outcome given precedential weight, on a rationale
that they expressly reject. Even if the Justices in camp B cared
more about the outcome than about the doctrine, they could not
trade with Justices in one of the other camps who care more about
doctrine than outcome, because of the first assumption above. Individual Justices could not announce an outcome for Gore based upon
the resolution of issues in a manner that favors Bush.
To summarize, unlike in the unidimensional case, 316 the Justices confronted with multidimensional and asymmetrical preferences have no incentives to move from their ideal points in an effort
to secure gains from trade. Because this holds true for the Justices
in all three camps, no camp has an incentive, as they do in the
unidimensional case, to try to reach an accommodation to avert a
successful strategic accommodation in the opposite direction between the remaining two camps. As stated above, while we have
presented this in the context of discussing Bush v. Gore, the point is
fully generalizable to this category of cases. The point, of course, is
not generalizable to every conceivable rule for resolving multidimensional, asymmetrical preferences. If the Supreme Court operated under a regime that rendered the logical progression of majority resolutions of dispositive issues-as opposed to the majority out-

316. This analysis applies as well to a multidimensional case with symmetrical preforonces.
See supra note 314.
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come vote-controlling, then there would have been an incentive to
switch votes. Setting aside the problem that this alternative regime
might affect the framing of issues, and assuming that the Justices
would still have voted consistently with the presentation of Table 4,
then this alternative regime would have produced a Gore victory.
As a result, if the Rehnquist camp cared more about the outcome of
the case than about the resolution of the equal protection issue, this
hypothetical voting regime would have given it an incentive to sign
onto the per curiam opinion. In contrast, the outcome voting rule
serves to discourage such strategic behavior. As a result, we must
now look for some other explanation of the Rehnquist camp's decision to join the equal protection analysis.
We have now provided a basic explanation for why, under
the Court's actual voting protocols, this category of case eschews
gains from trade. And yet, there are three known cases in which
one group of Justices confronted with this type of voting anomaly
acquiesced in what would have become the dissent's contrary resolution of one identified dispositive issue, with the effect of elevating
what would have been a dissent to majority status. 317 In each of
those cases producing an acknowledged "vote switch," the Justices
conceded their preferred resolution of an issue arising at one level
to secure a majority precedent on an issue arising at another.3 18 In
contrast, in those cases in which the identified dispositive issues
arise at the same level-whether procedural or substantive-the
Justices have not engaged in a vote switch.319 In such cases, Jus-

317. For an analysis of these cases, and an explanation of why the title case did not present
such a "vote switch" even though it involved a combination of a threshold and substantive issue,
and thus was conducive to a vote switch, see Stearns, supra note 289.
318. Thus, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1989), Justice White
switched votes, conceding to a contrary majority that determined that Congress intended to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, to reach the Eleventh Amendment question whether Congress has the constitutional power to do so. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279. 313-14
(1991), Justice Kennedy conceded to a contrary majority that determined that a confession was
coerced, to reach the constitutional question whether harmless error applies to the admission of
a coerced confession. And in United States v.Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), Justices Harlan and
Blackmun conceded to a contrary majority that determined that the Supreme Court had jurisdic.
tion in appeals from a conviction for abortion under a statute that applied only in the District of
Columbia, to reach the constitutional question whether the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 93 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 97-98 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). For a more
detailed discussion of these cases, see STEARNS, supra note 250, at 129-41.
319. Thus, in Kassel v. Consolidated F&eightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), neither of two
camps achieving the same judgment, but opposite resolutions of the two disjunctive issues
needed to reach that judgment, conceded to a contrary majority on either of tvwo dispositive issues needed to find a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. And in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), neither of two opposing camps
achieving the same judgment, but opposite resolutions of the two disjunctive issues needed to
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tices have no incentive to switch positions on an issue not of central
concern as a means of reaching and resolving a substantive legal
issue to produce a desired precedent. The vote switch cases reveal
that when a preliminary or gateway issue prevents a Justice from
reaching the merits of a logically subsequent substantive issue, if
the affected Justice is more concerned about how the second issue is
resolved than how the gateway issue is resolved, he might be willing to concede as needed to the contrary majority resolution on the
gateway issue to produce a desired precedent on the substantive
issue.320 But when the issues in the case arise at the same levelgateway or procedural-then it appears likely that there really is a
fundamental disagreement as to how the case issues should be
32 1
characterized and resolved.
This analysis only reinforces the conclusion that the desire
to gain advantage on one aspect of a case, such as resolution of an
issue or the outcome, cannot explain any vote switching in Bush v.

reach that judgment, conceded to a contrary majority on either of two dispositive issues needed
to uphold a statute granting the citizens of the District of Columbia citizenship status for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see STEARNS,
supra note 250, at 142-46.
320. This was the central thesis of Stearns, supra note 289, at 146-56.
321. In Stearns, supra note 289, one of us posits that that this explains all of the voting
anomaly cases under review except for the title case, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). In
that case, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy alone embraced the view that Lorelyn Penoro Miller
was unable to raise her father's equal protection challenge to a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act under which a foreign-born illegitimate child of a U.S. citizen father had to formalize his or her relationship with the father prior to reaching majority as a precondition to
obtaining citizenship, while a foreign-born illegitimate child of a U.S. citizen mother could secure
citizenship at any time without the need to formalize his or her relationship in advance with the
mother. Miller, 523 U.S. at 445-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The author offers three reasons
that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might have declined to concede this gateway issue to allow
their views on the underlying equal protection claim to control. First, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist declined to
give stare decisis effect to the structurally identical case of Union Gas, see supra note 318, in
part as a result of Justice White's vote switch. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might therefore
have taken this as a collective condemnation of the practice. Second, an independent analysis of
the standing jurisprudence of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy reveals a strong separation-ofpowers underpinning, which might have produced an independent rationale for their outcome
judgment to decline Miller citizenship. And finally, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might have
declined to switch votes due to a peculiarity of the Miller opinion, namely that the contrary majority resolution on standing was spread over four separate opinions, rather than contained in
one as was the case in each instance of a vote switch. The question addressed, as well as the
theory advanced, in the text is the flipside of that presented in the analysis of Miller. The article
on Miller considered why a vote switch did not occur even though the necessary conditions-namely two identified dispositive issues arising at different levels in the case-appeared conducive to a vote switch. Here, in contrast, we explain why there was a vote switch even though the
necessary conditions appear to have been absent, given that the underlying issues arose at the
same level in the case.

2001]

BEYOND COUNTING VOTES

1937

Gore.322 In Bush v. Gore, the disagreements between the positions
embraced by camps A and C arise at the same level; both involve
substantive constitutional challenges-one based upon Article II,
the other based upon equal protection-to the Florida Supreme
Court ruling. The case therefore did not produce conditions that
facilitate an incentive to acquiesce in the resolution of one issue to
secure a majority precedent on the other. This is borne out by the
explicit disclaimer in the per curiam opinion itself.32 If the concurring Justices were motivated to ensure a majority precedent on the
equal protection basis for striking down the Florida Supreme Court
ruling, it seems most unlikely that they would have done so by including language that effectively limits the precedential force of
that issue to the case facts. 324 In addition, the majority resolution of

322. We certainly agree that Justices sometimes vote to reinforce institutional concerns that
are not directly related to the case merits. In some cases, Justices might simply conclude that a
majority-backed precedent is preferred to a fractured panel decision producing the same judgment in which they stick to their ideal point. We have argued that this arises most typically in
cases with a single dimension or cases with two dimensions and symmetrical preferences. In
addition, even when the Court has a majority to support its judgment disposition, in certain high
profile or doctrinally significant cases, the participating Justices experience significant internal
pressure to achieve unanimity. Characteristic cases include Brown t. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Cooper u. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); and United States u. Nixon, 418 U-S. 683
(1974). This might also explain Bush v. Palm Beach County CantassingBoard, 531 U.S. 70
(2000). For an article that explores these institutional pressures and norms, see Caminker supra
note 205. And as we have noted, see supra note 318, in the three vote switch cases, one more
Justice conceded to a contrary majority their preferred resolution on a gateway issue. While
Bush v. Gore has features that resemble each of these case categories, it nonetheless remains
critically distinct. First, when there is pressure to establish a precedent or to achieve unanimity,
such pressure generally results from the need to provide a clear resolution to a contested or salient point of law. But it is difficult to maintain that Bush L). Gore generated doctrinal clarity on
the per curiam's underlying equal protection issue. If it had, there would have been little need
for a case-specific disclaimer. In addition, Bush v. Gore has a critical feature that distinguishes it
from each of the three vote switch cases. In each of those cases, the conceding Justice or Justices
acquiesced in a contrary majority's resolution of a gateway issue to elevate what would have
been a dissenting opinion to majority status. In Bush E. Gore, in contrast, even if the concurring
Justices adhered to what we maintain was their likely ideal point-finding a violation of Article
H, but not of equal protection-the judgment would have remained the same. For these reasons,
we argue that the concurring Justices likely possessed a distinct motivation from that in other
case contexts where the resulting behavior can fairly be characterized as strategic. These concurring Justices likely voted as they did to preserve the appearance of the institutional integrity of
the Supreme Court by producing a single majority-backed rationale for this vitally important
case judgment, even though the judgment was unaffected by their decision to join the per curiam's equal protection analysis and even though that decision was not intended to strengthen
the clarity of any proposition of law.
323. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
324. Indeed, Linda Greenhouse suggests that the language might have been the result of a
negotiation between the two conservative factions. See Greenhouse, supra note 5 C In language
that was perhaps the result of negotiations between the majority's two factions, the opinion
contained an unusual declaration that the principle it established was in effect a ticket for this
train only.").
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the case on equal protection grounds did not affect the precedential
status (or lack thereof) of the Court's Article II analysis. Regardless
of whether the Justices switched on the equal protection issue, the
case would produce no holding with respect to Article II. Nor can
one tell a story in which any of the other Justices might switch because of a deeper concern for one issue than another.
We are left then with a puzzle. Why did the Rehnquist
camp-camp A-sign onto the per curiam opinion, apparently conceding their preferred resolution of the equal protection issue, when
the relationships between and among the various camps is not such
as to promote any kind of ordinary strategic gain from trade? Our
answer rests in part on an observation that might appear stunningly obvious. This was, to be sure, no ordinary case. Rather, it
was one in which the importance of the outcome vote eclipsed that
of any doctrine that the case might produce. This was, of course,
well known to anyone following the case. Moreover, the case involved an election in which every stage of decision making was resolved by historically thin-and contested-margins. This was true
of the nationwide popular vote, the Florida popular vote, the immediately preceding decision of the Florida Supreme Court (4 to 3 for
Gore), and apparently it was also going to be equally close in the
opposite direction in the Supreme Court (5 to 4 for Bush). This is all
troubling enough, especially when the vote margins likely fell
within the range of counting error. 325 And while it is certainly possible that with different election rules, the candidates' strategies
would have changed this result, 326 at least the popular press tended
to claim that but for the rather odd Electoral College system, which
most regard as an historical relic, Gore would have won based upon
the popular vote. 327 Still, elections, like games, have rules, and

325. Cf., e.g., William R. Brody, The Truth About Recounts, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2000, at
A27 (arguing that the conclusion of any recount would be within the margin of error),
326. Cf. George F. Will, 'Had 'Ent All the Way!,' NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 2000, at 92, 92 (analogizing claims that Gore won the election to a claim that the Mets won Game 5 of the World Sories because they were on base more often).
327. See, e.g., National Archives and Records Administration, 2000 Presidential Election:
Popular Vote Totals, at http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/2000popres.html (last visited July 17,
2001) (indicating a popular vote differential of 540,520 votes); see also John Duchneskio &
Stephen Seplow, Gore's Vote Lead Totals 540,435, PHIL. INQ., Dec. 15, 2000, at A27 (noting inconsistencies in reporting of the popular vote differential). Indeed, a media postmortem suggests
that "despite the griping about the Supreme Court's intervention, Bush would have won Florida's electoral votes under most realistic scenarios." Another Postmortem on Florida'sDebacle,
NEWS TRIB., July 17, 2001, at B6. The author adds: "Nevertheless, his margin of victory was
smaller than the margin of error, given the problems that permeated Florida's amazingly slip.
shod voting system." Id. For one of The New York Times articles that grew out of this postmor-
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however close the popular vote, both sides understood that the election came down to the Electoral College. And the Electoral College
came down to the historically close margin in Florida. And in Florida, the margin was so close, and the result subject to claimed voting irregularities, that it gave rise to several legal contests, two of
which made it to the Supreme Court. As was the case in the Florida
Supreme Court, which favored Gore, the United States Supreme
Court was destined to come down to a split victory, favoring Bush.
It is one thing to decide a landmark case involving a presidential election by a razor thin margin. But it is another to do so
based upon a set of rationales that simple counting could disclose
not to support the judgment. 3 2 We do not imagine that the peculiar
voting anomaly in Bush v. Gore would have been the stuff of headlines, but we do think that in a case of this magnitude, the Justices
had a strong incentive to at least appear to stand behind a united
front on a single common rationale. This concern was especially
acute in a case in which the Court's legitimacy had been called into
question simply for having entered the fray. 32 The Rehnquist camp
might have reasoned that however slight the impact, presenting a
majority rationale would at least remove one quiver from the bow of
those calling the Bush v. Gore Court's legitimacy into question.
Those in the Rehnquist camp might well have believed that while
such a maneuver undermined to some extent the strength of their
own reasoning, that was a small price to pay for trying to enhance

tem, see David Barstow and Don Van Natta, Jr., Examining the Vote; How Bush Took Florida:
Mining the OverseasAbsentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at Al.
328. Indeed, a critique of Bush v. Gore that circulated widely on the Internet shortly after the
decision made such a claim in spite of the apparent strategic vote by the members of the
Rehnquist camp, albeit based upon a false premise. It emphasized, for example, that "Is]ixof the
justices (two-thirds majority) believed the hand-counts were legal and should be done," and that
"[t]he five conservative justices clearly held (and all nine justices agreed) 'that punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean,
complete way by the voter.' " Mark H. Levine, The Supreme Court Explained (Dec. 14, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). This argument is not persuasive because four of
the six Justices referred to maintained that the Florida Supreme Court's approach to the recount
violated equal protection. But absent the apparent vote switch by the Rehnquist camp, a complaint that six Justices rejected the proposition that there was an equal protection problem demanding reversal and that six Justices rejected the proposition that the Florida Supreme Court
had effected an unconstitutional change in Florida election law would have been both easy to
understand and powerful Whether or not the Justices consciously recognized the potential existence of an issue voting anomaly, they presumably would have intuitively understood the likeli.
hood of criticism of a disposition that lacks majority support for either of the two logically plausible, and agreed upon, rationales supporting a reversal And thus the anomaly helps us understand the reason that the five signatories were concerned with presenting a united front.
329. Some of this criticism was from within the Court itself. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
144 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) C'The Court was wrong to take this case.").
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the prestige associated with an imprimatur by the nation's highest
court for the person who, as a result of its decision, would be elected
the President of the United States. In this unique case, it therefore
seems probable that the Justices reached an accommodation in
spite of, rather than because of, the presence of preferences that
possessed the characteristic features of multidimensionality and
asymmetry.
Not only does the social choice analysis thus help to explain
the unique nature of the strategic accommodation by Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas, but it also helps to explain the limited scope of
the per curiam opinion that they joined. Just as it is plausible to
intuit why the Rehnquist camp joined the O'Connor camp, it is
equally plausible to imagine why the O'Connor camp might also
have agreed to include language limiting the equal protection
analysis to the case facts, assuming that the O'Connor camp did not
prefer to include a fact-specific disclaimer. 330 In addition, O'Connor
might well have agreed-whether or not explicitly-not to openly
criticize the concurring opinion's resolution of the Article II issue.
One question about the concurrence, however, still remains. Once
the Rehnquist camp signed onto the per curiam opinion, why did
these Justices not simply abandon the Article II analysis, which
was no longer necessary to the desired case disposition? After all,
the attitudinalist analysis suggests that the conservatives' resolution of the Article II issue, as distinguished from the outcome generated by the judgment, was contrary to the conservatives' federalism preferences, even if not as contrary to their preferences as the
resolution of the equal protection claim.3 3 1 The likely explanation is
that members of the Rehnquist camp felt that the Article II argument for reversing the Florida Supreme Court was more persuasive
than the equal protection argument. Their concurring opinion thus
managed both to eliminate the formal anomaly discussed above and
to signal to legal scholars and historians that there was a sound
basis (or at least a more sound basis than that presented in the per
curiam opinion) for reversal. Had the conservatives simply ignored
the Article II issue, the Article II defense of the outcome might have
been lost in the debate.
Though we do not stake a position on whether the Rehnquist
camp's decision to sign onto the per curiam opinion was justifiable
despite the conservative Justices' likely disagreement with it, it is

330. See supra note 324 (suggesting the possibility of such an agreement).
331. See supra Part III.A.
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worth emphasizing that as strategic behavior goes, the Rehnquist
camp's decision was fairly benign. As the social choice model underscores, the case would have been resolved for Bush even if the
Rehnquist camp had only concurred in the judgment. In addition,
the decision produced a relatively low risk of entrenching a precedent with which they disagreed, given their emphasis on the unique
facts of the case. The motive, moreover, was to ensure the appearance of the continued legitimacy of the Court. There are counterarguments, of course. There is a straightforward appeal to judicial
candor,3 32 and perhaps the conservatives should have been willing
to bear the criticism that no rationale supporting Bush garnered a
majority, as appears to have been the case. In any event, this
analysis of Bush v. Gore reveals how rare and constrained such opportunities for strategic behavior really are. The Court's voting
rules do not eliminate strategic behavior altogether, even in the
multidimensional/asymmetrical case. But our ability to classify
strategic behavior in such cases as reflecting two relatively unusual
situations-associated with the multiple levels problem discussed
above and associated with the desire to show a unified rationale in
Bush v. Gore itself-shows that the exception proves the rule.
D. The Three-Judgment Anomaly
The multidimensional/asymmetrical model has greatly enhanced our understanding of Bush v. Gore. First, it explained why
the Rehnquist camp joined the per curiam opinion. Second, it explained some of that opinion's most peculiar features. And yet,
while the model has brought us most of the way home, we contend
that it still fails to provide a complete account. One important question remains: Why did the per curiam authors undermine the purpose of remanding this state court case by presumptively resolving
a critical underlying state law issue? To answer this question, we
must now introduce a third social choice model, one that relies as
well upon several insights drawn from the earlier judicial politics
analyses in Part III.
It is easy to come up with arguments against including any
remand language at all, despite the Court's traditional practice of

332. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L REV. 721, 723-41
(1979) (arguing for judicial candor); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of JudicialCandor, 100 HARV.
L REV. 731, 736-50 (1987) (same). But see Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial
Candor, 73 TEX. L REv. 1307, 1395-1417 (1995) (arguing that judicial candor is not always appropriate).
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remanding state court cases. 33 First, the remand risked confusion
at a time when there was a strong need to bring a clear and final
resolution to a drawn-out election battle. 34 Since Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion, which Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined, made plain that they perceived no basis for the Florida Supreme Court to continue a recount, joining an opinion that left open
the possibility of room to maneuver threatened to weaken the otherwise clear signal in the concurrence favoring Bush. Second, the
concurring Justices' conclusion that they "would reverse," 33 5 without
mention of remand, may have been a signal that they would have
been willing to sign onto an opinion ignoring the traditional practice. Third, Justice O'Connor had signaled frustration with the results of the remand in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board at oral argument in Bush v. Gore.3 36 It soems unlikely that
she presumed that a true remand in Bush v. Gore would produce a
more satisfying result than it had in the earlier unanimous Supreme Court case. If ever there was a case for ignoring the Court's
traditional practice, Bush v. Gore was it, and the Justices might
have justified such an approach by pointing to the occasional
3 37
straight reversal of a state court opinion.
Presumably, these arguments were insufficient to induce
such a dramatic break with tradition. Nonetheless, it is puzzling
that the per curiam opinion adhered to the letter of the practice,
while flouting its spirit by effectively deciding the question of Florida law at issue, whether the safe harbor deadline was to be met at
all costs. The answer stems from the recognition that if we include

333. See supranote 136 and accompanying text.

334. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might have even cited the famous statement, in an
opinion jointly authored by them and Justice Souter, that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion).
335. See supra note 137.
336. See George W. Bush v. Al Gore, supra note 223. Justice O'Connor said:

I did not find, really, a response by the Florida Supreme Court to this court's
remand in the case a week ago. It just seemed to kind of bypass it and assume
that all those changes in deadlines were just fine, and they'd go ahead and adhere to them. And I found that troublesome.
Id.
337. The most recent case failing to include a remand in a case on review from a state court
was PaInlorev. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), in which the Court simply used the word "reversed"
in rejecting the analysis of, by coincidence, a Florida court. There is nothing in that case, however, to indicate that this choice of disposition was anything but an accident, and indeed the
Florida court interpreted the Supreme Court's action as implicitly containing a remand. See
Palmore v. Sidoti, 472 So. 2d 843, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Nonetheless, cases like this
might have furnished an argument that the Court occasionally directly reversed state court
opinions and that Bush v. Gore was a particularly appropriate case in which to do so given the
need for a clear resolution.
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the concurring Justices in the group that would prefer not to give
the Florida Supreme Court any room to maneuver on remand, then
including the remand without resolving the issue of state law
threatened to produce a judgment impasse, in which no outcome
resolution of the case garnered five votes. On this assumption,
three Justices preferred an opinion amounting to a straight reversal leaving the Florida Supreme Court no room to maneuver
(Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas); four Justices preferred a remand,
although not necessarily subject to the same mandate (O'Connor
and Kennedy in the conservative remand camp and Souter and
Breyer in the liberal remand camp); and two Justices preferred to
affirm (Stevens and Ginsburg). Assuming this to be an accurate
lineup of first-order preferences on the judgment, no judgment
would have possessed the requisite majority support.
This initial hypothesized lineup does appear somewhat uncertain. At a minimum, Justice Breyer might not have joined in the
per curiam remand given that his separate dissenting opinion did
not find a clear violation of equal protection or due process. Just as
it would have strengthened the concurring Justices' signal to rule
for a simple reversal, so too would it have strengthened Justice
Breyer's signal had he joined with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in
favor of a simple affirmance and rejected all constitutional claims.
And had Justice Breyer done so, perhaps Justice Souter would have
followed suit. Even if Souter and Breyer had joined Stevens and
Ginsburg, however, there still could have been a judgment impasse,
as there would have been only four votes for affirmance. For the
analysis to follow, it is helpful to grade the various opinions along a
single dimensional issue spectrum, based upon the effective breadth
of the judgment, rather than upon the rationale. We do so in Table
6 below.
Table 6. The Bush v. Gore Three-Judgment Anomaly
(A) Rehnquist,
Scalia,Reverse
Thomas

(C) Souter,
(B) O'Connor,
Kennedy
Breyer
Remand

(D) Stevens,
Ginsburg
Affirm

This judgment anomaly, of course, would not have been apparent from the dispositions recommended in the opinions if the
concurring Justices' statement that they "would reverse" was just a
shorthand way of saying that they "would reverse and remand" in
accordance with the typical practice. The conceptual problem, however, is precisely the same as in a pure three-judgment anomaly
case. Because there would not have been a majority of votes for any
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one opinion, the Florida Supreme Court would not have been given
guidance by a U.S. Supreme Court majority on whether there was
anything left for it to do. The respectful Supreme Court practice of
issuing a surface remand even when an opinion amounts to a
straight reversal, thus allowing the state courts technically to get
the last word, 338 does not eliminate the real problem of what the
state courts should do when it is apparent that one opinion leaves
the lower court no room to maneuver, one opinion leaves the court
some room to maneuver, and one opinion tells the court that it need
not maneuver at all for it has already avoided federal law problems.
Technically, the anomaly might properly be labeled a "mandate anomaly," rather than a "judgment anomaly." In some cases,
this might make a difference, because the narrowest grounds rule
plainly would apply when the only ambiguity is as to a case's mandate. But, in contrast with the hypothetical unidimensional
model, 339 there would be no narrowest grounds opinion in Bush v.
Gore if the Rehnquist camp preferred to resolve the case on Article
II grounds only. A reverse and remand on equal protection grounds
would not technically be any narrower than a reverse and remand
on Article II grounds, even though a reverse and remand on equal
protection grounds would be narrower than a reverse and remand
on both equal protection and Article II grounds. Instead, the choice
of mandate would turn on the legal theory justifying the reverse
and remand. And as we have previously demonstrated, when the
rationales rest along two separate dimensions, the narrowest
grounds analysis cannot be assumed to apply.
The social choice analysis of Bush v. Gore presented here
thus provides an important theoretical refinement over previous
analyses of three-judgment anomalies. The analysis reveals that a
potential three-judgment case that is nominally avoided by the Supreme Court's practice of issuing a remand upon the review of a
state court decision might then manifest itself as a multidimensional/asymmetrical case in which the Court is split over two,
rather than three, judgments. 340 This demonstrates that a rule im-

338. That is all the Florida Supreme Court eventually did with its remand, as several Justices used the opportunity to reflect back on the case. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
The court itself straightforwardly interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion as having "mandated
that any manual recount be concluded by December 12, 2000." Id. at 526. The Florida court also
declined to address the issue of what a proper "specific, uniform" standard would be, noting that
such a decision was best left to the legislature. Id.
339. See supra Part IV.B.

340. Only one of the cases in which scholars have identified a three-judgment anomaly is a
review of a state supreme court decision, and in that case, the anomaly existed because Justice
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posing an arbitrary limit on the choice set of Justices with respect
to the judgment disposition cannot avoid an underlying intransitivity with respect to their collective preferences on the mandate to
the relevant state court. In any event, for consistency and ease of
exposition, we employ the convention, in Table 6 and in the discussion to follow, of characterizing the resulting difficulty as a "judgment anomaly" in which the Rehnquist position is identified as "Re34
verse." 1
As in Table 5, we have made certain assumptions in setting
out the voting camps in Table 6. First, we plot the preferences
based upon our intuitions about the prenegotiation positions of the
various camps. Thus, we assume that those Justices in concurrence
did not initially want to issue a remand judgment and instead preferred to send a clear signal of reversal. This assumption is easy to
defend because it is entirely consistent with the separate concurring opinion that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote and that Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined. It is also more consistent than is the remand given the signal that Justice Scalia sent in his opinion accompanying the stay. 342 Second, because the per curiam opinion itself appears to have left very little room for the Florida Supreme
Court to maneuver, we assume for now that Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy favored the disposition that the Court eventually reached.
The remand box is split, with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy to
the left (closer to those in concurrence who favor a simple reversal)
and Justices Souter and Breyer to the right (closer to Stevens and
Ginsburg who favor a simple affirmance). Third, we assume that
Justices Souter and Breyer initially preferred an affirmance given
that their separate opinions find no clear constitutional violation.
And finally, consistent with their opinion and reasoning, we assume
that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg preferred to affirm without remand. Thus, the only group whose resolution deviates clearly from
their ideal point in this stylized presentation is that of the conservative Justices. Our immediate task, then, is to bolster our earlier
explanation of why these Justices signed onto an opinion allowing

Stevens would have preferred to dismiss the writ of certiorari. See infra note 343 (listing the
identified cases, including Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), which was on certiorari
from the Connecticut Supreme Court).
341. But see infra note 345 (offering a further comparison of the situation in Bush v. Gore
and in a case presenting a pure three-judgment anomaly).
342. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (granting stay and certiorari) ("It suffices to say that the issuance of the stay suggests that a majority of the Court,
while not deciding the issues presented, believe that the petitioner has a substantial probability
of success.").
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the Florida Supreme Court some room to maneuver and to clarify
why Justices O'Connor and Kennedy followed the tradition of remanding in only a formal sense.
A quick glance at Table 6 confirms the possibility that unless
one or more camps departed from their ideal points, the case could
have ended in a judgment impasse. If we assume that camps B and
C, totaling four Justices, favored some form of remand, then the
Court as a whole risked failing to produce a majority judgment disposition unless one of the more extreme camps, A or D, moved to
the center. In fact, in every known case in which the Supreme
Court was confronted with a true judgment anomaly, one or more
members from a more extreme camp acquiesced in favor of a remand to avoid this potential impasse. 343 There is literally no exception of which we are aware in which the Court issued a decision
split on the judgment, thus generating an impasse on the mandate
to the court below. It is possible to argue that should this ever occur, then the logic that underlies the narrowest grounds rule itself
might be loosened, through an assumption that the remand opinion,
although not a first-choice majority candidate and although possibly, but not necessarily, a narrowest grounds opinion, 344 was the
dominant second choice. However sound this might be as a theoretical matter, it was obviously critical to the Court as a whole, or at
least to those who favored some form of reversal, that Bush v. Gore

343. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (casting vote to
remand rather than to affirm to produce majority judgment); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S.
73, 89-90 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (casting vote to affirm, rather than to dismiss cortiorari, to produce majority judgment); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 423 (1954)
(plurality opinion) (breaking deadlock by voting to remand, rather than to reverse, consistent
with concurring opinion); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 618 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring) (breaking deadlock by voting to remand, rather than to reverse, consistent with
plurality opinion); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726-27 (1948) (plurality opinion) (observing that two concurring Justices have agreed to break deadlock by voting with plurality to remand, rather than voting to reverse); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge,
J., concurring) (switching vote to remand to allow disposition and observing that a "[s]talemate
should not prevail for any reason, however compelling, in a criminal cause or, if avoidable, in any
other"); see also STEARNS, supra note 250, at 153 (collecting cases).
344. The logic behind applying the narrowest grounds rule is both stronger and weaker than
it would be in the typical three-judgment anomaly case. On one hand, the logic is stronger, because Bush v. Gore represents a mandate, rather than a judgment, anomaly, and thus Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), dictates adherence to the narrowest grounds rule, assuming
it is possible to apply that rule. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, the logic is weaker, because many judgment anomaly cases rest along a single normative
issue dimension, and thus will present an identifiable narrowest grounds opinion. When, in
contrast, the majority favoring a remand rests upon two noncomplementary rationales, as in the
multidimensional asymmetrical case that we posit characterizes Bush v. Gore, there may simply
be no narrowest grounds opinion.

2001]

BEYOND COUNTNG VOTES

1947

not be the test case on identifying a dominant judgment when confronted with judgment ambiguity.
Let us begin the analysis with a minor puzzle. Even at the
issuance of the order to stay, Justice Scalia sent a clear signal that
a majority thought that Bush had a strong probability of success.3 5
Why would he have published such an unusual statement in such a
high profile case? One possibility is to raise the costs to the median
Justices-O'Connor and Kennedy-of defecting by publicizing that
the stay had the support of five Justices. A result in favor of Gore
would have resulted from at least one of those five going to the
other side. So viewed, this published statement might have signaled
to Justices O'Connor and Kennedy that the media would readily
detect who among those granting the stay defected in the event that
the Court's issuance of the stay backfired. Another explanation is
that, anticipating the very brief window of opportunity for negotiations from oral argument to the issuance of the final opinion, Scalia
was sending a signal of solidarity to his more moderate colleagues,
more so than a signal as to the probable outcome to the media.
Scalia might have been signaling to the marginal Justices in support of the stay that he would do what it took to secure a majority
in favor of his preferred result, even if that required some accommodation.
The moderate liberals in Bush v. Gore, Souter and Breyer,
certainly understood that they were not going to form a coalition
with Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, who stood on the opposite side
of the Court, and that their only opportunity to affirm was to sway
the moderates. But they also understood that the Court practices
favored those who initially were part of the majority coalition once
a draft opinion was circulated. 34 6 The liberal wing could also predict
that Rehnquist, if he behaved rationally, or even if he merely behaved typically when confronted with a closely divided Court in a
high profile case, would likely assign the majority opinion to
O'Connor or Kennedy to secure their continued commitment.37 The
result was to raise significantly the stakes at oral argument, which
we have shown may have become their only real opportunity to signal an alliance between the moderate conservatives and the moderate liberals. 348 Such an alliance could produce a remand that criti-

345. See supranote 342 and accompanying text.
346. See supranote 233.
347. See supranote 245 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 229-32232 (noting the limited opportunities for bargaining after assignment of the opinion, particularly in a case with a time deadline like Bush v. Gore).
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cized the Florida Supreme Court while appealing to the concerns
that Justice O'Connor might find attractive in favor of respecting
state court determinations on state law.
The question is why the moderate alliance did not prevail.
While the oral argument signaled a common basis for agreement
between the conservative moderates, O'Connor and Kennedy, and
the liberal moderates, Souter and Breyer, at the opinion stage it
quickly must have become apparent that the differences outweighed
the similarities. Souter and Breyer preferred a remand based upon
a finding that the Florida Supreme Court ruling had violated equal
protection in failing to establish consistent manual recount instructions. But if this was the constitutional problem, then it was one
that could easily have been fixed. 349 The differences between the
approach of O'Connor and Kennedy versus that of Souter and
Breyer might seem minor at first glance. Although the per curiam
opinion presumed that the Florida Supreme Court would stick by
its earlier statement that Florida law sought to take advantage of
the safe harbor, the opinion nowhere stated that the Florida Supreme Court could not refute this logic on remand. Instead of criticizing the per curiam opinion for making an assumption about Florida law, Justices Souter and Breyer might well have emphasized
that the Florida Supreme Court could conclude that Florida law
actually did not insist on taking advantage of the safe harbor.
The significance of the distinction between the two positions
becomes clear once we recall that the per curiam opinion did not
explicitly disagree with the concurring opinion's Article II analysis.
If the Florida Supreme Court actually issued an order remedying
the seemingly inconsistent recount standards, then this presumably
would have represented a change in existing state-legislated election law. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might have been willing
to find such a clear shift by the Florida Supreme Court to violate
Article II even if they were unwilling to find that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretations leading up to Bush v. Gore constituted a change in the law. Unlike an equal protection violation, an
Article II violation could not be cured with clearer standards. Pursuing the nominal remand thus likely would have produced at most
a Pyrrhic victory for the Gore camp. The nominal remand ended the
game one move shy of checkmate because to fix the equal protection

349. Indeed, after Bush v. Gore was decided, Gore's lawyers recognized that it would be
straightforward to come up with an unambiguous recount standard. See Von Drehle et al., supra
note 3.
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problem, the Florida Supreme Court would have had to declare a
new legal standard that arguably would then have contravened the
express delegation in Article II to the state legislature.
Thus, by making a presumption about state law in the per
curiam opinion,35 0 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might well have
signaled how they would resolve the case using an alternative-and
fatal-rationale if the case bounced up to the Court again. In doing
so, they afforded Gore an opportunity for a graceful exit while making the Supreme Court decision the penultimate instead of the final
step in identifying the Florida winner.35 ' This analysis explains why
the nominal remand was appealing to Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who presumably preferred a Bush victory. It also explains
why Justices Souter and Breyer, who presumably preferred a Gore
victory, decided to criticize the per curiam's approach with respect
to the safe harbor instead of pointing out that there was only a
small difference between their opinion and the per curiam's and
that the per curiam opinion did not foreclose the possibility that
Gore could seek to have the Florida Supreme Court declare that in
fact Florida law did not insist on meeting the safe harbor deadline.
The conservatives-Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomascertainly had no incentive to join a result that would generate a
remand with room for maneuverability. At a minimum, such a result suggested the possibility of a new manual recount, and thus a
potential victory for Gore. But if a remand coalition consisting of
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer did form, then Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg would have had every possible incentive to
acquiesce in that position. By insisting instead upon an affirmance,
they would have risked an impasse in the judgment. But by joining
in a remand judgment that actually facilitated a corrective order in
the Florida Supreme Court, the liberal camp could express their
skepticism regarding the equal protection analysis while still producing a result that could lead to a Gore victory. Moreover, in doing
so, they would afford Gore the prestige associated with a majority
mandate on a single rationale and judgment.
From the perspective of the conservative coalitionRehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas-the possibility that the liberal Justices might convince O'Connor and Kennedy not to conclude that
350. And recall that this presumption was consistent with, although not necessarily controlled by, the Florida Supreme Court's decision upon remand in Palm Beach County Con ,assing
Board v. Harris,772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
351. In his inaugural address, President Bush commended Gore for a contest "conducted
with spirit, and ended with grace." 'Bound Ideals That Move Us,'WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at

A23.
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the December 12 deadline was binding as a means of avoiding a
judgment impasse was likely a result to be avoided at all costs. And
the cost was not terribly high. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had
included the traditional remand, but they had not gone so faryet-as to provide that remand meaningful content. If the conservatives could strike preemptively by swallowing their pride on the
equal protection argument, and joining an opinion that nominally
remanded, while preventing a negotiation that conceivably could
result in providing content to that remand, then they would avert a
possible renewal of the recount and a possible victory for Gore. In
sum, the conservatives may have acted strategically to avert a strategic play from the other side of the Court, recognizing that the
judgment anomaly required the impasse to be resolved on one side
or the other. And since a remand, if given content, was tantamount
to a Gore victory, the safe course was a preemptive strike, joining
the remand but keeping it empty.
This analysis furnishes a complementary explanation to that
of the multidimensional model in understanding why the conservative Justices joined the per curiam opinion. Similar analysis, however, also could produce a slightly different plausible story that
makes the three-judgment anomaly even more important. Assume
that Rehnquist was insistent on a resolution tantamount to a
straight reversal and the moderate coalition initially was cohesive,
with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy favoring a full remand to the
Florida Supreme Court. In this case, the existence of the judgment
anomaly would have meant that both the conservative and the liberal Justices needed to do something to ensure a majority judgment. Presumably, as we have noted, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would have joined an opinion providing a full remand to
eliminate the judgment anomaly, and ordinarily opinion authors
will not further deviate from their ideal points once they have secured majority support. But Justices O'Connor and Kennedy might
have resisted this because of the signal that a 6-3 decision for
Gore-even in the form of a remand-might send, recognizing that
the conservative Justices were unwilling to join to achieve a unanimous opinion. In essence, the feared signal from such a voting
alignment might have become an additional concern, just as the
stare decisis weight of a case can become an additional concern in
cases fitting the unidimensional model. Thus, Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy might have moved away from their ideal points ever
so slightly in an effort instead to form a coalition with the conservative Justices. Of course, the opinions cannot tell us whether this
story is correct or whether Justices O'Connor and Kennedy pre-

2001]

BEYOND COUNTING VOTES

1951

ferred the nominal, and hollow, remand approach initially. Our
purpose, however, has not been to provide final answers but to reveal possibilities that ordinary legal analysis would miss.
V. CONCLUSION
It is commonplace in academia to become hegemonic in the
pursuit of the ideal theory. Theory is difficult to master, and having
made the investment, scholars become jealous of those who claim
that alternative methodologies are more fruitful or robust. While
this is understandable, it is also unfortunate. Models are never
"right" or "wrong"; instead they are more or less explanatory. And
even this characterization fails to capture an important point.
Theories that grow out of different disciplines often employ tools
designed to explain phenomena that the other disciplines either are
not studying or are ill-equipped to explain. It is therefore critical to
distinguish a critique of a theory with a critique of the theory's object of inquiry. Political scientists reject the "legal model" as fundamentally indeterminate. Of course there is no such thing as a
legal model, and attitudinalists are entirely correct that doctrine,
as such, does not allow lawyers to predict as well as they can, using
databases with a large number of observations which code votes
according to the Justices' attitudinal predilections, how the Supreme Court will decide any given case. Judicial politics scholars
who approach the Court from a rational choice perspective have
amply demonstrated, however, the limitations of the attitudinal
assumption of pure ideological, nonstrategic voting. New institutionalists have developed more subtle models that reveal the limited opportunities that confront Justices in anticipating or responding to the behavior of their colleagues in an effort to move doctrine
toward their ideal points. None of these theories is correct or incorrect; instead, they deploy different tools aimed at answering different questions.
Of course, traditional doctrinal approaches to law, which
have long since supplanted legal realism with a more contextual
understanding that implicitly incorporates attitudinal concerns,
provide a means that theory cannot of formulating arguments to
those who are empowered to resolve real cases. While the methodologies of political science and law remain distinct, their subjects of
inquiry have moved closer than ever before. Our own view is that
social choice provides a critical bridge between the data-driven approaches of judicial politics and the more nuanced, but less robust,
approach of law. We have proceeded inductively, using a particular,
but important, datum, namely Bush v. Gore, to make our case, and
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we have then reasoned deductively in assessing that datum using
models with general applicability in identified categories of Supreme Court decisions. Certainly political scientists can challenge
this method of proceeding on the ground that one datum does not a
theory make. But our point is not to prove the superiority of any
single theory or approach. It is instead to demonstrate that by asking different questions, and by developing different tools specifically intended to answer them, these approaches can be combined
to provide a richer and more robust understanding of cases and judicial behavior. We hope that our case study of Bush v. Gore encourages our readers to consider employing this interdisciplinary
technique in their own work.

